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Preface 
 
 
 
his book is for people who are interested in the problems connected with 
peace and with questions about how those problems relate to ways we talk 
and act in our culture. It deals with ways in which peace is related to 
practices that affect our private lives at home and our public lives throughout 
the world at large. 
There are many things we should cherish dearly and be ready to 
sacrifice a great deal for—even, at times, our lives. We should not blindly 
prefer peace at any price—especially if it is the kind of peace which may 
require us to accept injustice and oppression in order to avoid conflict and 
violence. But there are many kinds of peace besides the sort under which 
people suffer when they have been "pacified." We can conceive of peace in 
many different ways, and these differences are related to a variety of 
assumptions and practices we can adopt in our culture. This book is about 
those differences. 
Part I describes the ways in which we usually talk about peace. It 
argues that our conception is fundamentally obscure. We do not know what 
peace is and we do not know how to promote it. Part II develops an 
explanation of how peace has been obscured. It has been obscured by a 
network of beliefs and institutions in our culture. Part III critically evaluates 
some key parts of this cultural web and argues that there is an alternative 
cluster of assumptions and practices which we ought to adopt. It is a cluster 
which is intrinsically better—regardless of whatever it may imply about 
peace. Part IV argues that it happens to imply that we should think of peace 
as an activity—a practice we can cultivate at high levels of excellent 
performance. 
This book is intended for a broad audience that includes parents, 
diplomats, social scientists, lawyers, labor/business mediators, social 
activists, philosophers, military officers, educators, theologians, and 
politicians. Its style is meant to provide good reading that is illustrated with 
meaningful examples. Its arguments aim to be intellectually compelling 
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without being academic. It is not meant to be lightly breezed through in 
order to glean a few key ideas or insights, though people who read it that 
way should find themselves satisfied. It is meant to be read critically and 
reflectively and it is meant to be read as a whole. 
One notion worth reflecting on at the start is the idea that our culture 
may be hiding or obscuring peace. What does it mean to say that our culture 
has "hidden" something or "obscured" it? 
Think, for a moment, of a field agent who has been trained to scout 
land for a timber agency. In walking through the woods she can, of course, 
"miss the forest for the trees." But notice also she can "miss the trees for the 
lumber." The concepts of board footage, cord wood, and marketable lumber 
may fit into a conceptual perspective that makes her think about oaks and 
hemlocks in a distinctive way and makes her actually experience seeing the 
trees differently than you or I would—or than a landscape painter or a Druid 
would. 
To take another example, think of a marriage that has gone completely 
sour. It may be impossible for either spouse to communicate any feelings of 
love or generosity. Every issue is viewed in terms of conflict, every gesture 
is interpreted as a hostile look or a manipulative trick. Even a confession of 
guilt gets turned around. The response it yields is the thought: "Great. So 
he’s willing to admit he made a mistake. So what is he trying to make me 
take the blame for?" 
When things have reached this point, hostility hangs in the air. Every 
look, word, and gesture gets flung back in anger—regardless of how 
lovingly it was intended. The spouses have bought into a network of 
antagonizing habits, perceptions that picture the other as hostile, and 
categories that conceive of the situation in terms of opposition and conflict. 
This will obscure the true nature of any genuinely loving gesture the other 
may try to offer. 
Relations between nations can degenerate in a similar way. Before the 
nuclear bomb was invented, there was a rather straightforward way to 
resolve a situation like that. Nations that could no longer talk could go to 
war. But developments in physics, chemistry, and biology have changed 
things in a radical way and we have entered a new era. It is an era that is 
often said to require new modes of thought. And this is true. 
Modern weaponry has made warfare between superpowers a matter of 
Mutually Assured Destruction. Prior to our age, governments relied on war 
as an alternative to negotiation. When mutual consent could not resolve 
differences, military force served as the ultimate arbiter, the final sanction. 
But insofar as international conflict has become "MAD," war can no longer 
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serve this function and we do not know what can. Nations stumble and 
grope, like sports teams without referees, living in fear that a bruhaha will 
break out—one in which the playing field and the players will all be 
destroyed. And the world is becoming more mad each year. Before long a 
score more nations will find both the means and the motive to use nuclear 
weapons—as well as chemical and biological ones—to make their enemies 
face mutually assured destruction. 
There is some reason to hope that in the long run these weapons will 
prove to have been a blessing. Practically speaking, they pose enormous 
dangers, but in theory, they offer the promise of bringing an end to the wars 
that have cost humankind so dearly. They offer this promise precisely 
because they turn war into a god-like Ares who can not award any spoils to 
the victor—they make war function like an umpire who ends the game by 
making all players absolute losers. From a theoretical point of view, 
however, a problem arises: How do you play without umpires? When 
nations are in deep conflict, how can they settle their disputes without appeal 
to war? 
The easy answer is, of course, diplomacy. In point of fact, most 
international disputes have been settled this way. But traditional practices of 
diplomacy were developed in a context in which war remained the final 
court of appeal. Baron von Clausewitz, a nineteenth century military 
strategist, characterized the tightness of this connection by saying that war 
was politics carried on by other means. But it would have been just as 
accurate to say the reverse was true. Diplomacy was conceived of as "war 
carried on by other means." New practices need to be developed to deal with 
these new contexts in which war cannot be carried on at all. 
An analogy may help drive the point home. Our Anglo-Saxon legal 
system of two party advocacy is structured around courts which have police 
at their disposal. Judges can command armed officer to enforce decisions. 
Whether legal cases are decided by a judge or settled out of court (as most 
are) these armed police remain a reality that structures the ways in which 
lawyer argue and disputes get resolved. An easy way to see the significance 
of this is to simply try supposing that there were no police. Suppose judges 
had no one to send off to force people to submit to giving testimony, 
undergoing arrest, paying fines, or enduring imprisonment. What would 
happen? The whole practice of law would have to be radically restructured. 
Even the standard line "Do it or I’ll see you in court!" would have to be 
dropped—or else be used to offer an invitation instead of a threat. 
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This is something like the situation in which nations are coming to 
find themselves. It is a situation that traditional diplomacy was not designed 
to cope with and is unable to deal with effectively. 
It is an international situation which poses a very difficult task. 
Jonathan Schell’s description of it in The Fate of the Earth is somewhat 
apocalyptic but essentially correct. We find ourselves in a situation in which 
nations have to "replace the mechanism by which political decisions, 
whatever they may be, are reached. In sum, the task is nothing less than to 
reinvent politics; to reinvent the world."1 
What would such a "reinvented" world be like? How would its politics 
be performed? 
We might say that what is required is a world of "peace" governed by 
a politics of "non-violence." But what do these two terms mean? They are 
generally taken to mean simply the lack of armed or violent conflict. Poke 
the question "What is peace?" at people and about eight times out of ten they 
will reply: "It is the absence of war." It is not just the non-academic laity 
who give such a reply. As we shall see, this is the sort of definition rather 
uniformly adopted by philosophers and social scientists with professional 
interests in the question. 
But picture a born again Socrates sitting near and perking up his ears 
in response to this answer. You can imagine what he might say: 
 
This question our friend has asked you interests me greatly, and I 
am glad that you propose to answer it. I too would like to know what 
peace is, as would all, I think, who truly care to seek to live rightly. 
But I am not sure I have understood you properly. Do you mean to say 
that peace is a kind of state or relationship between people in which 
there is not war? 
Yes. 
So you define peace by saying what it is not—that is, that it is not 
war? 
Yes. 
But then you have not answered our friend’s question, it seems, 
for you have only told us what peace is not, whereas the question was: 
What is it that peace is? 
 
Most of us would find it difficult to define peace for Socrates. We 
might well have as much difficulty as the Greeks of his own day had in 
trying to define courage, piety, and justice. 
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This is not because we are dull-witted. It is because central features of 
our dominant post-Renaissance conceptual scheme radically obscure the 
nature of peace. To eliminate this obscurity we shall need to think out a 
reconstruction of our own culture, one that would fundamentally transform 
our conceptions of reason, social knowledge, and rational action—as well as 
the institutions and practices that reflect these conceptions and are reflected 
by them. 
Violence has often been used successfully to defend things worth 
cherishing. In particular, war, despite all its horrors, has on repeated 
occasions been a vehicle of justice. It has liberated the oppressed and 
secured the life and culture of peoples threatened with extinction. On our 
own continent today, war can be argued to have just these merits (though 
there is a difference of opinion, of course, as to which sides are the ones we 
should join). Is there an activity of peace which can perform these functions 
and do so more efficiently and justly than war? When? To what extent? 
Realistic answers to these sorts of questions are needed. Yet it is not 
even clear here as to what "realism" itself means. Is it a matter of being 
tough minded about what we are willing to do to others or a matter of being 
courageous about what we will make as personal sacrifices? Is it a matter of 
accepting the reality of present social norms or disciplining ourselves to deal 
effectively with long-term problems? Is it a matter of having an accurate 
picture of the way the world is or a question of sticking fast to moral values 
that let us see how it truly ought to be? 
Our concepts of realism, like our concepts of peace, are rooted in 
culture and history. They are intimately tied to ways in which we talk about 
that "little peace and quiet" sought at home, the bigger "peace in our streets" 
sought in cities, and that "peace with justice" (or "peace and freedom") 
sought around the globe. 
Our concepts of realism and peace have undergone profound changes 
before and they may do so again. "Realistic" views of family life, race 
relations, and spheres of influence have changed a great deal in the last two 
hundred years and they have not yet become stable or non-controversial. Our 
ideas of peace in these contexts have also shifted in fundamental ways. We 
no longer understand the peace of wedded bliss in the same way in which we 
did when "a man’s home was his castle." Peace in "our colonies abroad" was 
different from the kind of peace now sought in the third world. 
We need to examine our concepts of reality and peace critically and 
reflect upon them with care. Both reality and peace stand before us as open 
questions. 
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THE PEACE THAT IS A PROBLEM 
 
Part I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT MIGHT PEACE BE? 
 
Too quick a clarity can be superficial. This book seeks to contrast the 
notion of peace commonly adopted (and acted upon) with a conception of 
peace as an activity. But to speak of "the notion of peace commonly 
adopted" is already to jump ahead of ourselves. The word "peace" is used in 
a wide variety of ways that are connected with diverse assumptions and 
practices. 
Sometimes it is used as a moral category to characterize a virtue that 
people or societies may have. Just as they may be just and wise, they may 
also be law-abiding or peaceful. Sometimes it is used as a religious category 
to describe the profound state of peace that God can provide—or to name an 
aspect of the divine, as in "the Prince of Peace." Sometimes it is used as a 
scientific category in social research. There it is often thought of as a state or 
condition of a social system, a bit like the states of equilibrium that chemists 
and ecologists study. 
Also peace is sometimes employed as a vague composite idea, as a 
kind of literary theme that resonates deeply without ever achieving neat 
clarity. "Ahh Peace, eternal peace! What a mystery!" The thought of it may 
capture the imagination the way "the eternal feminine, the mystery that is 
Woman" can—and leave a writer at a loss for words. All he can say is what 
it is not. Like "Woman" when she is conceived, in Simone de Beauvoir’s 
phrase, as "the Other," peace then seems to be nothing definite in itself. It 
can be defined only as that which is not argumentative, not competitive, not 
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aggressive, and not adventurous. It is indescribably sweet and pure by virtue 
of what it lacks: violence, vigor, and power. 
Peace can be all these things and more. Our notions of it are tied, in 
the end, to the way we understand the nature of life and the meaning of 
Being itself. 
Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of this 
century, held that the meaning of Being has been radically obscured in the 
West. He thought it was wrongly conceived of as a thing or state (instead of 
as an occurrence or event). He argued that this resulted from—and 
contributed to—profound and wrenching distortions of experience which 
pervade the fabric of our language, our institutions, and our culture as a 
whole. Yet he held that a dim, glimmering grasp of the meaning of Being is 
present and comprehended by each of us in a kind of "pre-ontological 
awareness." 
At odd times, we seem to perhaps have such an awareness of peace, a 
sense of what it most truly is. It is a sense we may dimly comprehend and 
yet find it difficult to articulate. 
This peculiar kind of awareness is something for which we have only 
clues. They are clues to be found in the cracks and crannies of our language, 
in the unvisited cupboards and the neglected closets of our culture. They are 
clues a bit like eighteen minutes of blank tape or files with pages torn out, 
empty spaces which announce the absence of something—something so 
patently not there that it achieves a kind of presence in this mode of absence. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
The Obscured and the Glimmering 
 
 
 
anguage reveals. Just as a Freudian slip can tell me something about 
myself, the idiosyncrasies of our ways of talking can tip us off to basic 
features of our culture. 
The words "War and Peace" not only serve as a famous book title, 
they provide us with a common phrase. Like the minister’s pronouncement 
of "man and wife," "war and peace" trips off the tongue with an habitual 
ease. We often employ the phrase as though we were contrasting two poles 
along a single dimension—as though war and peace were symmetrical 
opposites like left and right or pain and pleasure. 
But it would be more accurate to say that we think that we think of 
them in this way. Close inspection shows that there are important 
asymmetries involved. It may be a mere accident that we habitually give 
syntactic priority or pride of place to war. (It is perhaps as uncommon to say 
"peace and war" as to say "woman and man.") But there seem to be good 
conceptual reasons why this linguistic accident should have happened. 
For instance, notice that if people say "Nations are warring" they 
affirm an all too true fact. But if people say "Nations are peaceing" they 
commit a grammatical error. 
The word "war" is used as a verb; "peace" is not. We sometimes say 
"Peace!" in an imperative tone, but here we do not use it as a genuine verb 
any more than we employ a genuine verb when we say "Into you bedroom, 
young man!" or "Upstairs!" We think of war as an activity in which people 
can purposefully engage. It is something soldiers can learn how to do. In 
contrast, we think of peace as a kind of condition or state which is achieved, 
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or simply occurs. Unlike warring, peace is not thought to be something we 
can do. 
We do, of course, speak of states of war as well as acts of war, and we 
sometimes do speak of peaceful acts. But with war, the notion of the activity 
is primary. We understand the notion of a state of war in terms of this 
activity, defining such a state as a condition in which acts of war are 
threatened or performed. But with peace, the reverse is true. We do not have 
a concept of peace as something done, and insofar as we speak of peaceful 
acts, we understand these in terms of the state of peace which they promote, 
or at least do not violate. 
This asymmetry of activity and state would seem to be connected with 
a further sort of lopsidedness in the relation between the notions of war and 
peace. The word "peace" has a broader range of contexts in which its use is 
natural and is taken to be literal. We commonly talk of wanting to be at 
peace with ourselves or to have peace in our homes or make peace with our 
employer or our maker. It is less common to speak of war in such contexts. 
When we do, the word tends to sound distinctively metaphorical. It is more 
natural to speak of being in "conflict" or "opposition" with ourselves, our 
spouses, our employers, or the divine. 
Our concept of peace seems broader than our concept of war. Peace is 
perhaps most typically thought of as a state distinguished not only by the 
absence of armed conflict between nations, but more generally by the 
absence of conflicts of all sorts—inner turmoil, confrontation, aggression, 
personal violence, hostility, and so on. This gap in the contrast between war 
and peace gets formulated in varying ways. Some people are drawn to think 
in terms of a linear continuum and degrees of peace along it. These degrees 
may vary with the intensity of the violence, opposition, or instability of the 
dynamic conflicts present. Other people are tempted to think instead in terms 
of different kinds of peace—social, personal, physical, mental, and so on. 
Another index of the asymmetry between war and peace is the 
temptation to speak of "real peace." People sometimes insist that for genuine 
peace mere absence of war does not suffice. 
It is a striking fact that a halt in warring is often little more than a 
truce nations arrange to buy time. Then they build up their military and 
prepare to either engage in armed conflict or use the threat of it to extract 
demands from opponents. It is just as remark-worthy a fact that countries 
without civil war are often plagued by injustice, oppression, and simmering 
unrest. In cases of both sorts it may be that the peace present is best 
conceived of as war-in-the-making, and not a genuine peace at all. In any 
case, defining peace as a state in which there is not war or conflict can leave 
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us with an empty feeling, a sense that something is lacking in the definition 
itself—we await the answer as to what peace is. 
But what then is the genuine thing? What is real peace in the strong 
sense of the term? 
Instead of characterizing peace as some form of absence, people often 
speak of it as a state distinguished by harmony or unity or tranquility or 
concord or something of that sort. This type of definition has an evocative 
character that makes it attractive. And it may well contain something like the 
glimmer of insight Heidegger spoke of as a "pre-ontological awareness." But 
it is a rather dim glimmer that glints in two directions. 
On the one hand, it suggests a kind of blessedness that is not in this 
world, a kind of "peace that passeth understanding." This phrase may mean 
much to mystics, but most people find it difficult to apply the idea on this 
side of the veil of tears. Still, we should not simply dismiss the notion. It has 
its roots in experiences we can share, discuss, and evaluate in relation to 
other aspects of life. It draws on experiences of states achieved in meditation 
or bumped into during everyday activities that become tinged with mystery 
or special meaning—the kind of meaning often best communicated through 
shared silence. 
On the other hand, talk of harmony, unity, and concord can suggest a 
sense of group solidarity, the bond we feel with family or the best of friends. 
Parts of such solidarity are the deep meanings which words cannot express 
but which can be mutually acknowledged in silence. After an evening of 
intense talk we sit on the porch, quietly sipping coffee... and we understand. 
We may be unable to name the resonant way in which we feel at one with 
each other, but the silent harmony into which we fall is tangible. It hangs in 
the air the way the moonlight fills a garden. 
It does no harm to wax poetic here in trying to initially name the 
nature of such harmony. We could perhaps think of it as a kind of musical 
"conchord." Or in an etymologically more correct vein, we could pun in 
French and say the pulse of this music comes from a sharing of the hearts 
that are "concoeured." This sharing may be the source of the tranquil quiet 
or resting together in unity. 
This notion of peace—the mystic’s notion of concord which is so 
often expressed in poetic terms—offers a glimmering understanding of a 
third notion, a dynamic one. Instead of thinking of peace as a state in which 
hostile conflict is absent or in which tranquil concord is present, the third 
way of understanding peace views it as an activity. What kind of activity? 
The activity of cultivating agreements. 
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Peace, in this view, is the struggle to solve concrete problems in ways 
that enable us to agree to work together in the future. It is not a quiet 
agreeable feeling that descends upon us from beyond. However, the vague 
notion of concord does capture an intuition of the third conception of peace. 
Concord brings to mind the agreements we seek in the process of practicing 
peace. It fits with the etymology of the term peace—in the Roman notion of 
pax and our concept of "pact" as an agreement. But the notion of concord 
misleadingly suggests that the goal of peace makers is a definite pact, vow, 
contract, or treaty—some final state of peace we will reach and be able to 
rest in tranquility. The reality is that what we reach is simply a further stage 
in the process. 
The result of successfully practicing peace is that we reach a point at 
which we can work together in the future—working together by dealing with 
new problems and other aspects of the original ones. The notion of 
agreement is best understood as a verb: "to agree." Agreeing is something 
we do. It is something we must continue to work at. When we get married or 
sign our first business contract we may not realize this. But we soon learn 
that marriage vows and business contracts, like all other agreements, are 
things we must work with, work on, and continue to work out—long after 
the ink has dried on the pages of the written "agreement." 
This insight is at the heart of the third way of understanding peace. In 
this view, peace is an activity of cultivating the process of agreeing—the 
agreeing that enables us to continue to work together, cultivating the process 
of agreeing. The point has been encapsulated in a motto of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation. The motto emphasizes that peace is not a state of tranquility 
we are trying to reach, but a process in which we can engage: "There is no 
way to peace; peace is the way." 
The central aim of this book is to define and elaborate this third way 
of understanding peace, "the peace that is a way," and to show that it is the 
one we should adopt. 
In some respects, the notion is rather straightforward; in other respects 
the concept is fraught with difficulties. 
We all have some familiarity with the various ways of cultivating 
agreements and we are used to hearing people who practice them referred to 
as "peace makers"—especially when the disputes they try to mediate, the 
deals they try to negotiate, or the problems they try to solve are dealt with 
successfully. (If these "peace makers" fail we may be tempted to call them 
"interfering busybodies.") 
However, when people try to articulate this notion of peace, a variety 
of problems emerge. The problems have roots that are set deep in our 
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culture. And they constantly get in the way. In the remainder of Parts I and II 
we will see how and why. 
One problem is the temptation to keep thinking in war-like terms 
when we try to express the idea of peace as an activity. A phrase like the one 
used as a title of a recent book edited by Jim Wallis, Waging Peace, may 
tempt us to "make war on war" and lead us to feel righteous hate of all self-
righteous haters. A similar thing may happen when we think about non-
violent actions often associated with pacifists and peace makers of non-
violent social action—public protest, non-cooperation, and civil 
disobedience. We may be tempted to view these as methods of struggle and 
coercion (or even "making war") that simply do not use violent weapons. 
(Gene Sharp does something like this in The Politics of Non-Violent Action.) 
Or we may even view these as "weapons of the weak" (the way Saul Alinsky 
does in Rules for Radicals). 
The net result is that our new notion of "peace" may not really differ 
very much from the traditional notion of war. It may simply differ in the way 
that "cold war" and "economic warfare" do—different weapons are used, but 
the basic structure and definitive features of the activity remain little 
different. We still have opponents in conflict who are trying to outmaneuver 
and manipulate each other in order to achieve victory. 
There is an alternative way to understand the activity of peace. We 
may think of it as a process defined not by conflicts that define oppositions 
but by problems that pose difficulties. We may think of people involved not 
as opponents seeking victory, but as participants seeking solutions. But to do 
so, we need to rethink the basic concepts of reason, social reality, and action. 
For the ones dominant in our culture today militate against the clear 
conceptualization of such a genuinely different notion of the peace that is a 
way. Indeed, even our language "militates against" this. 
The best way to see how this is so is to begin by looking at the 
concepts of peace usually employed—and the ways in which they are wed to 
other basic categories like reason, reality, and action. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Against Tranquility and Concord 
 
 
 
Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish 
but wish the things which happen as they are, and you will have a 
tranquil flow of life. 
Epictetus 
The Enchiridion # VIII 
 
In 1955 I talked with a Frenchwoman who had suffered cruelly 
during the war from lack of food and anxieties for her family, but 
now was living in a comfortable bourgeois fashion with her 
husband and son. We reviewed the misadventures of those war 
days, and then she confessed to me with great earnestness that, 
despite everything, those times had been more satisfying than the 
present. "My life is so unutterably boring nowadays!" she cried 
out. "Anything is better than to have nothing at all happen day 
after day. You know that I do not love war or want it to return. 
But at least it made me feel alive, as I have not felt alive before 
or since." 
J. Glenn Gray 
The Warriors1 
 
 
 
 C 
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ontemporary social scientists and philosophers rather uniformly define peace 
as the absence of war, armed conflict, violence or instability. They do not so 
much reject the harmony or tranquility notion of peace as ignore it. 
They tend to see it as little more than a vague and sentimental 
expression of a wistful fondness for flowers, butterflies, children, summer 
days, and symbols of peace like the olive and the dove. Furthermore, they 
have strong reasons for thinking it is unscientific, unrealistic, and—even 
worse—morally misguided. 
The notion seems unscientific because it is hard to define 
experimentally. To test if tranquil peace is present we cannot simply take a 
people’s pulses with cardiographs or take the community’s pulse with polls. 
There is no simple way to distinguish the pulse of peace from the pulse of 
lethargy. Likewise it is hard to distinguish the polled perception of genuine 
peace from that of the self-deception en masse. 
In contrast, though incidents of violence can be somewhat difficult to 
classify neatly, still, third degree burns and dead bodies are comparatively 
easy to count. It seems that fairly clear measures of the incidence of war 
could be constructed. So it seems foolish to mush about with studies of 
tranquility and harmony when we can define peace simply as the absence of 
war and get to work. We can then operationalize the concept of peace as the 
absence of fighting, measure occurrences of conflict and peace, and study 
them with the rigor that the scientific method provides. 
Such thoughts lead prominent social scientists like Kenneth Boulding 
to set aside the harmony and tranquility view. Instead, they focus on "peace 
in a narrower sense which is easier to understand, more susceptible to 
specific research, and more susceptible also to recommendations for policy," 
this narrower sense being, simply, "the concept of peace as the absence of 
war."2 
The notion of peace as tranquility and concord seems not only 
unscientific but unrealistic as well. Just as it is less "susceptible to specific 
research" it is less "susceptible also to recommendations for policy." It is 
hard to see how the at-oneness of true concord can be instituted as the aim of 
a national policy. Daily public prayer (as in Iran) or regular community 
meetings (as in China) might promote solidarity, but it seems more likely 
that concord comes, when it does, as an after-effect—as something resulting 
from concrete achievements. Like the joy of any chase, it would seem to 
come to us as we are seeking something else. 
It also seems perhaps unrealistically naive to cling to a hope that our 
biological natures fit us for life in a tranquility of harmony and concord. 
Furthermore, regardless of what the future possibilities for a world of 
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concord may be, the current state of the world may make those possibilities 
appear so remote as to be, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. With actual 
wars wreaking carnage all over and with the growing threat of 
thermonuclear war, realism seems to dictate that we inquire first into how 
we can secure a world in which the threat of war has been diminished and 
lives have been preserved—and worry later about rendering those lives 
harmonious and tranquil. 
In a critical survey of Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict 
Research, Juergen Dedring notes that this is a key reason why contemporary 
researchers define peace as they do:  
 
The traditional assumption that has been that the term 
"peace" is non-controversial in that it is the counterpart to the 
state of war; therefore, peace is defined as the absence of war. 
This conventional conception has recently been reaffirmed 
vigorously by many peace researchers who consider the 
prevention of war as the overriding task in the nuclear age.3 
 
Besides seeming unscientific and unrealistic, the concept of peace as 
tranquility and concord also seems morally misleading. The reason why is 
related to a bad feature that peace sometimes has: it can be boring. 
Tranquility suggests a lack of tension-ridden vigor that many people 
would say makes life worth living. Harmony, unity, and concord can often 
amount to little more than a lack of difference, a lack of zest, and a lack of 
vital life process and growth. Such tranquility may really be little more that 
the grave but empty peace in which the dead are said to rest. 
 
A system may be peaceable to the point of dullness. For 
instance, a family without conflict is likely also to lack many of 
the qualities we regard as desirable in family life, such as 
creativity. The problem, then, is first to identify an optimum 
degree or range of strain, and then to make certain that the system 
is strong enough to withstand it without recourse to war.4 
 
Conceived as a lack of conflict and violence, peace may simply be 
stability—and stagnation. Such stagnation is, when pushed to its extreme 
form, death itself. 
In that sense, we would want to say that peace can be a genuine evil. 
In this light, the ideal would seem to be to avoid peace and quiet enough to 
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feel fully alive and yet have enough peace and law abidingness so we do not 
get killed. We want to have optimum strain without lapsing into war. 
But perhaps we should not even add the condition that the strain of 
conflict should be kept low enough to "make certain the system is strong 
enough to withstand it without recourse to war." It seems as though there are 
not only unjust wars, there are also unjust states of peace To advocate any 
particular kind of peace is to advocate that things stay as they are, or at least 
that the currently armed and accepted government authorities remain the 
armed and accepted authorities. 
If we favor peace and oppose war, we are adopting an ideological 
position. We are committing ourselves to views about who should remain in 
power and who the legitimate authorities are. Notions of peace would seem 
to be: 
 
…inescapably bound up with the preservation of the status 
quo, or the status quo minimally adjusted. So seen war or the 
prospect or threat of war comes to be viewed as an instrument of 
promising change favoring a future condition.... The perceived 
legitimacy of war and peace, therefore, is itself an ideological 
weapon favoring one objective or the other.5 
 
It would seem that there are societies with whom we ought not to be at 
peace. They could be said to lack a morally acceptable form of peace, a 
peace free of oppressive forms of physical and social violence of a structural 
form. 
Furthermore, there is a sense in which a political system which denies 
people basic human rights or an economic system which denies them basic 
physical necessities is a system that involves a kind of violence done to 
people’s dignity or welfare. With this concern in mind, the social scientist 
Johann Galtung has introduced a distinction between "negative" and 
"positive" peace. It is a difference between peace as a mere absence of war 
and peace as this plus an absence of systematic oppression and "structural" 
violence. 
The distinction at issue here is an important one. Many people now 
make a point of emphasizing that they seek "peace with justice." But we 
should make clear that it is a distinction made within the general conception 
of peace as an absence of war. It simply separates cases of peace with 
injustice from those of peace without injustice. As Juergen Dedring puts it: 
"Galtung has not abandoned the traditional concept of peace as an absence 
of violence; rather, he proposes to refine the idea and to compliment it with a 
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theorem of a structural violence and positive peace."6 In that sense, concepts 
of "peace with justice" do not make our idea of peace itself positive. They 
simply introduce a new, compound concept that adds the positive notion of 
justice but leaves us with the original idea of peace itself as an absence of 
conflict. 
One of the things that makes such a compound idea attractive, 
however, is that it seems that there are important relationships between the 
presence of justice and the absence of violence. It may well be that justice 
serves to promote and sustain stable peace. Further, part of justice is 
generally thought to involve distinctive procedures by which disputes are 
settled. 
In particular, many people suppose that justice requires that disputes 
be settled by the rule of law rather than by appeals to force. They suppose 
that, in a just system, disagreements are resolved by principles about which 
there is a prior and more profound agreement. We may fight things out in the 
courts, but we agree to do so following due process. 
Since the notion of concord involves an element of agreement, this 
suggests that the harmony/tranquility/concord conception of peace might be 
developed and elaborated by an appeal to some notion of agreement on 
principles of just law. Peace, we might say, is the rule of just law. The 
Hebrew notion of shalom offers one version of such a notion, the liberal 
tradition of political theory (represented, for instance, in Immanuel Kant’s 
essay on "Perpetual Peace") offers another. The one bases its notion of just 
law and rightly ordered life on divine revelation, the other bases its notion 
on principles of reason. 
I do not think we should dismiss notions of peace as the rule of law, 
justice, or just law. But we must acknowledge important problems with 
them. It would seem that peace can only be the rule of law when the law is 
obeyed. If it is disobeyed, then the rule of law becomes the rule of legal 
force. When the police or military are required to enforce the law in violent 
ways, justice may still rule, but peace reigns no more. This indicates that the 
notion of peace is not strictly identical to the notion of the rule of law. You 
can have one without the other, so they can not be one and the same thing. 
Of course, if there was a way for law or justice to rule without 
enforcement, then perhaps we might formulate a notion of peace as 
something strictly identical with the rule of justice or law. This suggestion is 
worth keeping in mind. After all, it seems that in international relations 
between nuclear armed superpowers no enforcement of law is possible. It 
would seem that no appeal to force can very effectively settle disputes 
between nations whose weapons guarantee mutually assured destruction if 
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war breaks out. If one threatens to use force, then the other can threaten in 
reply—and both are left hoping that the other does not call the bluff. 
Perhaps then, we ought to search for some notions of peace as the 
unenforced rule of just law. But whether we can find any coherent notion of 
this is, of course, an open question.7 
In any case, it is clear that our common notions of justice are distinct 
from a mere absence of war. Furthermore, notions of justice are 
controversial themselves. The early Hebrew notion of justice that was 
associated with shalom will seem sexist to some and ethnocentric to others. 
Likewise, liberal theorists disagree with others and even among themselves 
as to what justice is and whether it requires equal opportunities to compete, 
equal distribution of wealth and prestige, or tolerance of different religions 
and life styles. 
It would seem that when we combine the two conceptions in some 
idea of "positive" peace, we still have two sets of questions to deal with—
questions about the presence or absence of violence and questions about the 
presence or absence of justice. So it appears, at least initially, that we would 
be wise to just say that peace as the rule of law really means peace (as the 
absence of violence) plus the rule of law. Why not admit that "peace with 
justice" is simply that, namely, peace with something else which we think of 
as justice? 
In doing so, we can separate the questions about the rightness of a 
social order from questions about its peacefulness. We can simply 
acknowledge that, considered in and of itself, "peace can be either good or 
bad."8 This still enables us to keep in mind the point behind proposals for 
notions of "positive" peace or peace as the rule of just law. We can 
distinguish cases of peace with justice from cases of peace without it. By 
doing this, we avoid confusing distinct questions. Also, we avoid thinking 
that peace itself is an inherent good. We refuse to associate it with 
tranquility, concord, harmony, unity and other pleasing terms that might lead 
us to think that the absence of conflict is always best. 
These arguments have considerable force. If the tranquility and 
concord concept is unscientific, unrealistic, and morally misleading, we 
might do well to follow contemporary philosophers and social scientists in 
rejecting it. 
Furthermore, the arguments represent lines of thought we experience 
personally as we live issues in everyday life. They are lines of thought that 
may come upon us when we pause amid time’s rhythms and reflect for a 
moment on one of the experiences that the tranquility and concord notion of 
peace evokes. There is that familiar and disturbing way in which self-doubt 
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can creep up on us, lurk about a bit, and then lurch out—leaving us shaking 
our heads in uncertainty: 
 
Perhaps The Moment in the rose garden was nothing more 
than a few minutes of alpha waves brought on by peculiar eye 
movements. Maybe it was a moment of "peace." Still, would an 
understanding of it really be of much helping settling the 
Arab/Israeli dispute? Perhaps that moment of tranquil rest had no 
more moral significance than that of a short nap... 
 
or: 
 
In that moment of mutual silence, what did I really share 
with my friend? Maybe she did not really understand. And 
perhaps such moments have their place, but I would want a 
friendship to be filled with hours of such silence? It may have 
just provided a way of deceiving ourselves, enabling us to gloss 
over profound differences we do not have the courage to face... 
 
For you and me, in ways such as these, doubts can arise about our 
experiences of harmony, tranquility and concord. The uncertainties we feel 
raise doubts about the tranquility concept’s cognitive status, its realistic 
merit, and the moral value of it as well. As the magic moment passes, and its 
charm begins to fade, we may be tempted to shake our head and "come back 
to reality." As we do, we typically forget the glimmering kind of peace as 
absence plain and simple—as the absence of conflict or violence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Peace as Absence 
 
 
 
onceptions of peace as an absence of war, aggression, violence, or 
conflict clearly have their merits. They permit clarity in scientific research, 
policy articulation, and moral deliberation. When we talk of conflict, they 
give us a kind of placeholder. It is a symbol like the zero of mathematics—a 
placeholder whose meaning lies not in something to which it points, but 
rather precisely in its not pointing to anything at all. 
If the concept of peace as a kind of "conflict zero" helps people figure 
out ways to avoid nuclear war, terrorism, or torture, then we should applaud 
their use of it. But conceptions of peace as an absence are attractive for other 
reasons as well, reasons which are suspiciously profound. The reasons 
concern dominant ways in which our culture tends to characterize 
knowledge and human nature—as well as ways in which it institutionalizes 
distinctively conflict centered views of human activity. The beliefs involved 
may seem so basic and obvious as to be beyond all reasonable doubt. Indeed, 
they may seem so obvious as to be beyond argument. We might not care if 
we can offer no justification for them because they seem to need none. That, 
in part, is what makes their apparent profundity so suspicious. 
But we can consider those sorts of reasons later. There is no need to 
leap into profundity without first considering questions of a rather 
straightforward sort—questions which raise important doubts about absence-
style definitions of peace. 
On the face of it, a very basic rule of logic seems to be violated when 
peace is defined as some kind of absence. It is a rule first formulated by 
Aristotle. It forms part of the traditional logic that serves as the nursery 
school curriculum of Western philosophical reasoning. So we should be 
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concerned when intellectually capable social scientists violate it without so 
much as a whisper of hesitation with regard to the rule. We should be taken 
a bit aback when distinguished philosophers violate it as well. 
The rule is simply that definitions should be affirmative rather than 
negative. This means that they should say what a thing is, rather than simply 
distinguish it in terms of what it is not. It is a rule we break if we define a 
woman as "an adult who is not a man" or if we define the good as "that 
which is not evil." We also violate the rule if we use a word like "lacks" or 
"absence" which introduces the negative element in disguise. We may define 
sanity as "a condition which is not mental illness" or define it as "an absence 
of mental illness," but in both cases the rule is violated. We have said only 
what sanity is not, and failed to say what it is. Someone who defines peace 
as "the absence of war" breaks this rule. 
We saw earlier that social scientists like Kenneth Boulding do just 
this. Philosophers such as Raymond Aron do as well. In his massive work, 
Peace and War, he introduces distinctions within the general concept of 
peace. But he takes the essence of peace to be "the more or less lasting 
suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units."1 He might 
just as well have defined it as a condition in "there are not" such violent 
modes of rivalry or one in which they are "absent."2 
When contemporary social scientists and philosophers violate 
Aristotle’s rule of definition, this should give us pause. But perhaps the 
thought we should pause for is that peace is an exceptional concept, one to 
which this rule does not apply. 
There is, in fact, a clearly definable class of cases in which the rule is 
not applicable. However, the rule is, in general, a very good one to follow 
and it is not clear why our definition of peace should be exempted from it. 
The most profound reason why the rule is, from a philosophical point 
of view, a good one is perhaps also the reason most readily dismissed when 
definitions are looked at from a pragmatic point of view. Philosophers have 
traditionally taken the goal of a definition to be to accurately state the 
essence of an idea—to say what a thing of the type being defined is. A 
definition which is negative rather than affirmative (in the logical sense) 
only tells us what a thing is not. It obviously fails to achieve the goal and so 
is judged fundamentally unsatisfactory. If we define the feminine as that 
which "is not strong and not rational and not masculine," then we leave it 
conceived as a vague something else, a kind of "Other" thing which we still 
do not really comprehend. 
But it sometimes does seem as though a little profundity can go a long 
way. It may be much more difficult to say what a thing is than to say what it 
  22 
is not. Health and sanity are good examples of this. It seems easier to define 
physical ailments than physical health, and the same is true—in spades—for 
the concept of sanity. When our concerns are practical, we are often readily 
satisfied with a definition that in not affirmative. For example, if we can 
easily define sanity as an absence of mental illness and find it hard to define 
it as something substantive or positive in its own right, then it is tempting 
just to adopt the negative definition and get on with the tasks at hand. 
People defend the negative definitions of peace on pragmatic grounds 
just as they defend the negative definitions of health and sanity. The 
pressures of the practical can lead us to dismiss any lingering philosophical 
misgivings and any haunting trace of personal insight. We may dismiss them 
as little more than moonlight in the rearview mirror. 
Yet there is, from a quite pragmatic point of view, a problem with 
such dismissal. Absence-style definitions can only tell us what to avoid, not 
what to seek. Medical personnel who employ such definitions are left in the 
disquieting position of literally having no idea as to how to go about 
cultivating health or sanity—apart from eliminating certain impediments to 
it. The same is true of national policy analysts concerned with peace. If they 
conceive it simply as the absence of war, then they know only what to 
prevent, not what to promote. They may know they want to stop warring, but 
they may not know what they want to start doing instead. This practical 
difficulty resembles another, a problem that each of us can experience in our 
personal lives with a kind of vague frustration. 
Picture a rainy day, a late afternoon, and a room full of kids who are 
screaming and fighting. Ma hangs up the phone, turns down the burners on 
the stove and rushes in with a touch of disoriented shock. Perhaps she 
simply shouts "Will you kids stop fighting! But, in the kind of penetrating 
near scream that can stop children in their tracks—the way "Freeze!" does in 
a kids’ game—she may simply fill the room with the intense plea: 
"Peace!...Please!" 
What happens? The kids freeze. They look at her, waiting, as if to ask: 
"What do you mean?"—and then it simply dawns on them that she objects to 
their behavior and they suppose she simply meant: "Stop it!" And then they 
start it again with a probing glance of sidelong hostility and an exploratory 
grumble, "It was his fault." And she has a harried urge to shake them and tell 
them that she does not just want them to stop fighting. She wants the 
bickering to stop. She is tired of the ill-will and hostility. She wants them to 
start doing something different, something peaceful. She seems to have a 
vague sense of what that something is. It is a sense born of experiences in 
her own childhood, quiet rainy days when family members were working 
  23 
together on shared tasks or laughing in common games. But she does not 
know how to explain. She is not alone in this. 
And perhaps there is really nothing much there to explain. That 
possibility is worth considering. Perhaps such vague intuitions rest on an 
illusion. In particular, it might be that they rest on a kind of linguistic 
illusion with which our words bewitch us. 
Two analogies will help explain this possibility. First think of an 
obsessively competitive runner who hears: "Nobody is as fast as he is." He 
hears this as a challenge and says: "Oh yeah? Well bring him on! I can beat 
anybody! That goes for Nobody as well as everybody else." This crazy 
runner has misunderstood; he has been deluded by the way he understood 
the way he understood the word "Nobody." He thinks it refers to somebody 
when in fact it does not refer at all. 
In much the same way, we use the word "nothing" as a noun, and this 
has suggested to various philosophers (who may have their own obsessions) 
that there must be something which nothing is. Our language permits us to 
pose the question: "What is nothing?"—and so it seems as though our 
language should enable us to formulate a correct answer. And many 
philosophers have been led to speak of nothing, or sometimes Nothing, as 
though it were something. Yet it is not easy to say how we should 
characterize it. As Peter Heath has noted: 
 
Nothing is an awe-inspiring and yet essentially undigested 
concept, highly esteemed by writers of a mystical or existentialist 
tendency, but by most others regarded with anxiety, nausea, or 
panic. Nobody seems to know how to deal with it (he would, of 
course) and plain persons generally are reported to have little 
difficulty in saying, seeing, hearing, and doing nothing.3 
 
Heath goes on to consider a view that many philosophers have come 
to hold, namely, that "nothing" refers to nothing at all and there is nothing to 
say about it and there is nothing that we should worry about this. It is just a 
word that functions as a kind of placeholder in our talk—the way an 
otherwise meaningless chip or slip of paper may function as a playing piece 
in a game. 
"Nothing" would seem to belong to a distinct class of terms which 
ought to be defined negatively. They provide legitimate exceptions to 
Aristotle’s rule. They are negative in their very essence. Besides "nothing", 
examples of this would include impregnable, apolitical, nonrational, and 
senseless. Such terms enable us to talk about there not being a thing or else 
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there being a condition of some thing or person in which there is a lack or 
absence of pregnability, politicality, rationality, or sense. It is possible that 
peace is, like these other concepts, an essentially negative notion. Perhaps 
the fact that we use it as a noun tricks us into thinking it stands for 
something positive and substantive—but in reality it is a placeholder 
concept, the concept of "zero conflict." 
There are three good reasons for resisting this suggestion. 
First, "peace" has no prefix like "non" or suffix like "less" to suggest 
that it is an essentially negative notion. Etymologically, the roots of the word 
tap a notion of agreement common to "pact" and "pax." If anything, this 
suggests that the harmony view of peace bears further looking into. But, of 
course, the origins of a word can have little to do with its current meaning as 
the origins of a checking deposit may have to do with the goods or services 
it is used to purchase. 
A second point is perhaps more significant. If a term’s essence has 
been properly specified, then the definition will be neither too narrow nor 
too broad. The definition of love as "an emotion which is not hate" is plainly 
unsatisfactory because it is too broad. It would include frustration, wonder, 
and a variety of other emotions which are neither hate nor love. If a term is 
negative in essence, then a negative definition of it will be able to avoid 
being too broad in this sort of way. But negative definitions of peace—
definitions of it as a kind of absence—seem too broad. 
For example, suppose that seventy or eighty percent of the nuclear 
weapons currently in existence were fired off at points around the globe and 
that the result—over a period of months or years—was the extinction of 
homo sapiens. In the remaining world, there would be no hostility or 
confrontation, no aggression and no war. Likewise, there would be no illness 
or insanity. But it would be as bizarre to call this a world of peace as it 
would be to call it healthy or sane. So definitions of peace as an absence 
appear to be too broad because they would lead us to call a glowing desert 
like that peace. 
Perhaps we simply need to narrow the definition down a bit by 
introducing some qualification. We might say, for instance, that peace is the 
stat in which people are living AND in which there is an absence of war or 
conflict. But suppose that homo sapiens survived but without culture, 
returning to a stage of animal existence without language or institutions. It 
would still be odd to accept that as an example of peace. Perhaps we should 
add further qualifications, characterizing more specifically how they must be 
living together. 
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But at this point, we begin to verge on a rather different conception of 
peace. We begin to find ourselves saying what it is that people should be 
doing instead of engaging in confrontation or aggression and the like. And at 
that point we begin to formulate a logically affirmative notion of peace. Well 
and good. But the question then is: Precisely what should we adopt as our 
conception of the essence of peace as a positively distinguishable activity? 
And once we define it thus, we no longer are conceiving peace 
primarily as an absence. The fact that peace involves an absence of war is no 
longer a central and essentially definitive feature of it. Once we get clear 
about what peace is, we can expect to find that there is an indefinite number 
of things that it is not—it will exclude war and conflict surely, but also 
prime numbers, crossword puzzle and lunar eclipses. 
A third point is best understood by first noting that while we cannot, 
Humpty Dumpty fashion, mean whatever we choose by our words, it is still 
true in an important sense that whatever meaning our words have is meaning 
we have chosen—meaning we can revise if we see fit. In the case of peace, it 
would be desirable to formulate a notion of it as a kind of activity which 
could be distinguished from war in positive ways and which would provide 
an alternative to the activity of war. In the important (and rapidly growing) 
number of contexts in which war can no longer serve its traditional function 
of settling international disputes, it is not clear what can serve this function 
when diplomacy fails. So we might be wise to choose to think of peace in 
positive terms if we can conceive of an activity which could serve that 
function. 
Of course it might be said that diplomacy should serve this function. 
When diplomacy fails, the solution is—more diplomacy. And something in 
some sense like this must be at least part of the truth. But what sort of 
diplomacy? Surely not the sorts practiced by Neville Chamberlain and Adolf 
Hitler. Would it be the kinds employed by the U.S. State Department in 
conjunction with the Pentagon and CIA or by the Kremlin in conjunction 
with the Kremlin? 
To sum up, we have reason to think that peace should not be defined 
negatively because its etymology suggests this, because its negative 
definitions turn out to be too broad, and because an affirmative definition 
might be of some practical value in dealing with the nuclear arms race. 
However, it is clear that the only really telling criticism of the absence-style 
views of peace would be one offering an alternative that was clearly 
superior. But in order to adequately formulate such an alternative it is 
necessary to consider the background assumptions which have led people to 
adopt the absence view. We need to look at the background assumptions 
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which make the peace-as-absence view attractive for suspiciously profound 
reasons—and which make it difficult to conceive of any alternative. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The Pervasive Presence: Conflict 
 
 
 
he suggestion that the peace-as-absence view is attractive for 
suspiciously profound reasons can only be explored by examining some 
fundamental features of our culture. 
We are not gods and we cannot see things whole or view them from 
the standpoint of eternity. To speak of something like "our culture" is to 
engage in a series of oversimplifications—oversimplifications which can, of 
course, be of varying use. 
For our purposes, it will help to begin by considering a rather extreme 
oversimplification which has the merits of brevity, clarity, and an element of 
familiarity: 
 
In our culture, we conceive of life in evolutionary terms as a 
competition governed by the survival of the fittest. This 
conception pervades the ways we have structure our institutions. 
Every individual and every species is thought to be in conflict 
with every other. To live is to endure, and to endure the organism 
must assimilate and grow. It must eat others and prevail over 
competitors. This is as true in human society as it is in the jungle. 
To act is to fight for a future. To live is to conflict. 
Because our culture conceives of all life activities as forms 
of conflict, this limits the way we can conceive of peace. 
Whatever peace is, surely it is at least an absence of conflict. But 
if conflict is essential to life and each life activity is a form of 
conflict, then peace—as an absence of conflict—must involve the 
absence of life activity. 
T 
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Particular forms of peace must simply be the absence of 
particular forms of life activities. The most extreme and ultimate 
form of peace would be the peace in which the dead are supposed 
to rest. 
And what is death? A nothing which is not anything, an 
essentially negative state—a state that can only be defined as an 
absence. If Life is War, and Peace is Death, then there is nothing 
to be said of peace beyond the fact that it is an absence of conflict 
and "War." Because we, in our culture, conceive of life as 
conflicting in its essence, we can only conceive of peace as an 
absence. 
 
This way of characterizing our culture greatly over emphasizes the historical 
influence that the evolutionary metaphor has actually had on our thought and 
practice. It overlooks implications that the notion of symbiosis has for 
spelling out that metaphor. It leaves out the important distinctions between 
non-violent modes of conflict (which might be said to be "peaceful" forms 
of conflict) and more physically dangerous or morally objectionable ones. It 
sketches our thought in monochromatic dullness. 
But the sketch clarifies the relation between conflict centered views of 
life and concepts of peace. If we suppose that conflict is an essential and 
ever present aspect of human activity, then we will find it difficult to 
conceive of peace as anything beyond a simple absence of conflict. For it is 
surely at least as an absence of conflict. And if conflict is essential to life, 
then to eliminate the one we must eliminate the other, leaving... nothing, 
nothing but death. So peace then at most can only be an absence of conflict. 
Limited forms of peace will simply involve limited forms of constraint of 
life—limited forms of activity we withdraw from in order to avoid the 
particular forms of conflict associated with them. 
We sometimes encounter a simple and extreme version of the conflict 
view sketched above. There are people who constantly bark that "This is a 
dog eat dog world" and who act on that assumption. But conflict centered 
views of human activity can take a variety of forms, and they can have 
intellectual grounds of a variety of types. 
One index of the prevalence of the conflict view of human nature is 
the centrality it is given in the branch of contemporary research that is 
referred to as "peace studies," "peace science," or (significantly) "conflict 
resolution." In a recent article, Walter Isaard, one of the leaders in this field, 
attempts to provide "A Definition of Peace Science" which he argues is "The 
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Queen of Social Sciences." He tries to do it by crystallizing theory in this 
field with a "step-by-step development of a broad conceptual framework." 
He introduces the very first step of theory construction in a 
remarkable way. To build a theory of peace he says: "Begin with a basic 
production subsystem, with simple conflict among two participants over the 
joint action."1 After starting by picturing the simplest and most social 
primitive interaction as a case of "simple conflict between two participants 
over the joint action," Isaard then proceeds to add various economic, 
political, and other aspects to the theory. 
From the very first, he takes conflict to be essential to the human 
activities that provide the subject matter of social sciences in general and of 
peace science (their "Queen") in particular. Issard’s work is representative. 
His assumption is not arbitrary. There are good reasons why it should seem 
plausible to suppose that conflict is an invariant feature of human activity. 
When we examine the conceptions of rationality, social knowledge 
and human action that are dominant in our culture, as well as the institutions 
which elaborate these and reflect them, we find that they provide us with a 
thick web, a whole network of conflict centered views of human life. This 
family of conceptions provides reasons for finding the absence-style 
definitions of peace attractive. To put the point differently, this family of 
conflict centered views provides profound features of our thought which 
radically obscure the nature of peace, leading us to define peace in terms of 
what it is not. 
There is not, of course, just one single set of assumptions that provide 
the conflict centered view of our culture. There are clusters of views in 
varying degrees of connection. Many share some common ancestry and have 
relations of family resemblance and familial interdependence. Ideas and 
institutions are a bit like people—in a sense, all belong to one great family. 
Still, we can (for various reasons) choose to write genealogies centered 
around the origins and interrelations of particular families. And we can 
group people or ideas and institutions in networks or family trees. 
The problem we are interested in—the obscuring of peace—gives us a 
kind of genealogical perspective. We are interested in the roots of a 
particular family of ideas and institutions—a family of conflict centered 
views. This family is extended rather than nuclear and it admits no single 
test of membership or simple definition. But it does form a reasonably clear 
focus for our study. 
In piecing together an account of this family’s characteristic features 
and forms of interdependence, we will identify a kind of genetic syndrome. 
And we will find the markings of what may be offered as a kind of diagnosis 
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of our culture, an account of how and why our culture radically obscures the 
nature of peace. There will be a fundamental symmetry between this 
diagnosis and the later constructive account aimed to eliminate the obscurity 
of peace. For in seeing how peace is systematically obscured, we will see 
what must be done if we are to eliminate this obscurity. The diagnosis 
offered in Part II shows that to formulate a conception of peace as a 
positively distinguished activity (as Part IV will attempt to do) we must 
reconstruct our conceptions of rationality, social knowledge and human 
action—and reconstruct the dominant institutions and practices of our 
culture as well. 
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THE CULTURE OF CONFLICT 
 
Part II 
 
 
 
Civilization is not an incurable disease, but it should never be 
forgotten that the English people are at present afflicted by it. 
 
Mohandas K. Gandhi1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: HOW DO WE SEE DIFFERENCES? 
 
In our culture, hostility, confrontation, violence, aggression, and war 
are common. It has been suggested, in fact, that conflict is a growth industry. 
It is surely an industry that gets plenty of press—not only because of its 
intrinsic importance and human interest but, further, because of the nature of 
our media. 
Different kinds of events take different lengths of time to happen. The 
British philosopher R. G. Collingwood argued: "If an historian had no means 
of apprehending events that occupied more than an hour, he could describe 
the burning down of a house, but not the building of a house; the 
assassination of Caesar but not his conquest of Gaul." He added: "We can 
even say to some extent what kind of differences there would be. In general, 
making things takes longer than destroying them. The shorter our standard 
time-phase for an historical event, the more our history will consist of 
destruction, catastrophes, battle, murder, and sudden death."2 The news 
media of our culture operate with a "standard time-phase" that introduces a 
bias of just this sort. 
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The increasing frequency and prominence of conflict makes ours a 
culture of conflict—in something like the sense in which it is a culture of 
cars, televisions, cancer and heart disease. But there is a further and more 
profound respect in which we live in a culture of conflict. It concerns our 
dominant world view. 
What we see depends to a considerable extent, of course, on what 
there is to be seen. But the way we see it depends largely on our assumptions 
and the way we look. Business people see not only lots of costs and benefits, 
they tend to see things as costs and benefits. Painters tend to see things as 
aesthetic objects. Scientists tend to see things as causes and effects. In our 
culture, how do we tend to see human differences—differences in plans, 
beliefs, and concerns? 
Suppose two people on the bus strike up a conversation about the U.S. 
role in Central America. One notices that the other is reading a newspaper 
editorial on U.S. militarism. The talk starts like this: 
 
Daye: You know the Soviets have a huge military 
investment in Afghanistan. 
Knight: But they have deep fears about the security of their 
borders. 
Daye: Well look, we’re concerned about the security of 
ours in Central America. And the Soviets are supplying aid to 
insurgents trying to topple governments that have safeguarded 
free enterprise and U.S. investments. 
Knight: But the CIA is supplying the same kind of aid to 
Afghani rebels. And the U.S. government has refused to allow a 
socialist government gain power in Latin America 
democratically and keep it in the same way, so socialists there 
have no real alternative except to resort to force and appeal to 
Eastern bloc countries for aid. 
 
We can imagine various ways in which the conversation might 
continue. They might, for example, start arguing about the precedent set by 
Chile or begin to squabble about the legitimacy of Castro’s Cuba. 
But suppose Daye replied by saying: "Well then, it seems that we are 
completely agree on all these points so far." Then Knight responds: "Yes. 
But what is your view of the situation in Bolivia right now?" 
If this happened, we might be very tempted to say: "What? I thought 
you were disagreeing!" It did seem as though they were having an 
"argument." But notice something. All their claims could be true together. 
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There is nothing contradictory in believing that the Soviets are aiding Latin 
Americans and the CIA is aiding Afghanis. Daye and Knight might very 
well have been discovering they were in complete accord. 
Still, because they were saying different things, it seems only natural 
to suppose they were engaged in arguing for conflicting things. 
We tend to see differences as conflicts. In our culture, we have 
assumptions and practices that commit us to conflict centered views of life. 
It is not just that we tend to see lots of conflicts around us. Because of these 
basic assumptions and practices, when we look at things we tend to see them 
that way. We tend to see whatever we look at as conflict. In that sense our 
dominant world view entrenches us in a culture of conflict. 
A wide variety of conflict related views have been proposed, 
promulgated and adopted with varying levels of commitment. We will focus 
here on central ones in the dominant currents of our culture. They concern 
things such as reason, social knowledge, and intentional action. 
These things might at first seem to have little significant bearing on 
our views about the place of conflicting human activity. But it turns out that 
it is just these sort of very basic elements in the chemistry of our civilization 
that make us prone to react to differences as oppositions and conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The Strife of Reason in Defending Claims 
(And What I Learned Near the Broccoli Dip) 
 
 
 
ne key set of conflict related assumptions concern prevailing views of 
the self, reason, feeling, meaning, and truth. These assumptions have 
historical roots that reach back through the Middle Ages to the Golden Age 
of Greece. 
The forerunners of the early Greek philosophers were called sophists. 
Sophists refined the art of verbal combat. They often worked as the Greek 
equivalents of lawyers and public relations agents. To win court cases and 
elections they employed a rhetoric for reasoning that was rich with 
metaphors of physical combat and war. 
It is a rhetoric with which we are all familiar. We often employ 
military and pugilistic terms in reasoning. We "defend positions," "counter-
attack," make "charges," offer "ripostes." We adopt "strategies" and "tactics" 
in order to "win" and emerge as "victors" in argument. We seek to "defeat 
opponents" by "outmaneuvering" them with alternative "lines of attack" and 
by "nailing" them when we spot an opening in their defense. These 
metaphors reflect a distinctive view of what reasoning is, one Aristotle long 
ago gave the label "eristic," a term whose root—eris—meant strife. 
These metaphors do not just ornament our speech. They structure our 
understanding of what a rational argument is and they guide the ways we 
reason. They are metaphors we live by. In a discussion of "Conceptual 
Metaphor in Everyday Life," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued 
this point in a forceful way: 
 
O 
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It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments 
in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see 
the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his 
positions and we defend our own. We gain or lose ground. We 
plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we 
abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we 
do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. 
Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the 
structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc—
reflects this. It is in this sense that we live by the ARGUMENT 
IS WAR metaphor in this culture; it structures the actions we 
perform in arguing.1 
 
This style of reasoning that Lakoff and Johnson focus on is perhaps 
especially prominent amongst lawyers and philosophers. Many people have 
a distaste for the more piercing forms of verbal violence. But they still 
operate with the eristic concept of reasoning; amicable combat is still 
combat. It is generally supposed that good reasoning is critical reasoning in 
the pointed sense of the term. Even if we don’t always defend our views 
against attacks, we typically suppose that we should do so and that our 
beliefs are rational only insofar as they can be given such a rational defense. 
In that sense, the eristic view of reason is dominant in our culture. 
It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the eristic style of 
reasoning is the only one with which we are familiar. Personal experience 
drove this point home for me in a rather vivid way. 
My experience involved conversation at suburban, middle class 
cocktail parties—the kind with crackers, cheese, and broccoli dip. The 
guests would generally divide up into two groups and the one I normally 
joined would typically get discussions going when someone announced a 
claim he believed. It might concern politics, sports, or economics or 
occasionally religion, modern art, or something else of importance. People 
would choose up sides and begin to argue the point. 
It was really rather like a game, and the point of the game was to win 
points and prestige. To score, people would demand precision in definitions 
and pick claims apart. They would treat each sentence like a little soldier 
sent out to the front lines to be shot down. It was supposed that each claim 
had a clear and definite meaning and it marked out a position that was either 
held or lost. Each sentence was either true—and a winner—or false. 
Part of scoring involved saving face by keeping your feelings masked. 
When pinned in a particularly untenable position, you bluffed. Feelings were 
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considered irrelevant to the logic of rational argument and, worse, betrayals 
of personal weakness. 
People would demand reasons for the claims, evidence for the 
reasons, and sources of documentation for the evidence. They would treat 
each other as quite separate and autonomous antagonists who were 
individually responsible for their own words. The disputants would concede 
a point only under severe fire and only when an honorable retreat of some 
sort was available. They would remain on the attack until their drink needed 
a refill or suppertime had arrived. It was a lot of fun. 
My problems arose when I went for the broccoli dip. Another group 
would be talking and I would try to join in. But I could not follow the 
conversation. I could understand each sentence, but I could not follow the 
discussion. 
They would start off talking about a new doctor in town, a dying 
mother, or a child reaching puberty. They would get excited about it and all 
would seem to throw in their two cents, and then they would calm down a 
bit and suddenly be off talking about something else. When I tried to 
participate, I suddenly felt like a basketball player on the wrong court—
dribbling a volleyball under the volleyball net while everyone else stared, 
nonplussed. I would query: "Just what do you mean by ‘a good doctor’ 
here?" and get puzzled expressions. I would insist: "I don’t think we’ve 
really settled the last point yet because..." and draw blank looks. So far as I 
could see, these people did not appear to be willing to rationally discuss 
things. They were simply babbling along in an irrational way. 
Two things made me draw back from this conclusion. The first was 
that these people were typically female (and the first group almost uniformly 
male). I thought of myself as liberated. I cringed in thinking that this 
experience might somehow suggest that deep down I really believed half the 
human race might be irrational. The other thing that gave me pause was this: 
these women seemed to know what they were doing. They all talked in 
concert, as though they were following rules. But what rules? 
I began to hang around the cheese and crackers and listen with care 
when women talked in this style. I came round to the following view of 
these non-eristic conversations. 
The point of them was not to win points and prestige. The point was 
to share and cultivate important information and insights. Value judgments 
were used to decide how important and relevant a point was. These value 
judgments were reflected in people’s gestures and feelings. Also, feelings 
and expressive gestures served to provide initial expressions of budding 
interests and growing understandings of how facts fit together. 
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Meaning was treated as a communal affair, something the group 
constructed or gathered and kept a sense of collectively. It was holistic and 
dynamic. People were not interested in pinning down definitions or 
dissecting them. The aim was to help ideas grow and mature by letting them 
take on a life of their own. People would use the first person plural pronoun 
to try to sum up "what we are saying"—instead of insisting on "What I 
meant when I said that." 
Truth was something cultivated and shared as it emerged in this 
cooperative process. It was not a static flag marking out a position to be 
taken by a victorious disputant. Sentences were not thought to be "simply 
true or false. People would talk about how there was "some truth" in what 
one person said and "a lot of truth" in some other remarks—and they would 
look for connections and try to build upon them. 
Furthermore, the conversationalists’ self-concepts seemed remarkably 
interdependent. People were playing fluids roles in a shared activity, rather 
than staking out their positions and guarding their flanks. They might even 
voice a view or concern of someone who had not spoken or who was not 
present because they thought it was important for that voice to be heard—
even if the view or concern was not one they themselves shared. 
There is not technical term in philosophy that neatly fits this second 
style of reasoning. For example, the style differs in important ways from the 
type of method that Socrates practiced, though it also resembles it in key 
respects. Socrates was a master of sophistry and would sometimes compete 
in the most strife-filled eristic arguments one could picture. But he often 
tried to engage in a cooperative cultivating of shared insights. He would 
engage in an open dialogue in which he tried to serve as a "midwife" who 
helped new ideas and insights through the birth process. To contrast with 
"eristic," that kind of open dialogue is sometimes called "maieutic." The 
word’s Greek root is maieusis, which means "midwifery." 
"Maieutic" will be a useful label to use here not only because it may 
suggest the idea of open Socratic dialogue but also because the birthing 
process is an excellent example of a way of dealing with human differences 
without viewing them as conflicts. A child, its mother, and her helpers are 
all engaged in an intense, painful process that deals with the most basic 
human difference of all—the separate integrity of physical bodies. Yet the 
struggle is not a fight and there are no victors. There is simply cooperative 
success or failure for all concerned. 
In some ways the maieutic style of reasoning described here 
resembles the style of ethical reasoning that psychologists like Carol 
Gilligan suggest may be characteristic of women.2 However, women often 
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excel at eristic reasoning and many men excel in maieutic reasoning. In 
general it is very difficult to generalize about any sex-related differences of 
any kind. It is unnecessary to attempt to here. The point of describing these 
two styles of cocktail party conversation is not to demonstrate facts but to 
illustrate concepts. 
The two particular groups of conversationalists provide concrete 
examples of two distinct sets of assumptions about truth, meaning, feeling’s 
relation to reason, and the individual’s relation to the community. 
The eristic view adopts the "correspondence theory" of truth. It 
supposes that truth consists in a relation of correspondence between 
individual claims (which we can dispute) and a fixed reality (which the 
claims either match or fail to fit). Further, claims are thought to be governed 
by the logician’s "law of the excluded middle." They must either be true or 
false. There is no third range of possibilities which provides alternatives. 
The maieutic view adopts an emergent version of the "coherentist theory" of 
truth. Truth is an overall characteristic of emergent networks of insights and 
perceptions of fact in their various relations. Claims are expected to be 
partially correct and incorrect rather than simply true or false. Truth is 
thought of as something emergent—something in a process of birthing and 
growth that can be nourished. Put differently, truth is thought of as 
something that can be gathered and woven together, or cultivated and 
harvested. 
The eristic style treats meaning as something that comes in atomic 
units (claims or propositions) which are attached to individual sentences by 
individual reasoners who are separately responsible for the significance they 
give to each soldierly sentence. The maieutic style views meaning as a 
communal project. Significance is viewed as an organic feature of talk—of 
talk whose sense is shared corporately by the group. The context of a 
particular speech is thought to play a prominent and crucial role in 
determining its import. The meanings of sentences and gestures are viewed 
as interdependent and holistic. They develop over time in ways analogous to 
biological processes of growth. 
On the eristic view, feeling and reason are quite disparate things. At 
its best, argument is disinterestedly unemotional—apart from a keen desire 
for victory or, perhaps, truth. Feelings are irrelevant and non-rational 
responses that obscure reasoning. On the maieutic view, feeling is viewed as 
continuous with reason. Emotions are viewed as cognitive in character. They 
are first approximations to sound moral and descriptive judgments and 
articulate insights. And they are also intrinsic elements of the expression of 
such judgments or insights once they are fully understood. (On this view, an 
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emotional detachment when offering a description of a profound truth or a 
moral dilemma is, on the face of it, evidence that one has not fully 
understood the truth or the dilemma.) 
The eristic style embodies a view of the individual reasoner as an 
atomic self, a body with a mind of its own which functions as an 
autonomous and completely independent agent with a private will seeking to 
realize personal desires such as winning points and prestige. The individual 
is the basic unit of social reality. "The community" is just a convenient 
verbal fiction used to talk about a collection or juxtaposition of such real 
individuals. The maieutic style embodies a view of the self as something 
defined in terms of the functions it serves in a communal process to which it 
is internally and organically related. The things a person means, the values 
she or he holds, and the actions that are performed are inherently communal 
in character. Individuals are related to one another in community in 
something like the way that heart and lung and brain are related to one 
another in a body. They are interdependent; their relations to one another are 
supposed to be crucially determinative of who each is. On the maieutic view, 
it would make as much sense to say that the community is a convenient 
fiction as it would to say that the "human body" is just a convenient verbal 
fiction used for clumping organs together when we talk of them 
In general, the eristic style is characterized by atomism, discreetness, 
and fixity; the maieutic style is characterized by holism, continuity, and 
emergence. 
Each style rests on a relatively coherent set of assumptions which can 
be adopted in sophisticated practices of thinking pursued with high degrees 
of excellence. Skilled lawyers and debaters can provide examples of this for 
eristic, skilled committee workers and consciousness raisers can do so for 
maieutic reasoning. We could, of course, ask which form of rationality 
seems to have the most worthy aims: Is it better to pursue points and prestige 
or share information and cultivate insights? But this way of evaluating 
the two styles does not do justice to the eristic one because it could plausibly 
be argued to be aimed most fundamentally not at individual glorification but 
at the discerning of truth. 
But truth of what kind? It would seem that what we have here are two 
distinct modes of rationality which need to be evaluated in terms of the 
plausibility of their assumptions about such things as meaning and truth. In 
Part III, we can return to a consideration of the merits of such assumptions. 
For now, let’s focus on a thread of thought in our historical traditions closely 
tied to the eristic view of reasoning but worth considering in detail on its 
own. It is a view of feeling, emotion and desire—a type of view which takes 
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these affective elements of life to be a root source of oppositions, something 
that makes conflict an essential feature of human activity. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
The Fires Inside:  
Feeling, Passion, Emotion, and Desire 
 
 
 
 fairly clear and common view of emotions is that they are irrational 
brute forces that come unbidden. We just "get" them. We get feelings that 
tear us apart, emotions that leave us torn between reason and desire, and 
passions that push at each others throats. An emotion is just a "given," a 
piece of data about ourselves which we must simply accept—passively, 
rather than actively. It is a "passion" we suffer rather than an action we 
choose. This view of emotions has been called "the myth of passions."1 It is 
a "myth" with a venerable lineage and it has had an enormous influence. 
It is one of the central views making up our culture of conflict. A brief 
history of its development will serve to clarify its key assumptions and the 
roles they play in our culture. It will also enable us to neatly locate the flaws 
in the view and to clarify the ways in which we ought to revise our 
understanding of feeling, emotion, passion, and desire. 
Part of the view originated with the Greeks. They saw sexual lust, 
pride, and anger as brute powers within a person—powers often overcoming 
his reason and leading to excesses that could twist a life in tragic ruin. The 
lust of Clytemnestra wrecks the ship of state. Oedipus is blinded by his pride 
and anger. In the Iliad, Achilles cannot bring himself to obey the wise advice 
of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Aias—advice that would have saved the life of 
his most beloved Patroklos. He acknowledges that their words seem "spoken 
after my own mind. Yet still the heart in me swells up in anger"—an anger 
that cannot be controlled.2 
The ideal for the Greeks was not, of course, lack of emotion (apathy), 
but moderation. Emotions were likened to horses that must be bridled and 
restrained by reason. They were reactions or "pathe" caused by external 
events the way a startled jump may be caused by a loud noise or sunburn 
A
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caused by solar rays. (This is the origin of the contrast between "passions" 
and "actions" and our conception of emotions as something we passively 
undergo.) The Greeks thought we were responsible for the pathe of anger in 
the same way we are responsible for the pathe of sunburn. Some people have 
thin skins and bad tempers just as some have tender skins that are easily 
burned. As individuals, we cannot help this: it is part of our heredity. But we 
can choose to build characters or suntans that inure us to the causes of anger 
and sunburn. Also we can choose to avoid situations in which they are likely 
to cause us harm. Through such deliberate choice, reason can thus gain a 
control over emotions—a control that is real though indirect. 
In early Christian thought, emotions are likewise likened to horses in 
need of bridling, the man subject to their power was likened as well to a ship 
tossed in a gale, and they were seen as the source of conflict of all sorts. 
James asks: 
 
Where do these wars and battles between yourselves first 
start? Isn’t it precisely in the desires fighting inside your own 
selves? You want something and you haven’t got it and you are 
prepared to kill. You have an ambition that you cannot satisfy; so 
you fight to get your way by force.3 
 
Unlike the Greeks, the early disciples thought that the cure for this 
was not a Reason that would moderate but the Christ who could transform 
Through Christ we could be cleansed of the dark world of sin in all its lusts 
and conflicts, for "God is light: there is no darkness in him at all... If we live 
our lives in the light, as he is in the light, we are in union with one another 
and the blood of Jesus, his Son, purifies us all from sin."4 
But there is a crucial question here which the New Testament did not 
seem to answer clearly. Can we achieve union with this light of God in this 
lifetime (through the Christ who is in our midst wherever two or more are 
gathered) or must we wait in faith and patience for a redemption after death 
and accept a fate of life in sin and conflict during the interim (because Christ 
is not of this world)? 
The first answer underlay the pacifism of the early Church and was 
taken up by later sects such as the Quakers. But the second view was 
adopted by writers such as Augustine and the founders of the medieval 
Church. 
On this second view, the emotion of pride was identified as a cardinal 
sin and emotions in general were viewed as lusts which were central to our 
condition of sin. Emotions were a kind of brute given in a double barreled 
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way. They were given, on one hand, by our carnal nature as animals. But, 
further, our lusts were grounded in that distinctly human state of original sin 
devolving upon us from Adam and Eve. 
In giving up the earlier hopes for perfection in this world, the 
proponents of this lust model of human nature conceived of human activity 
as inherently conflicting: 
 
With the passing of the hope of Christian perfection was 
coupled the vanishing of the dream of peace on earth. Swords 
had never been beaten into plowshares and never would...On our 
earthly pilgrimage we pant after peace, yet are involved in 
constant strife—with the pagan, with the heretic, with the bad 
Catholic, and even with the brother in the same household. One 
may grow weary and exclaim, "Why should I eat out my life in 
contention? I will return within myself." But even there one will 
find that the flesh lusts against the spirit. Peace will not come 
until this corruptible puts on incorruption, and then only for the 
redeemed, because hell is the perpetuation of unresolved 
conflicts. Perfect peace is reserved for heaven, where there shall 
be no hunger nor thirst nor provocation of enemies.5 
 
This view led Augustine to develop a doctrine that is now time 
honored and widely adopted, the "just war doctrine." Godly men could kill 
others in wars if their cause was righteous and they fight in moral ways. 
Indeed, in some cases, duty might require us to fight. For if conflict governs 
this life, then we must forego hope of divine order for now and seek 
whatever human forms of justice we can muster with the institutions of the 
armed state. 
Constantine tied the spiritual authority of the Church to the temporal 
power of Rome. Early Christian pacifism was forgotten and the practice of 
war was justified as a tool of a politics which was the "result of an 
agreement between imperfect men to make the best of a bad job." It was thus 
that "the influence of the dogma of original sin led many of the Church 
Fathers to conclude that political authority was a consequence of man’s 
corrupted nature, a punishment and at the same time a remedy for his sins."6 
Among the means legitimately employed by this remedying state was war—
albeit war carried on in a spirit of love and in accordance with rules and with 
the intention of righting a wrong and restoring peace. 
The influences of the doctrine of original sin and the lust model that 
went with it were long-lasting. In many religious communities traditional 
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versions of the lust model of humanity are still held in rather intact form. 
Perhaps even more importantly, this view is continuous with later, similar 
ones which have become especially widespread in our own day. After the 
intellectual revolution we associate with Copernicus and Galileo—after 
medieval theology had started burning oil and science had replaced it as the 
central moving force of our intellectual history—the lust model of humanity 
kept running like a car with a new engine. 
In some respects, the work of the eighteenth century Scottish 
philosopher David Hume provides the neatest way to pinpoint the core of 
these continuities. Impressed by the success of Newton’s science, Hume 
made a clean break with the religious tradition in his A Treatise on Human 
Nature. There he offers "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of 
reasoning into moral subjects." 
He depicts human nature as rather like a Newtonian system of bits of 
matter acting and reacting according to natural laws—only the bits are the 
"impression" and "ideas" of the mind, images that come in bundles we refer 
to as perceptions of parents, tables, and fireplaces. Book II, which provides 
the central third of the work, is a discussion of the passions, and the account 
he offers is in many ways simply a naturalized and non-pejorative version of 
the old lust model. He does not see pride as a sin, but he does see it as the 
foundation of a natural egoism that defines the self. 
Hume supposes that feelings of pride enable us to distinguish 
ourselves from the other bundles of impressions and ideas we take to be 
other persons or things. I form a concept of myself by feeling proud of the 
nice clothes, the strong father, and the big house that are mine. I am the 
being to whom these things belong. This ego or self born of pride is one that 
the Christians considered worldly and depraved but which Hume takes to be 
quite natural. 
Not only did he think it inevitable and normal, he also thought it 
essential for the development of morality. I care about other people’s 
welfare because I take pride in my reputation. The just man is one whose 
character is molded by public opinion. The paradigm of such a man is the 
just magistrate, someone whose character is formed by the public eye in 
which he acts. He is a man who seeks an approval in which he can take 
pride—and someone who is, moreover, an agent of the state which policies 
itself and employs military might. 
In general, Hume agreed with Augustine that our passions govern us. 
But he thought that this is as it should be and that we should not describe 
this human condition as a "state of sin." 
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Further, he held that to speak of a conflict between reason and passion 
(as the Greeks did) is misleading: "We speak not strictly and philosophically 
when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is and ought to 
be, only the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them."7 Reason is but the instrument of an egoistic 
self pursuing desires and avoiding objects of pain. 
Hume goes on immediately to note that "as this opinion may appear 
somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other 
considerations." In introducing these, he provides a very concise statement 
of the two central features of our common conception of emotion, "the myth 
of the passions." Using the word "passion" to refer to emotions of all sorts, 
he says: "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of 
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a 
copy of any other existence or modification."8 
By saying they are "original," he means that emotions come upon us 
unchosen as a kind of brute given that is a raw and uninterpreted bit of 
experience. On the other hand, in saying that emotions contain no 
"representative quality" he means that they do not refer to anything or 
provide us with any information. They are inherently non-cognitive. He goes 
on, in fact, to argue that they cannot conflict with reason because they are a 
different kind of thing. Reason provides knowledge, emotion does not. 
The relationship of this view to the eristic style of reasoning should be 
clear. Both view emotion as inherently non-rational. The view has an 
important place in the scheme of post-Renaissance ideas concerning science 
and action and we will look at its relations to these in the next section. 
Before going on, however, we should pause to contrast this view of emotion 
with an alternative, one that is more compatible with the maieutic 
conception of reasoning. Now that we have the "myth of the passions" neatly 
stated we can see that it is a myth. It is demonstrably false, and false in ways 
that will prove quite relevant to the central aim of this book—the task of 
conceiving peace as a positively distinguished activity. 
Emotions are neither brute givens that are passively undergone nor 
non-cognitive elements of experience. The reason is that they are 
interpretive or, as philosophers would put it, "intentional." 
Emotions typically (perhaps always) involve some bodily tingling or 
tangling of feeling with a physical immediacy. But an emotion like anger is 
not simply a buzzing of the blood and a constriction in the chest. It also 
involves an object, some person or thing we are angry at. The same is true of 
frustration, delight, love, hate, sadness, pride, envy, and fear. In each case 
the bodily feelings we have do not enter consciousness like unconnected 
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atoms bounding in a void. We are aware of them only as interpreted. We are 
aware of them only when we consciously—and, in that sense, 
"intentionally"—think of them as related to something which is their cause 
or consequence or object in some way. When we have emotions we find that 
we are always already to understand our feelings in terms of something—
however vaguely conceived—which we are sad about, proud of, frustrated 
with, fearful for, or delighted in. The judgment that some unfortunate state 
of affairs is actual or likely is not just a frequent appendage to the emotion of 
sadness or fear. Judgments are intrinsic and essential elements of the 
emotions themselves. 
Perhaps the most compelling way to appreciate this point is to note 
that it is not just emotions that are interpretive. Every sensation, perception, 
fleeting image, and bit of experience of every kind is as well. The standard 
way of explaining this point is to say that our experience of sensation would 
be blind without the conceptual interpretations that judgments provide. If we 
were given an uninterpreted and brute visual sensation we would not know 
what we were seeing. We would not see it as a piece of a book or as a white 
patch or as a corner of a rectangle or as anything at all. In that sense, we 
would see nothing, i.e., nothing in particular. 
Devoid of pre-conceptions or prior intentions, the experience would 
be devoid of significance. As soon as we experience something as one kind 
of thing rather than another, we have made some judgment of it, 
categorizing it in some way. We have interpreted it, projecting or 
"intending" some view of it. (When philosophers say that all experience is 
"intentional" in this sense they do not mean that it is carefully and 
deliberately chosen. They simply mean that it is interpreted, whether or 
purpose or by habit.) 
The same point applies to emotions. They are always intentional in the 
sense that they involve some projected interpretation of experience. This 
point has two important consequences. 
To see the first, suppose that you are feeling something, but are not 
sure what it is. This happened to me the morning I was given an oral 
examination for the defense of my dissertation. I had some jumpy flash-of-
heat here and constriction-of-muscle there sort of feelings. They were hard 
to pin down and feel clearly, let alone classify. It seemed that the might be 
anxiety and a fear of the coming interrogation or that they might, instead, be 
an eager desire to share the results of my three years of work—and perhaps 
even shine a bit. 
I thought that the orals were likely to go better if I chose the second 
interpretation, and I did. Doing that gave me sense to the feelings, organized 
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them, made them more continuous and directed. The jumpiness took form in 
the bodily gestures of jumping into an explanation. The constrictions of 
muscles were given shape and rhythm in the grasping of hands and the rising 
to an erect posture which both aided and expressed concentration on the 
issues at hand. The flashes of heat took shape as a general alertness and 
eagerness. I found myself actually having the desire to get on with the exam. 
If I had chosen to read the feelings as anxiety and fear, they would 
have gotten organized in a very different set of ways—as the jump of flight, 
the constriction of withdrawal, the flash of panic. 
For most of our feelings, we have pre-constructed interpretations with 
which to organize them, and we apply these in a habitual way. As a result we 
overlook the fact that when we have emotions we are choosing 
interpretations and making judgments about ourselves and the world. But 
once we see this is the case, a second important point emerges: emotions are 
cognitive in character and continuous with more explicit verbal reasoning. 
Suppose a door will not unlock. When I feel frustrated at the failure of 
the key, I am making a cognitive judgment just as much as when I see that a 
falling tree is breaking the branches of the bush on which it lands. I organize 
my experience in terms of judgments about what—faulty key or falling 
tree—is causing what—jammed lock or broken bush. These judgments may 
be wrong, of course. The point is that they are cognitive judgments and 
subject to critique and revision in the light of further evidence. My 
frustration with the key may be revised into anger at my housemate if I 
discover the lock is not preventing the door from opening but a bolt on the 
inside is—especially if I suppose she just thoughtlessly locked me out. But if 
I acquire more information and adopt other beliefs, then the frustration may 
be revised to jealousy (because I believe there is a man in the house with 
her) or spirited playfulness (because I think she is putting the finishing 
touches on a surprise party she is about to spring). 
The continuity of reason and emotion does not simply lie in the fact 
that judgments constitute definitive features of our emotions. The subtlety of 
feeling can be cultivated. Skill in responding to complex situations with 
complex emotions can be acquired. And for the people who acquire the 
knack of this, their emotions serve as a central and often indispensable 
vehicle of cognitive insight and judgment. 
A lawyer unable to follow out "hunches" about a case lacks a basic 
skill. A personnel officer who has no "intuitions" about people belongs in 
another line of work. These kinds of feelings about things and people can 
often go wrong—that is precisely what is meant in saying they are cognitive. 
They involve judgments that can be refined or revised. They can be adopted 
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or rejected in explicit verbal judgments. They are not exercises of some 
mystical power. They are implicit judgments with which we respond to a 
complex environment, feelings with which we think. 
Because emotions are interpretive, they are actively chosen (rather 
than merely passively undergone) and they are cognitive and continuous 
with explicit verbal reasoning (rather than non-conceptual and non-rational). 
But to say that emotions involve chosen interpretations is not to say that they 
are always the result of deliberate and responsible choice. In our culture they 
often are not. 
In fact, we commonly suppose that emotions cannot be chosen to 
voluntarily revise because we view them as "passions" that are merely 
passive reactions to our environment. But we can assume responsibility for 
our emotions and decide which to have and how to revise them. We can 
evaluate the hunches they encapsulate or the intuitive judgments they 
express. In the maieutic style of reasoning, this is done. 
It is, of course, possible to make honest errors or even dishonestly 
deceive ourselves when we choose or revise our emotions. They are clearly 
cases when choosing to interpret pre-exam feelings as eagerness is a mistake 
and I hang on to this interpretation only by lying to myself. This is an 
important kind of point to which we must later return. But now we need to 
pick up and complete the account of some other key assumptions in our 
culture of conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
A World of Fact and Preference: 
Galilean Science and Instrumental Action 
 
 
 
here are times when people seem to act without purpose, responding 
blindly with no aim or end in view. There are also times when they seem to 
act without giving thought to the efficacy of the means they adopt. They 
know that they want the kid to stop crying but they have simply not paused 
to consider carefully whether a slap and a shout will still the screams. But it 
seems that though such behavior is action it is not rational action. It seems 
as though a rational action is one in which we deliberately adopt what we 
believe is the most efficient instrument or means for causing the end we 
happen to prefer. 
This "instrumentalist" conception of a rational action is wed to a 
particular conception of knowledge—a scientific one. 
The seventeenth century saw the birth of a new view of the way the 
world is and how it is best known. We associate this view with Galileo. Our 
theories of the world have changed markedly since that Italian’s day. But 
there is a core view—a theory of what theories are—which has persisted 
and still dominates popularly held conceptions of science. It is a view of 
what science is about and how it is best done. In our science dominated 
culture, this is tantamount to saying that it gives us our view of what reality 
is and how it can be known. Though this view may have little connection 
with products of contemporary physics—or current histories and 
philosophies of science—it remains the ruling ideology of contemporary 
social science.1 It is a view that commits us to a conflict centered view of 
human activity. 
Before saying how this is so, it is worth noting how it is not so. In two 
ways, quite the opposite is true. 
First, in many contexts, the employment of an instrumentalist view of 
action leads to the prevention of violence and the amelioration of conflict. 
There is considerable truth in the motto of Salvador Hardin, the mayor in 
T 
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Isaac Asimov’s Foundation: "Violence is the last refuge of the 
incompetent." Violence is often a blind reaction, an irrational response of 
frustration and rage. Brute force is often expensive and ineffective. 
Moreover, cooperation often pays. When we look to our own interests and 
the long run, we often find it wise to suppose that each of us will benefit 
most when the interests of others are promoted. 
Second, the process of scientific research itself—at least in principle 
and in the ideal—provides one of our best models of cooperative and 
emphatically non-conflicting human activity. As the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein once noted, "Mathematicians do not fight over proofs—they 
look and see." When scientists differ in their views they do not reach for 
their pistols. They reach for their telescopes and test tubes. Scientists 
suppose that their differences of opinion simply pose shared problems that 
can be solved cooperatively by appeals to objective tests and standards that 
are independent of any individual’s will or desire. Science—understood as 
the kind of thing Galileo and Einstein did—marks an extraordinary advance 
in the methods for resolving differences of opinion. The censorship of the 
Church and the mind control of the state are set aside. Instead of reliance on 
the auto-da-fe and the power of the police, people who disagree reason 
together about public data until they discover the truth. 
But science has also provided us with a particular world view in 
which such cooperative inquiry is severely restricted in its scope. The most 
important concerns of life are left in a non-cognitive no-man’s land where 
force alone can decide. And it has provided us with an instrumentalist 
conception of action which portrays the human condition as a state of 
ineliminable, irremediable conflict. 
In the Middle Ages, nature was viewed as the creation of a purposeful 
God who designed each part of it for some end. It was compared to the Bible 
and treated as a second text of divine revelation, The Book of Nature. A 
literary, poetic language was used to describe nature in terms of alchemical 
symbols, metaphors, and analogies. The basic pattern of explanation was 
purposive or "teleological." And nature itself was believed to be structured 
in a hierarchy of values. 
For example, a plant would be described as having leaves the shape of 
a liver. Such a fact was explained by viewing it as a means God had used to 
achieve one of his goals; he used it as a sign to tell men that the plant was 
designed to cure liver disease. And plants, river deltas (which were created 
to promote civilization), and metals (like mercury which was thought to cure 
venereal disease because its sign was the same as that of the houses of ill 
repute) were all part of a wondrous organic whole which God created to 
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serve the lower needs of animals, the higher moral ends of man, and—above 
all—the divine goodness of God himself. 
Modern science developed a very different view, one in which nature 
is conceived of not as a book to be read but as a machine to be 
manipulated—an instrument to be used. It was thought that this machine 
might have been originally set in motion by God but that it has been left, in 
any case, to work itself like a wound-up clock—running on its own 
according to mechanical laws. 
Galileo’s new kind of science called for the use of a mathematical 
language to describe nature. It adopted a different basic pattern of 
explanation—one that appealed to uniform laws that made one event follow 
another through "efficient causality." And nature was viewed in completely 
value neutral terms—as an unfeeling mechanism that was entirely indifferent 
to the goodness or evil of its events. 
For example, to study the laws of motion, Galileo observed metal 
balls rolling down inclined planes. He did not note the zodiacal sign of the 
metal or the analogies between its spherical shape and the shape of the eye. 
He attended to measurable quantities rather than poetic qualities. He 
determined their weight, speed, and the angle of the incline. Then he looked 
for mathematical correlations between these quantities. He did so because he 
believed that "nature speaks mathematics." 
What he was looking for were correlations between the initial 
conditions and the subsequent ones they caused. He had adopted a new 
concept of cause. Instead of viewing later events as goal that (teleologically) 
explained why the earlier events occurred as a means, he viewed the earlier 
events as simple givens—brute facts—which explained why the later events 
occurred—later events which were blindly but "efficiently" caused. When 
other scientists began to study geography in this Galilean way, they 
supposed that the existence of river deltas was not to be explained by appeal 
to God’s goal of fostering civilization. Instead, the development of 
civilization was to be viewed as a kind of accident that the brute reality of 
river deltas helped explain. Given the existence of a delta, the increased 
probability of civilization could be predicted. 
In social science, it has turned out to be extremely difficult to develop 
predictive theories as simple and powerful as those of physics. In fact, even 
at this late date, we find distinguished social scientists like Seymour Martin 
Lipset confessing: "None of the social sciences can predict worth a damn."2 
But social scientists have not yet given up hope. Like the characters in 
Samuel Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot, they are "waiting for their 
Galileo." They labor in hopes that some genius will provide them with the 
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kind of simple but powerful explanatory theories that Galilean natural 
scientists have developed. The standard model for such a theory is Newton’s 
system of laws which explained motion and gravity. 
Its explanatory laws of efficient causality were distinguished by four 
things. First, they were laws rather than rules of thumb. They claimed to 
govern some clearly specifiable types of events universally and without 
exception. Newton’s third law claims that every "action" of one mass on 
another always yields an equal and opposite reaction. Second, they were 
causal laws in the sense that they explained what made things work. They 
did not just describe what happened to be actually true, they also explained 
what was possible and what was necessary. Third, the laws could be 
expressed in strict and unambiguous mathematical formula such as "force 
equals mass times acceleration" or "F= M x A." Fourth, they each belonged 
to a system of laws. With equations that combined them, they could be used 
to predict and explain a wide variety of things—the ways in which 
pendulums swing, tides roll, and planets sweep around the sun. 
The new, Galilean science was value neutral because it made no 
reference to purposes (divine or otherwise) in its descriptions and 
explanations. It was completely indifferent to the moral worth of the events 
it explained and the laws to which it appealed. There was no consideration 
as to whether the law of gravity was a good thing, and, if so, what it was 
good for. It was simply the law. 
Judgments of value were extraneous to the knowledge that science 
could provide. At best they were an irrelevance, at worst an encumbrance 
that biased research. Nature as known by science was a world of fact and 
law; values were simply not part of the reality studied by science. Or rather, 
if they were studied, by social scientists, they were to be treated as mere 
facts about people—facts to be causally explained. They were not taken to 
be normative truths, only truths about norms. 
For example, a Darwinian might discover what caused people to be 
sympathetic to others, but this did nothing to show us that we should be 
sympathetic or that group solidarity was a good thing. As scientists, 
researchers were observers or spectators who sought to mirror nature with 
their theories. They were not participants who made value judgments about 
reality or gained ethical knowledge from their study of it. 
The view just sketched provides the central ideology of contemporary 
working social scientists. Most working political scientists, economists, and 
sociologists seek to use experimental and statistical analysis to discover a 
simple and powerful set of mathematical functions that can explain social 
activity in terms of efficient causes. They attempt to make value neutral 
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studies of the complex mechanism of social reality and them view 
themselves as disinterested observers. 
They have attempted this not only to find out how society works but 
to learn, also, how to work it. Social science provides a central part of our 
world view, one that proposes to tells us how to punish criminals, run our 
schools, distribute health care, and bring an end to war. As an ideology, 
social science has been an enormous success, one that has laced our culture 
with a conflict centered view of life—though as a branch of research, it has 
been a rather dismal failure. 
Its Galileo has not arrived. Key terms like "status" and "power" 
continue to elude clear and unambiguous definitions that could be used to 
describe society in rigorous, mathematical terms. The quest for value neutral 
knowledge has come, increasingly, to seem like a hopelessly Quixotic 
enterprise. Above all, in terms of Galilean standards, "the social sciences are 
almost or perhaps completely devoid of achievement. For the salient fact 
about those sciences is the absence of the discovery of any law-like 
generalizations whatsoever."3 Rules of thumb and statistics that describe—
but do not explain—abound. And sociologists have invented formula 
claiming things like behavior is a function of genetics and environment, 
formula like "B = F(G+E)." But such formula are only pseudo-mathematical. 
"F" and "+" do not stand for the mathematical operations that can be 
computed algebraically. They are just a shorthand way of saying that there 
are important connections between these things. 
The one social science which might seem to be an exception, 
economics, is not—for reasons we will see in Part III. We will also see there 
why Monsieur Galileo has not arrived and cannot. But at this stage, the key 
point to note is that he has been expected, and social scientists’ expectations 
have projected a view of human life in our culture which pictures it as 
essentially conflicting in nature. 
To appreciate this, we need to consider two ways that human beings 
enter into this picture of science, as things known like other objects in nature 
and as knowers who act to pursue their ends in rational ways. 
As objects of scientific knowledge, humans are thought to be the same 
in principle, as rats and monkeys. Our behavior is to be observed, 
experimented with, and explained by mathematical theories which have the 
same sort of structure as those used to account for rodents in the lab and 
primates in the field. Our behavior is not rationally chosen, it is 
mechanically caused. Furthermore, from a scientific point of view, there is 
nothing right or wrong about what we do. There are only various facts about 
our behavior and various efficient causes and natural laws that explain them. 
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But as knowers we must view ourselves differently. Scientists demand 
that their own theories of human behavior be responsibly and rationally 
chosen in order to achieve the ends of explanation at which they aim. 
Despite the way they view their experimental "subjects," scientists are 
committed to viewing themselves as rational actors whose research is to be 
understood in terms of purposes and means employed to achieve these. 
When we attempt to apply scientific knowledge in rational actions, we are 
committed to viewing ourselves in the same way. 
The Galilean world view tells us that reality is a mechanism we must 
manipulate by intervening in series of causes that produce effects. For our 
actions to be rational, such intervention must be intentional rather than 
haphazard. The rationality of such intentions can be assessed in two ways. 
First, we can ask if it is rational to value the ends which the intervention 
intends to bring about. Second, we can ask whether the form of the 
intervention chosen is a rational (or the most rational) way of bringing about 
these intended effects. 
On the first score, science cannot tell us what our values and purposes 
should be, because it itself is supposed to be value neutral. Economists, for 
instance, emphasize that they cannot—as economists—tell us whether it 
would be better to lower inflation or raise employment. (They can only tell 
us how to do one or the other.) Such value judgments do not lie within the 
domain of scientific knowledge. There is no objective realm of the ideal to 
which they can be empirically known to correspond—the way judgments of 
fact can be shown to correspond to the realm of the real. 
Value judgments can be criticized as irrational in one very limited 
way. We can demand that they be coherent. Economists put the point by 
saying that rational actors must have "consistent sets of preferences." By this 
they mean that if you prefer A to B and prefer B to C then you should prefer 
A to C. Whether you ought to value A at all, however, is not thought to be 
something rationally decidable. 
Or, at least, it is not rationally decidable by science. It is possible, of 
course, that values may be the object of some other sort of knowledge such 
as the humanistic studies of art and history and philosophy. But do English 
professors and philosopher really know anything at all? It is not clear. Their 
intuitions and arguments are notoriously controversial. Disquiet about such 
lack of consensus has led many humanists themselves to emulate the 
methods of natural science in order to reach toward some sort of objectivity. 
In the process, such humanists typically seek to achieve a value neutrality in 
their work analogous to the scientists’. But this kind of value neutrality then 
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disqualifies them from providing precisely the kind of knowledge that would 
fill the gap at issue here—the lacuna of ethical knowledge. 
The view widely advocated and which tends to prevail in practice is 
that for want of any agreed upon method for demonstrating which values are 
right we must treat values as subjective, as matters of non-rational, 
individual choice. Judgments of good and bad are considered non-cognitive 
dispositions of individuals rather than matters of fact. There is no truth about 
them which can be discovered by science or any other branch of knowledge 
with a similar legitimacy and objectivity. 
However, if we do have some values—be they what they may—
science does purport to tell us how to realize them in a rational way. It 
claims to tell us how the world works, and so it claims to tell us how the 
things we consider ideal can be made real. Knowledge is power. If we want 
some satisfying condition (SC) to occur, the laws of science tell us it will 
follow as a subsequent condition if we adopt as our instrument or means 
whatever initial conditions (IC) efficiently cause it. Often it turns out that 
there is more than one way to skin a cat. The choice of means can then itself 
be assessed rationally by using science to answer factual questions about the 
causal consequences of the means we are considering. (What are the effects 
of skinning it one way rather than another?) We can then let value judgments 
about which consequences are to be preferred get decided by our (hopefully 
consistent but otherwise non-rational) preferences. 
Insofar as we adopt the Galilean view of knowledge and reality 
sketched here, then we must suppose that rational actors will be instrumental 
actors. They will be individuals manipulating things—and other people—as 
means to their preferred ends. The extent to which such actors are more or 
less rational will depend upon the consistency of their preferences and the 
extent to which they can justify their empirical beliefs about how the world 
works and about how their chosen means will yield their preferred ends. 
People concerned with ecological problems have criticized the 
Galilean/instrumentalist view of knowledge and action on the grounds that it 
pictures humans as pitted against nature and seeking to master it—rather 
than acting as stewards of organic processes which need to be nurtured and 
cultivated in holistic fashions. Further, some ethical theorists have argued 
that the instrumentalist model of action—at least in the version of it 
described here—leads us to misunderstand much of what is really going on 
in human affairs. But, overall, the view provides us with a rather neat and 
very attractive account of rational action. 
However, it is an account with a widely recognized implication of an 
unpleasant sort: In a world of scare means and differing preferences, conflict 
  54 
is inevitable. And insofar as values are viewed as non-cognitive and 
subjective, appeals to reason cannot determine who is right. 
A typical sort of illustration of the point would be the two islanders 
and the one coconut. Both want it; only one can have it. The result? Tension, 
hostility, confrontation, conflict, violence, "war"—all the things of which 
peace is said to be the absence. This illustration, once abstracted from the 
tropical details, is precisely the kind of simple production system which 
Walter Isaard begins the construction of his theory of "peace science, the 
Queen of the social sciences." 
We can see now why Isaard’s starting point is so plausible. Conflict 
can be eased, but cannot be eliminated. Breakthroughs in technology, 
discoveries of new resources, compromise, symbolic enactments of violence, 
and a variety of other techniques can be used to prevent the hostilities from 
getting unpleasantly physical. But the Galilean/instrumentalist view of 
reality, knowledge, and action commits us to the belief that these steps are 
but stopgap measures. In individual cases, these steps may resolve specific 
conflicts, but they can do nothing to eliminate the underlying structural 
conflict that is an inevitable feature of life. Wherever two or more are 
gathered, in their midst there shall be differences of preference that place 
them in opposition—an opposition that reason may ameliorate but never 
resolve. 
Some social scientists try to temper the implications of the 
Galilean/instrumentalist view by arguing that much human activity does not, 
as a matter of fact, place us in opposition to others. Kenneth Boulding, for 
instance, has argued that many activities (like dancing and praying) do not 
involve us in conflict: 
 
Non-conflict includes such things as eating, drinking, 
sleeping, working, procreating, reading, learning, walking, 
traveling, and so on. It constitutes by far the larger proportion of 
the activities of the human race. Conflict activities are those in 
which we are conscious that an increase in our welfare may 
diminish the welfare of others or an increase in the welfare of 
others may diminish our welfare.4 
 
This point seems to be plausible and somewhat comforting. But there 
are two basic problems with it. A tipoff to the first is provided by Boulding’s 
qualifying phrase. He says that conflict activities are those "in which we are 
conscious" of differences our choices make in the subsequent welfare of 
ourselves and others. But our acts constantly affect others. We live in an 
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intricate ecosystem in which each act of commission or omission has a 
spreading subsequent influence. In principle, all our actions may be viewed 
as causes of redistributions of welfare. 
When you and I eat meat or drink coffee, we consume resources that 
might otherwise have fed people in the third world. In turn, when those 
people in the third world procreate, they place demands on the world’s 
resources which affect the welfare of others around the globe. If a parent of 
an ill baby chooses to sleep through the night, his decision may well be in 
conflict with the interests of the other parent who must remain awake and 
care for the child. 
In many cases, conflict may remain latent. We may not be conscious 
of it and we may not engage in it purposefully. But it still provides an 
underlying structure of all our activity which results from the differing of 
preferences about the future and the ecological ramifications of whatever we 
choose to do or not do. As we become conscious of these different 
preferences and ramifying consequences, open conflict ensues. Ignorance 
can sustain the bliss of pacification. But once we find out what other people 
are actually doing and what effects it will have, disputes begin to arise and 
wax ugly. 
The second problem with the line Boulding takes is that it offers no 
assurance that we will find nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts once we 
become conscious of them. If we are lucky, some "win/win" solution to the 
dispute may be found—or at least some way of arbitrating it which is 
acceptable to all the parties involved. But on the Galilean/instrumentalist 
view of knowledge and action, it would seem that the final court of appeal 
for nations remains war. For other groups and individuals it remains their 
equivalent of war. 
So the view seems to commit us to a conception of human activity 
which understand "non-conflict" to be simply action in which conflict is 
merely latent and not yet an object of conscious concern. And we are 
committed to taking "peaceful conflict" to simply be conflict in which there 
is an absence of war and violence so far. 
In either potential or actual form, conflict and violence are seen to be 
essential features of human activity and of rational life itself. And so it 
would appear that peace must be conceived the way social scientists do in 
fact conceive it, namely, as an absence. It would seem difficult to conceive 
human activity in ways which do not make conflict an essential feature of it. 
In this sense, we live in a culture of conflict and, for us, it remains difficult 
to conceive of peace in any way other than as a static absence. 
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But these ideas are not just theories that intellectuals adopt and which 
affect our concepts. They are founding principles entrenched in many of our 
institutions and they affect the details of our lives. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
The Practice of These Preachings: 
The Institutionalization of Conflict Assumptions 
 
 
 
hile most of us usually do not seem to talk about what we know and do 
in tidy Galilean and instrumentalist terms, there is still a strong tendency to 
think that our knowledge and action take these forms. For these seem to 
provide the clearest and most legitimate rhetoric for justifying our beliefs 
and plans. 
People who resist describing their insight or activity in these terms are 
usually thought to be doing something peculiar—at least from a cognitive 
point of view—probably suspect. For example, many historians claim to 
have a distinctly non-Galilean, "narrative" understanding. But their insight is 
often dismissed as "merely anecdotal" and is widely supposed to not embody 
genuine (i.e., scientific) knowledge. To take a second example, artists often 
refuse to explain their work in instrumentalist terms and they deny their 
works have any goal—or at least no goal like the sort served by street signs, 
anatomical drawings, or advertisements. But many people (perhaps most) do 
not consider art a source of authentic knowledge—at least not any public 
knowledge which can play a legitimate role in deciding issues of public 
concern. 
When differences of opinion give rise to problems and we need to 
think about what we believe and do, we try to think out answers in Galilean 
and instrumentalist terms—and we end up construing these differences in 
plans and opinions as conflicts. Further, when we find we need help and we 
turn to experts for advice, we tend to expect their knowledge to be as 
scientific as possible. We do not want to listen to stories and poems. We 
expect their proposals for action to be rational ones based on accurate, 
instrumentalist assessments of the costs and benefits of the alternatives 
available. We want professional advice. 
There was a time, however, when people had no modern professionals 
to consult. There was no AMA, ABA, NEA, AFT, or Triple A for motorists. 
If they needed advice, people turned to elders, lords, priests, and people who 
could tell old stories well. That has changed, and with the change have come 
alterations in the fabric of our culture. These alterations have tailored the 
W 
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institutions of our society to fit with assumptions that provide a conflict 
centered view of human activity. 
It is somewhat difficult to say what things were different in the 
Middle Ages, but it is clear that they were different. Tradition laid claim to 
being the chief source of genuine knowledge. When questions arose, people 
appealed to venerable custom or turned to texts whose authority rested on 
divine or classical authorship. These were rarely cut and dried. Europe was a 
crazy quilt of culture, and customs governing people’s acts were highly 
varied and often quite specific to local communities. But evaluations of 
people and their actions were made in terms of functions that were thought 
to be natural to them. Choices were based on beliefs about the customary, 
natural purposes of things—not on the basis of cost/benefit calculations. 
There were two great shifts which changed all this. The first was led 
by the class of capitalists, the class Karl Marx critiqued. It was a class whose 
power derived from the control of the means of economic production. The 
second shift was led by the professionals, "the new middle class." This 
second class played the historical role Marx had wrongly assigned to the 
working class "proletariat." It was a class whose power derived from control 
of the means of the production of authoritative opinion. 
This second class arose because of a cultural lacuna created by the 
displacements brought on by the activities of the capitalists. People were 
uprooted by capitalism, uprooted from jobs, homes, communities, 
consumption patterns and traditions of all sorts. The new professionals 
organized, sectored off domains in which they could claim expertise and 
gained the support of the state and public opinion for their claims to 
authority. They delivered the non-material goods, the beliefs and practices 
that fill our culture today. Both the capitalists and the new professionals 
employed three techniques which radically transformed our culture: 
abstraction, standardization and aggregation. 
In the Middle Ages, workers, their labor, and its products were 
connected in a complex network of parochial and often intimate ties to a 
variety of natural, social, political and religious aspects of the community. 
With the coming of the industrial revolution, worker and labor and product 
were increasingly divorced from these ties. To the purchaser of coal or cloth 
in London, the details of who produced the goods and how were irrelevant. 
What mattered was that it be the kinds of coal or cloth they desired. The low 
cost of mass produced goods placed a premium on treating things in mass 
ways, abstracting from their origins and standardizing them. The same 
premium was placed on the standardization of workers and their labor. 
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Workers got identified by job types and labor was characterized in terms of 
production routines. 
Such abstraction and standardization were the economic analogue of 
the process of generalization occurring in the sciences. Galileo ignored the 
origins of the objects he rolled down inclined planes and science overall 
sought to classify things in terms of general types. The "initial and 
subsequent conditions" governed by causal laws were not complete 
conditions; they were not describable by taking into account the sorts of 
features of things attended to in the Middle Ages. Coal became, for the 
capitalist and scientist alike, a standardized substance. Likewise, for the 
social scientist, capitalist, and social worker human beings became 
standardized entities as well—"Cockney adolescent males," "semi-skilled 
lorry drivers," or "head-of-household welfare clients." 
In Western Europe, the chief force at work to effect these changes was 
the market system. But since Stalin it has become clear that markets are not 
essential; a command economy can serve to move a culture into the modern 
era. What is essential is that things be dealt in standardized types and 
considered in abstraction and moved in a flow of goods and services which 
is aggregated by some centralizing mechanism. The net result is a vast and 
complex social mechanism serving the desires and aversions of people who 
manipulate it in instrumental ways. 
These economic transformations brought a variety of social problems. 
In response, non-economic aspects of society have been abstracted, 
standardized, and aggregated in analogous ways. Social welfare is 
administered to types of clients who qualify in specified ways and are dealt 
with en masse. Schools, medical facilities, penal systems, and other 
institutions have been developed along similar lines. 
We have, in effect, developed a culture which institutionalizes the 
patterns of regularity and the ideals of mechanical efficacy which are 
projected by the Galilean view of knowledge and the instrumentalist view of 
action. There are other kinds of knowledge and action which enable the 
system to run—the "wisdom" of the Mayor Daley variety, the "art" of good 
teaching, and the "knack" of negotiating good business deals. But the social 
system in which we live is presented as a network of standard cases 
governed by general rules. It is pictured as a network of means and ends. 
In this sense, we live in the midst of a social reality whose practices 
commit us to Galilean and instrumentalist ideas seem natural, inevitable and 
correct without question. Of course knowledge must be scientific! Of course 
rational actions are ones we have chosen carefully to make the best means 
achieve our preferred end! What else could useful knowledge or rational 
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action be? And this picture of the way reality works commits us to 
assumptions that spell out a conflict centered view of human activity. 
Two other ways in which conflict views of human activity are 
embedded in our culture are worth note, one because it is so obvious and 
familiar, and the second because it is so basic and pervasive. The first is a 
common conception of negotiation. It is a view characterized (and critiqued) 
rather neatly by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their Getting to Yes: 
 
Whether a negotiation concerns a contract, a family quarrel 
or a peace settlement among nations, people routinely engage in 
positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, 
and makes concessions to reach a compromise. The classic 
example of this negotiating minuet is the haggling that takes 
place between a customer and the proprietor of a second-hand 
store: 
 
Customer: How much do you want for this dish? 
Shopkeeper: That is a beautiful antique, isn’t it? I guess I could 
let it go for $75. 
Customer: Oh come on, it’s dented. I’ll give you $15. 
Shopkeeper: Really! I might consider a serious offer, but $15 
certainly isn’t serious. 
Customer: Well, I could go up to $20, but I would never pay 
anything like $75. Quote me a realistic price. 
Shopkeeper: You drive a hard bargain, young lady. $60 cash, 
right now. 
Customer: $25 
Shopkeeper: It cost me a great deal more than that. Make me a 
SERIOUS offer. 
Customer: $37.50. That’s the highest I will go. 
Shopkeeper: Have you noticed the engraving on that dish? Next 
year pieces like that will be worth twice what you pay today. 
 
And so it goes, on and on. Perhaps they will reach agreement; 
perhaps not.1 
 
This is a familiar and in many ways classic type of positional bargaining.  
These are two sides trying to agree on the distribution of some goods or 
sources of welfare (like crockery or cash). The players suppose that the 
distribution can be described in terms of a linear continuum measured, for 
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example, by quantities of money. The players also suppose that an increase 
in the welfare of one requires a decrease in the welfare of the other—and, in 
that sense, that their interests are opposed. 
Metaphors from the physics of movement tend to structure the 
understanding of this kind of negotiation: people push, pull, resist, hold 
back, create friction, acquire inertia and so on. We can think of bargaining as 
a general type of game that can be played in many contexts and in different 
styles. The stakes at issue may be household goods in a divorce settlement or 
work hours and wages in a labor negotiation or missiles and warheads in an 
arms treaty. Players can adopt a hard bargaining strategy and hold out to 
maximize their wins in the current round of talks or they may adopt a soft 
bargaining strategy to maximize amicability in this and future talks and 
expedite the reaching of a settlement now. 
This particular picture of negotiation—classic positional bargaining—
is very prominent in our thought and practice. It influences the ways in 
which people practice law, make real estate deals, settle on wages and 
salaries, dicker over legislation, and barter for international treaties. It is 
deeply entrenched in a wide variety of institutions such as courts, 
corporations, and Congress. It is at work in local yard sales and arms 
negotiations in Vienna. It is laced through our language as well. When 
people want to reach an agreement with us and they make a proposal, we 
find them offering "to make a deal" and we listen for "their first offer" and 
we adopt an initial "position" and then wonder who will give in the most and 
who will win on this round. In countless ways we act as though life is a 
game whose essence is conflict—and the name of the game is "Winning." 
One other conflict-related view central to our culture concerns a way 
of understanding the overall character of our relations with other human 
beings. We tend to view them in terms of the category of "the Other." The 
French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir introduced this phase in The Second 
Sex. Though her analysis can be generalized to a wide variety of relations 
between groups, her analysis there is directed toward relations between men 
and women. Her central thesis is that women have been traditionally defined 
and treated as "the Other" and, by this, she means a number of distinct 
things. 
Perhaps the simplest and most central kernel of the notion turns on a 
distinction that arose in post-Kantian philosophy and out of which Sartre and 
other existentialists got in a good deal of mileage. It is the distinction 
between persons and things—or "subjects" and "objects." Persons are 
rational and thinking agents who interpret their world, synthesizing it in 
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judgments that define the things they encounter. Things are objects that are 
thought about. 
Martin Buber articulated this distinction by speaking of the "I/Thou" 
relations in contrast to "I/it" relations. In one case we deal with other people 
with whom we converse and share a sense of joint responsibility; we take 
our talk and interaction to involve a reciprocity or mutuality. In contrast, in 
"I/it" relations we deal with things which we have defined and which we 
manipulate but which we can take to be neither free nor responsible nor 
capable of conversing with us. Typically, when a prosecutor and defense 
attorney discuss the case of a child or insane person with a judge, they 
address each other as "I" and "you" but simply talk about the child or insane 
person as "he" or "she" or "it." One way to put de Beauvoir’s thesis is to say 
that woman has been defined as an object, as "the Other" which men talk 
about but do not address and share genuine conversation with. 
But this grossly oversimplifies de Beauvoir’s analysis. For she does 
not mean to say that women are never in any way conversed with, only that 
viewing them as object (for voyeurism or intercourse or breeding or 
housework or cheerleading) is a prominent motif—one which women as 
well as men have adapted to and learned to exploit. Further, it is a motif in 
complex thematic relations to other ways men view women. For instance, 
woman is also "the Other" in the sense that she is the outsider. Part of the 
contrast here is between that which is same and that which is different (or 
other). Men are the same as "us"; women are different, unlike, strange, 
mysterious, incomprehensible... 
Notice that we sometimes count: "one, then the other, then the third..." 
Women are "Other" also in the sense that they are second—second in worth, 
second in importance. On de Beauvoir’s analysis, women are "secondary" in 
the sense that they are lesser and deprived—less fully rational, strong, and 
courageous. They are the second by contrast (as well as privation) because 
they rely on feeling rather than reason, physical charms rather than physical 
strength and manipulative abuses of dependency rather than courageous self 
assertion. 
There are a variety of analogues de Beauvoir explores to try to capture 
features of ways men have related to women, analogues which are similar 
and yet importantly distinct: master versus slave, capitalist versus 
proletarian, adult versus child, white versus black, civilized versus primitive, 
and Protestant versus Jew. Other analogues could be explored as well: 
professional versus client, priest versus layman, sports participant versus 
spectator, and chair versus committee member. All the analogues can, in 
turn, be illuminated by comparison and contrast with relations between men 
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and women. "The Other" names of a kind of social syndrome which occurs 
in various ways across a broad spectrum of social divisions we commonly 
construe in terms of conflict. 
These various relations are not just metaphors which social 
researchers can use to build theories. These are metaphors employed in 
practice by participants in our social world. In some cases the employment 
of the analogue is quite explicit, in others it is perhaps more subliminal. 
Some men quite literally and self-consciously conceive of women as 
outsiders; some simply patronize them in the distinctive manner of 
professionals dealing with clients (thought they have never given the 
analogue any conscious thought). These metaphors we live by can operate in 
a wide variety of ways. 
To speak here of "the Other" is not to offer a neat and well defined 
concept but to employ a kind of motif which gives direction and thematic 
unity to these varied ways of relating to groups of humans who differ from 
ourselves. The dominant thread to which the theme of the Other serves to 
give prominence is a distinctive way of understanding difference between 
people—namely, by understanding them as oppositions. 
In this regard, the notion of the Other serves as a kind of leit-motif for 
all of the conflict categories we have discussed in the foregoing chapters. 
Those categories form a complex family relating in various ways. But all 
understand difference as opposition. It is as thought they suppose that a kind 
of "law of excluded middle" holds for all human difference. When there are 
two different choices or responses made to a situation, it is thought that one 
must be acceptable and the other not acceptable. There is a right one as over 
against... the other. 
The list here does not exhaust the assumptions and practices relevant 
to the conflict centered views in our culture. But at this point we have seen 
that a strong case can be made for the following summary conclusion. We 
live in a culture in which predominant conceptions of reason, feeling, 
meaning, value, truth, and the self characterize activity in terms of conflict, 
and this view is buttressed by conceptions of knowledge and action which 
are entrenched in the dominant institutions of our society. We find it difficult 
to conceive of human activities in ways which do not make conflict an 
essential feature of it. In this sense, we live in a culture of conflict and, for 
us, it remains difficult to conceive of peace in any way other than as a static 
absence. 
It would seem, then, that we face an alternative. Either these practices 
and assumptions are realistic and correct and peace is, in fact, nothing more 
than a static absence or the nature of peace has indeed been radically 
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obscured... and deep rooted assumptions and practices in our culture are 
flawed. 
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THE CONTEXT OF PEACE: 
SOCIAL REALITY, 
UNDERSTANDING, AND ACTION 
 
Part III 
 
 
 
It has not been sufficiently remarked that how we ought to 
answer the question of the moral and political legitimacy of the 
characteristically dominant institutions of modernity turns on 
how we decide an issue in the philosophy of the social sciences. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre1 
 
 
...nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature or essence 
in the same sense as other things. 
 
Hannah Arendt2 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of describing the culture of conflict, some alternatives to 
it and some criticisms of it were sketched. An illustration was provided of 
the possibility of adopting maieutic rather than eristic assumptions about 
reason, feeling, meaning, truth, and the self. The conflict-centered view of 
the passions was shown to be a myth. It is false because it ignores the 
intentional character of emotions—the way in which they, like all of 
experience, are structured by interpretations we can choose to revise in 
rational ways. 
Also, social scientists were said to have failed and failed profoundly. 
They have not been able to develop a value neutral, mathematical system of 
the laws of efficient causality. Most social scientists, with the exception of 
economists (and more about that later on), admit this themselves. Their 
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Galileo has not arrived and they have not discovered a single genuine law of 
social reality. For example, in reviewing the literature of peace and conflict 
research, Kenneth Boulding notes that studies seeking out the causes of war 
and peace 
 
…have been frustratingly disappointing. For instance, 
Professor Rudi Rimmell’s studies of the dimensionality of 
nations, while they have employed the most sophisticated 
statistical methods, have failed to come up with any clear 
correlates of the incidence of war and peace.3 
 
Why is this? Social science has no spring chicken. Like the audience of 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, we cannot help but wonder: What has detained 
Monsieur Galileo? Will he really come? Can he really exist at all? Or could 
it be that we are not waiting properly? Might it be that social science has 
been quite fundamentally misconceived and wrongly practiced? 
In Beckett’s play, a child brings a brief message each day, one that 
sustains some dim hope. On of the amazing things about children is that, 
apart from whatever preparation their biology provides, they are born 
entirely ignorant of their culture. In the course of remarkably few years they 
manage to learn an extraordinary amount about the social life of human 
beings around them. In a very important sense, their progress in 
understanding is much more rapid than that of contemporary social science. 
Of course, the kind of understanding they achieve is of a different 
sort. They do not discover a set of laws which provide disinterested 
theoretical explanations. They acquire a set of competencies which enable 
them to participate in their culture in a purposive and critical way. But, then 
again, perhaps something somehow like this is the proper kind of knowledge 
to seek when we engage in systematic and intensive studies of social reality. 
Here, in Part III, we will find that this is indeed the case. We will find 
that social reality has basic features that distinguish it and that it can only be 
understood in a non-Galilean way using a critical participatory method. It 
will turn out that that method requires that the researchers must engage in 
certain limited forms of peacemaking as a part of their cognitive study itself. 
It will also turn out that as we achieve a critical, participatory understanding 
of social reality we find that most rational activity is non-instrumental—is a 
process more like cultivating a hobby than manipulating a machine. We will 
find, furthermore, that the assumptions underlying the maieutic style of 
reasoning are, in fact, superior to those underlying the eristic style. 
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And as Part III progresses, we will find that we have eminently sound 
reasons for rejecting the dominant culture of conflict and adopting a network 
of assumptions that lead us to view differences between people as aspects of 
shared problems rather than oppositions between competitors. This network 
of beliefs will provide a framework, in Part IV, for developing a theory of 
peace. It will be a theory that views peace as an activity that employs 
maieutic reasoning, critical participatory understanding, and non-
instrumental modes of cultivating our projects and practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  68 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
How Social Reality Is 
Intended To Be Understood 
 
 
 
he peace that occurs in the social realm—where does it occur? What is 
social reality? 
There is a basic difference between things studied by natural scientists 
and social scientists. It is a very striking difference. Physicists cannot 
converse with quarks. Enzymes can offer us no descriptions or explanations 
of their movements. When a rock flies through an embassy window, it has 
no idea what it is doing. In contrast, the rioter who throws it does. He has an 
idea of what he is doing and why. 
The point applies here now. You are caught up just now in a bit of 
social activity: reading this book. You have some idea of what you are doing 
and why. In fact, you have many such "ideas." For instance, you have a 
notion of what the alphabet is and what a letter in it looks like. Similarly, 
you have notions of what sorts of things, words, complete sentences, theses, 
pieces of evidence, arguments, and books are. And you are experiencing 
these marked pages in terms of these concepts. When you see a mark here 
you see it as a letter, rather than just a squiggle of lines. Andevenifspacesare 
leftoutyoustillinterpret theseasmarks expressingwords. And the same with 
incomplete sentences. Just as importantly, you interpret these as specific 
words and sentences with specific meanings. If this cluster of paper was 
handed to a Cromagnon woman and man, they would see something. But 
they would not be able to read it, because they lack the skill—and they 
would not even see it as a book of letters, words and sentences because they 
would lack these concepts. (One way or perhaps beginning to get some 
inkling of what they would see is 2 considur a (yne uv teckst witch 
disengages NoRmAl C-ing and then stare at a single letter like this l until it 
starts to look odd.) 
Similar sorts of points apply in contexts where we are reading signs 
on a highway, the traces on a trail, the expression on someone’s face, the 
surface of a trout stream, the movements of a crowd, the current economic 
indicators or anything else we might run into on that great stream-like 
highway we think of as the book of life. One way the general point is often 
T 
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put is to say that social activity is intentional—intentional in the same sense 
we earlier saw emotions are. Whenever we feel something inside or perceive 
something outside us we feel or perceive is as something; we interpret it. 
Similarly, whenever we act, engaging the world with our bodies, we perform 
the movements as something. By waving my hand vigorously from left to 
right I can do many things: signal cars to halt, gesture hello to a friend, shake 
off a fly, threaten a dog, or dismiss a passing bum. But I can perform this 
arm waving as one of these acts (rather than some other) only if I have some 
idea of what I am doing—some intended description that interprets it. Part of 
what makes the same pattern of physical movements be one act in one 
situation and another in some other setting is the interpretation of the setting 
and them movement which I myself adopt. 
This intentional character of social activity is a fundamental and 
profoundly decisive feature of social reality. Social phenomena are in part 
composed of and constituted by descriptions and explanations people 
themselves have of what they are doing. The intentional understanding of 
what you are doing now in reading here does not come as an afterthought. It 
is not as though if someone asked you what you were doing you might say 
"Well, let me see... Here’s a hypothesis! Perhaps I’m reading. Let’s test it 
and see if I am right." 
The understanding is not something external to the action which you 
might simply arrive at the way an outside observer would. It makes the act 
the particular act it is. What makes a flip of the finger an insult (rather than a 
stretching twitch or a joke) involves the beliefs the flipper has concerning 
how the flippee will interpret the gesture and the desire he has that that sort 
of interpretation be adopted. In a world without such interpretations, there 
would be no insults. 
It is this intentional character that makes our activity distinctively 
social and human rather than merely animal. Mice would never insult one 
another. And, like the lilies of the field, they never spin nor toil nor perform 
labor of any sort. This is not because God provides for them. It is because 
they have no ideas and make no interpretations and so thought they "emit" a 
great deal of behavior, they do not perform any actions at all. 
This intentionality suggests a kind of double-barreled working 
hypothesis concerning how we should study human activity. On one hand, 
because people always already have some understanding of what they are 
doing and why, it would seem that if we want descriptions and explanations 
of their activity, we can simply ask people themselves to provide them. On 
the other hand, because social phenomena are, at least in part, constituted by 
the self-understandings the agents have, it would seem that to study them 
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properly we must ask them. We must find out what their own interpretations 
of their activities are. So it seems that social researchers can and must 
acquire an understanding of people’s activities by asking the people 
themselves to provide descriptions and explanations of what they are up to. 
This double-barreled hypothesis needs qualification and elaboration. 
(It is not as though we should just write down whatever people tell us about 
themselves and then publish it as finished research!) And we need a more 
developed account of the "social reality is shot through with intentionality" 
thesis, one that explains its relevance to notions of meaning, reason, feeling, 
and the eristic notions discussed earlier. And we need to develop an account 
of what the views of social science, social reality and reasoning that thus 
emerge have to tell us about the nature of rational action in general. But as 
we do so, we will begin to formulate notions that make it possible to 
understand peace as a kind of activity which rests on the kind of 
understanding you have when you converse—a kind of understanding we 
will never have of quarks. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
Holism in the Parts 
 
 
 
ocial reality is intentional in the sense discussed in Chapter 6. All our 
actions and reactions involve some kind of self-understanding and 
interpretation. But much of our activity is also intentional in the narrower, 
instrumentalist sense of the term. Often, we not only know what we are 
doing, we know what we are trying to get done. We not only have some 
understanding of what is going on, we conceive of what we are doing in 
terms of some aim we are trying to accomplish, some purpose we are trying 
to realize. 
However, we understand these instrumental intentions in terms of the 
background of understandings which make our activity intentional in the 
broad sense. We understand our employment of means to achieve ends in 
terms of more general beliefs about the world and more general values we 
hold. We also understand them in terms of more particular kinds of 
knowledge which we may find it difficult to express in propositions: 
knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understandings, and know-how. 
Suppose we exercise the social researcher’s advantage over the 
physicist (who is stuck with non-conversant quarks and we ask someone 
"What are you doing?" The person is likely to reply with a statement of an 
instrumental intention, something like: "I am writing an appeal to my senator 
to try to get her to vote against the funding of a new missile system." Or: "I 
am ordering my troops to spray tear gas into the mob in order to get the 
people to disperse from the capitol square." If we follow up with the 
question "Why are you doing this?" we may receive two different sorts of 
replies. One sort will explain why the means employed has been chosen over 
some other. This part of the explanation will include beliefs about the facts 
in this particular situation and beliefs about how, in general, the world 
works. For example: 
 
"I am writing because my senator has not yet made up her 
mind and because senators are sometimes influenced by letters 
from constituents." 
 
S 
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or: 
 
"I am ordering the spraying of tear gas because the crowd 
did not comply with the verbal command to disperse and because 
this stuff is an effective means of disabling the people it hits, 
intimidating the ones nearby, and getting the crowd to break up." 
 
If we ask why they have made these particular judgments of fact and why 
they have adopted these beliefs about what will work, we find that they 
relied in part on specific observations. Bu they also base their judgments on 
very general views about physical laws of nature, psychological theories of 
motivation, and beliefs about social institutions. 
Instead of considering the choice of their means, people may take the 
question "Why are you doing this?" to concern the end that has been 
adopted. Their replies may initially take the form of an appeal to some more 
general end: 
 
"I am trying to persuade my senator so the funding bill will 
be defeated. I am trying to get it defeated so there will be a 
slowdown in the arms race and more money will be available for 
education and social welfare activities. I am trying to achieve 
these things in order to promote peace and prosperity." 
 
or: 
 
"I am trying to disperse the crowd so order will be restored 
in the capitol. I am trying to restore order so the government can 
function smoothly. I am trying to achieve that in order to promote 
peace and prosperity." 
 
Typically, the justification of specific ends in terms of increasingly more 
general ones comes to a terminus with an appeal to some general value 
which the most general end will help to realize: peace, prosperity, happiness, 
self-actualization, justice, law and order, spiritual fulfillment, or something 
of this sort. 
The beliefs and values people use to explain their instrumental actions 
form a network. It is a network with a feature of decisive importance: the 
meanings involved are interdependent. Both the letter writer and the crowd 
disperser may speak of using "persuasion" to achieve their ends. But they 
clearly have different notions of persuasion in mind. To find out what these 
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different notions are, we learn about their more general views of human 
psychology and the specific techniques that exemplify the kind of 
persuasion they have in mind. 
Likewise, both may speak of trying to promote "peace and 
prosperity." But, again, their conceptions of these may be markedly 
different. To understand the phrase, we must learn how they believe peace 
and prosperity are related to other notions and practices like distributive 
equality, retributive justice, laissez faire economics, civil disobedience, and 
electoral politics. We must also learn what they think of as good examples of 
peace and prosperity. 
One way the thrust of this point is sometimes put is to say that 
meaning is holistic. Sentences are organically related, "interanimating" each 
other—giving meaning to others and taking meaning from other sentences 
and practices that form a context for their use. 
The analysis so far has five very important consequences for social 
research. First, to understand someone’s instrumental intention we must 
understand the network of beliefs and practices that provide a context for it. 
Second, their action is not an effect of efficient causes of the kind of 
Galilean social scientists have tried to discover. Instead, it is motivated by 
reasons that people believe justify their choices. The distinction is important. 
Flying rocks and chemicals in tear gas have no goals they may fail to 
achieve and no beliefs which may turn out to be false. They simply move 
and combine as they are caused to. They have no reasons which may be in 
error and so they cannot make mistakes. 
In contrast, rioters and police can. In fact, we all can and do make 
mistakes in almost every arena of social life. This is because our activities 
are structured in terms of beliefs and values which tell us what we are doing 
and distinguish better and worse ways of doing it. When we type a letter, 
pitch a stone, negotiate a deal, or reprimand an employee we are performing 
activities that are defined in terms of norms and goals that tell us what 
success requires—and ways in which we ought to pursue it. 
To understand the flight of a rock, we need only know how forces 
efficiently cause it to fly. And it would be absurd to say: "Stop stone! You 
should not move like that!" But to understand persons who throw stones we 
need to learn the reasons that led them to think or feel they ought to fling it 
and the beliefs they hold that motivate their throwing it overhand rather than 
underhand—beliefs that may be justified or in error. 
Third, we see now why the Galilean quest for value neutral 
descriptions of social reality cannot succeed. Social reality is structured in 
terms of values that define it, that make it what it is. We cannot explain what 
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someone is doing without referring to the norms they are trying to follow 
and the values they are trying to realize. A full explanation of why a chess 
player moves a pawn in a particular way must include an account of the 
rules that prescribe the ways pawns ought to be moved and the tactical goal 
he or she is trying to achieve. 
We cannot even accurately describe a chess game or battle unless we 
define it in terms of value-laden concepts like "effective strategy," 
"casualties," and "winning." If we try to sanitize our language and speak 
only of "arm movements," "interactions of forces," "body counts," and other 
"incidents" we end up with a description of physical events that have no 
special significance. To describe social reality we must characterize it in 
terms of value-laden interpretations that define it. 
A fourth point to note is that social reality is structured by normative 
institutions rather than natural laws. The difference is fundamental. 
Institutions can be changed, laws of nature cannot. 
The laws of genetics that govern things like the inheritance of 
intelligence, racial characteristics, and sex differences are what they are. 
Whatever they are, they are here to stay. We can manipulate the effects of 
these laws through selective breeding, but we cannot alter the laws 
themselves. 
In contrast, the norms and institutions that govern child rearing, race 
relations, and marriage are institutions that have been instituted. At some 
point in history they were set up. They may not have been set up deliberately 
by people with clear goals and instrumental intentions. But they did emerge 
in a social context in which they were defined in ways that were 
"intentional" in the broad sense of the term. They were defined in terms of 
interpretations and these interpretations can be revised. 
Even a regularity as basic as the normal rhythm of sleep and 
wakefulness is "institutional" in this sense. Humans have a biological need 
for sleep. And our biology and environment have, in most cases, had this 
result: It makes sense to sleep at night and be awake during the day. 
Furthermore, parents tell their children when they ought to go to sleep. 
Schools, businesses, and churches schedule their activities around 
"reasonable" hours. Prior to the discovery of electricity, most of humankind 
found sunlit hours were the most "reasonable." But neon lights, factories that 
are expensive to shut down, or the opportunity to go smelt fishing at high 
tide during a new moon may lead us to decide that other hours are more 
reasonable. 
These sorts of things may lead us to revise our institutions. Likewise, 
we may choose to revise the way we interpret differences in intelligence, 
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race, or sex. A feature pervading social reality for millennia may seem so 
regular and basic as to be virtual law of humankind. But then we may 
suddenly discover good reasons to revise the interpretations on which these 
are based—and new institutions emerge. In the United States today, the roles 
women have traditionally played in child care and industry are being revised 
in just this sort of way. As they are, a host of statistical regularities are 
reported by the Census Bureau are changing. 
Those statistics are important and well worth studying. But with 
Galilean social scientists are mistaken when they suppose that these provide 
correlations that reflect mathematical natural laws that explain social reality. 
The figures they find only provide statistics that describe the numbers of 
people who have chosen to accept—or at least chosen not to change—the 
institutions in which they participate. 
These first four points do not mean that physical causes play no part 
in social reality or that researchers should not worry about avoiding bias. 
The efficient causes and effects that natural scientists provide the 
necessary conditions for social reality. A knowledge of how soil gets 
depleted can help explain why an agricultural community stagnates 
economically—because rich soil is necessary for certain crops. Also, many 
physical conditions which are not necessary can, nonetheless, contribute to 
motivating action. Drought is not required before farmers migrate, but it may 
give them a good reason for moving on. But these necessary and 
contributory physical conditions are never sufficient in and of themselves. 
They are not Galilean "efficient causes" that make things happen. 
The key point is this: They are simply physical conditions that must 
be interpreted before they enter into social reality at all. The drought only 
motivates the farmers to move when they name it or think about it in some 
way—and the ways they interpret it may vary. They may view it as an 
accident of nature, a natural part of the rhythm of life, or a punishment being 
inflicted upon them by a wrathful God. As a result, they may view 
themselves rational opportunists who are moving to greener pastures, quasi-
nomads who are following the wheel of life, or a people who must retreat for 
a time until they have exculpated their guilt before God. In each case, the 
"migration" is a different act and must be understood in the distinctive terms 
the movers themselves use to define it. 
These terms are value-laden, but the researcher who uses them need 
not be "biased" in any objectionable way. This point will be considered later 
in more detail in a discussion of objectivity and completeness in social 
theory. Here, the point to note is that the researcher who uses the farmers’ 
own value-laden terms to describe their activity is not introducing a bias of 
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his or her own or making personal value judgments. He or she is simply 
describing what the farmers are doing. 
The first four points just considered bring us to a fifth. To understand 
people we must (1) learn how their own network of holistic meanings 
provides a context (2) that they take to give them reasons which justify their 
actions (3) in terms of value-laden notions (4) and normative institutions 
that—unlike the laws of nature—can be revised. The fifth point is that our 
understanding of these requires participation. To see how they understand 
their own activity, we cannot just peek at them for a moment. We must enter 
into their social world as they conceive it. 
I speak here of "entering into a world" rather than merely of 
"observing it at length" because much the understanding that provides the 
context for such holistic meaning is not the sort that can be simply stated in 
propositions and reported by observers. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
 
Participation in the Whole 
 
 
 
here are indispensable kinds of understanding that require participation. 
To see why, consider the following direction the questions we ask people 
can take. It is the direction taken when we ask not "Why are you doing this?" 
but "How are you doing this?" 
At first the reply to the "How?" question typically takes the form of 
some more detailed description of the way the means employed is enacted: 
 
"How am I writing to my senator? Well, I am taking out a 
sheet of paper and sketching the key points I want to make and 
then typing them up in a style I think will be sincere and forceful 
without sounding threatening." 
 
The answer as to how the order to spray tear gas is being delivered and 
implemented might be provided by a recitation of a standard form for 
commands and a technical recipe for spraying which was memorized in 
training sessions—one which specifies how the device will be fired, how it 
is to be aimed, whom it should be aimed at and so on. We can go on to ask, 
further, how each step in these processes is performed. And in reply to the 
answers offered we can ask again: "And how, precisely, do you do that?" 
(How do you engage the senator’s interest with your opening remark? How 
do you raise a question at the start? How do you type a question mark?) 
Eventually we reach a point at which the person finds it difficult to 
answer. Some perceptions, expressions of feeling and actions seem so basic 
as to be starting points for explanations—starting points which cannot 
themselves be explained. How do you distinguish red things from green 
ones? How do you express feelings of calm with a smile? How do you raise 
your hand? 
The ability to do these sorts of things does not require propositional 
knowledge of how we do them. It does not require the ability to use words to 
accurately state beliefs about how they are done. And propositional 
knowledge about the skill does not give someone the ability to use the skill 
itself. 
T 
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Instead, such abilities require three different kinds of knowledge: 
Knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how. 
These three root belief in practice and make understanding require 
participation. They require that we take part in a community if we are to 
genuinely understand it. They require this regardless of whether our motives 
in seeking understanding are pacific, predatory, or purely cognitive. 
Colors and sound qualities (like the tone of an oboe) provide the 
simplest examples of the first, knowledge by acquaintance. An educated 
person who has been blind from birth may be able to say as much or more 
about the color of blood as a sighted person can. His beliefs may well match 
reality more accurately. Yet there is something the sighted know which he 
does not. They know what blood looks like, because they have seen it. 
Likewise, people may have knowledge by acquaintance of much more 
complex things like facial features and body types characteristic of ethnic 
groups. I know by acquaintance what Swedes and Italians look like. I do 
not—at least usually—reason out my assessment in any explicit way. I 
simply see them as Swedes and Italians. 
While such knowledge requires direct experience, it requires more 
than mere exposure. We must learn to attend to the relevant features of 
things and we require general concepts to form ideas of such features. We 
must have some conception—even I it is only rough and pre-verbal—of 
ethnic types before we can learn to identify facial types. But on the other 
hand, knowledge by acquaintance is itself required to understand fully what 
general concepts like ethnic type mean. 
Such knowledge by acquaintance is, then, related to more general 
notions in two ways: it gives meaning to them and also derives meaning 
from them. It fills them in and gives them specific import, and it also tacitly 
presupposes them. One way this is sometimes put is to say that our general 
ideas or theories are "context dependent" and that our perceptions are always 
"theory laden." 
People may have different "perceptual types." They may literally see 
things differently in styles that are reflected in differences in the ways they 
draw on what they see and respond to it. Children who early on acquire 
different styles for perceiving flesh and clothing and gesture may come to 
have quite different understandings of what "woman," "man," and "sex" 
mean. Conversely, adults who later on acquire different beliefs may come to 
perceive the world differently. Because of the differences in the concepts 
they bring to the viewing of it, a butchered cow will be visually perceived in 
different ways by a biologist, a meat inspector, a painter, a Moslem or a 
Hindu.1 
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In a similar way, our understanding of expressions of feelings turns 
out to have a double connection of reciprocity in relation to general ideas. 
Very young children often do not know what they feel. As adult, we 
often have only vague awareness of our feelings. This is true of physical 
feelings—a child requires practice to learn to distinguish stomach aches 
from hunger. It is also true of the rich and varied feelings attendant upon our 
social activity. The subtle emotions of life often seem hard to pin down—
until we read some poem or hear some piece of music which expresses the 
vague feelings and we have an experience of recognition. "Aha!" we may 
say. "That’s just the way I have felt." 
If we are asked "And what is that precisely?" we may find ourselves at 
a loss. It is not as though a melody has a message that can be stated in a 
proposition like: "I am experiencing meandering loneliness." The expressive 
understanding provided by a work like "The Lovesong of J. Alfred 
Prufrock" or "The Moonlight Sonata" is something different from 
propositional knowledge—different in kind. 
Expressive understanding is not necessarily better or worse, it is 
simply different. Most art (some would say all good art) provides such 
expressive understanding, and much language and gesture does as well. The 
delicate nuance of after-dinner diplomatic overtures and the power of 
gripping public rhetoric cannot be understood apart from expressive 
understanding of this sort. Likewise, in everyday conversations of our 
ordinary activities like child care, making appointments, talking about the 
news and playing cards, a central role is played by expressive 
understanding.2 
Again, such non-propositional knowledge is related to more general 
ideas in two ways. It gives them content and it presupposes them. The 
samurai’s bows and his world view, like the British gentleman’s bows and 
his world view, are interdependent in their meaning. Knowledge by 
acquaintance and expressive understanding share this characteristic with a 
third kind of non-propositional knowledge—one often referred to as "know-
how." 
Know-how consists of skills acquired through practice, skill which 
can involve varying levels of complexity and expertise. Some (such as touch 
typing and marksmanship) involve primarily motor skills. Others (such as 
letter writing and crowd control) may involve a wide range of verbal and 
intrapersonal skills as well. Clearly people can have know-how of these sorts 
without having much in the way of theoretical knowledge about how it is 
that they manage to do them well. I can know how to ride a bike without 
being able to explain the bio-physics involved or the intentional (but non-
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verbal) conscious efforts I make. Often people with great skill at negotiation 
or public speaking are quite inept at teaching their skill—or even incapable 
of describing it in an illuminating way. 
This is not to say that general beliefs and notions are irrelevant to skill 
acquisition. Quite the opposite is true. For example, general conceptions of 
persuasion and beliefs about human psychology characterize the context and 
set the standards in terms of which skills at letter writing and crowd control 
are defined. Conversely, these general notions are given concrete meaning 
by the skills and practices in which they are applied. The point is simply that 
these general notions can—and most typically do—function implicitly. In 
learning the skill, we acquire a tacit understanding of a host of conceptions 
of the types of things to be dealt with and also a host of values which 
indicate how they ought to be dealt with—values internalized via role-
modeling, testing techniques, rules of thumb, feels for "how these things 
should look (or smell)," precedents, metaphors, simple cases used as 
paradigms, coached trial and error, hints, and visionary rhetoric. 
One can acquire a skill at "hard selling" cars or teaching kindergarten 
with the Montessori method without being very capable in offering explicit 
explanations of the general beliefs and values these practices presuppose. 
But one cannot learn such skills without some tacit understanding of the 
background such beliefs and values provide, and the background views 
cannot be understood apart from a grasp of skilled activities of these sorts. 
Speaking a language like English—or a dialect or jargon specific to a 
local community—involves know how. This is a point of central importance 
for social research. No amount of purely theoretical linguistics can enable 
someone to become a competent speaker of a language. Language is learned 
in practice, not in theory. To learn to understand what people say about 
themselves, we must converse with them. We must practice the use of their 
language in the contexts in which it is actually used. This means that social 
researchers must begin their study by participating in the communities they 
wish to study. 
This claim—that social researchers must participate in the 
communities they study—is a strong one. It is a claim which runs counter to 
the dominant, Galilean view of methodology adopted by practicing social 
scientists. On that view, social researchers can only achieve objectivity 
through observation. Direct participation leads to personal involvements, 
subjective reporting, and biased theorizing. 
It is supposed that there is a rather strict analogy between natural and 
social science. First rate theoretical physicists can use the data supplied by 
experimental physicists but lack the know-how that enables the 
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experimentalists to deal with complex (and often very temperamental) 
laboratory devices. By analogy, it is thought that there can be first-rate social 
theorists who use data supplied by field workers but who lack the skills 
required to participate in the institutions of the communities they study. 
However, they claim that competent social theorists must have a 
participatory understanding has two important merits: it is widely believed 
and it is true. 
It—or a version of it—is widely believed by practicing lawyers, 
teachers, midwives, counselors, politicians, soldiers, business executives, 
and administrators. Such people are often hesitant to argue in public that 
they have a better idea of what is going on in courts or classrooms or 
Congress than do the social scientists who come in as objective bystanders 
and observe. But these people typically affirm something like this in private. 
Often they adopt a cagey stance and say that they have a kind of 
understanding which is different. 
They are hesitant to argue it is better for a very good reason. Much of 
the knowledge they have learned at the bar or in the battlefield is tacit rather 
than explicit. It consists of knowledge by acquaintance, expressive 
understanding, and know-how which they cannot articulate as propositional 
knowledge. So they are not able to articulately argue for the superiority of 
their understanding. They find it hard to say what it is that enables them to 
recognize a distinct mood n a jury or class or patient or employee. They find 
it difficult to say what the significance of a gesture or piece of rhetoric is. 
They are not able to explain in a neat or rigorous way how they are 
reasoning when they appeal to precedent or guide the discussion of a 
seminar group or carry out a battle strategy in the thick of the action. But 
they know that such understanding is something they have acquired through 
participation and practice, and they know that their understanding of what is 
going on in the trial, counseling session, or political campaign is deeply 
rooted in such non-propositional knowledge. 
Such shared understanding is often mutually acknowledged through 
the sort of wink or nod which captures a moment—or the sort of quiet smile 
that savors a situation in silence. But in general, when lawyers or teachers 
wonder if someone else really understands what is going on—whether the 
other be a novice practitioner or a social scientist—they have a fairly clear 
standard with which they judge. They ask, simply: Can this person get things 
done and talk sense in the context of the institution of the law or the school 
system? Can he or she win cases or teach? Can he or she talk about the cases 
or classes in ways that make sense to other skilled lawyers or teachers? 
  82 
This participation-based criterion of understanding is, of course, one 
that social scientists reject. In doing so, they have made a fundamental 
mistake. Why? An analogy to natural science helps to explain. Galileo 
advised the physicists of his day to study geometry and algebra because, as 
he put it, "nature speaks mathematics." The subsequent success of the 
Galilean tradition of physical science speaks highly for the wisdom of this 
belief as well as the assumption on which it is based, namely, that to 
accurately describe and explain a kind of thing we must "speak its 
language." 
This point has an obvious corollary for social research. For people do 
not, by and large, speak mathematics. Instead, they speak "ordinary" or 
"natural" (rather than artificial) languages like English and Spanish. Such 
languages are not axiomatizable and they cannot be adequately expressed in 
rigorous and formal systems of abstract symbols. Their meanings can be 
only understood through participation in the kinds of social activities that 
provide the context for their use. 
To put the central point more straightforwardly—dispensing with the 
analogy to natural science—we can say the following. The social reality that 
social researchers seek to describe and explain is constituted by 
understandings people themselves have of the activities in which they 
engage. These understandings are expressed in ordinary languages rife with 
vagaries of syntax and semantics and which are rooted in practices and 
contexts in which non-verbal elements play decisive roles. To accurately 
describe and explain such social reality, researchers must begin (though by 
no means rest content) with a knowledge of those activities as they are 
understood—and constituted—in these natural languages. So, to do 
competent research, they must participate in the kinds of communities they 
wish to study. This is true whether the community they study is a Zande 
tribe, a Hutterite commune, a type of business clique or a kind of diplomat. 
Among many anthropologists, this point is held to be non-
controversial. Their experience convinces them empirically of the necessity 
of field work for adequate theory and the necessity of participation for 
adequate field work. 
Among philosophers, particularly those who have explored Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of a "form of life"—or the phenomenologists’ notion 
of a lebenswelt—the claim that the competent understanding of social 
activity requires participatory understanding is likewise fairly non-
controversial. The kind of analysis which has led to such a conclusion is 
difficult to summarize. It calls for extended and detailed consideration of 
specific concepts and specific ways in which our understandings of them are 
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related to practices of various sorts. As Wittgenstein emphasizes, we must 
"look and see." But the principal kinds of things we find when we do look 
and see can perhaps be summed up under two headings: the "family 
resemblance" structure of concepts in ordinary language and the nature of 
meaning as "use." 
The classic analysis of family resemblance occurs in a passage in 
which Wittgenstein examines the concept of "game." When we look at 
things we call games—such as card games, ball games, board games, ring 
around the rosy, twenty questions, and so on—we may wonder: 
 
What is common to them all?— Don’t say: "There must be 
something common, or they would not all be called ‘games’"—
but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For 
if you look at them, you will not see something common to all, 
but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. 
To repeat: don’t think, but look! Look for example at board-
games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-
games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, 
but many common features drop out, and others appear. When 
we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained but 
much is lost.—Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with 
noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or 
competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games 
there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at 
the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look 
at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the differences 
between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games 
like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but 
how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And 
we can go through many, many other groups of games in the 
same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And 
the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these 
similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, features, 
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-
cross in the same way.3 
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We find the same kinds of when we look at the central terms we use 
to define and understand our culture: "corporation," "economics," "political 
power," "government," "sex," "family," "experiment," "science," "prayer," 
"the spiritual," "teacher," "school," and "culture." 
(Note: Criticisms of this analysis which employ the distinction 
between "directly exhibited features" and "relational attributes" are 
mistaken—at least in almost all of the cases relevant to social theory. The 
key terms used to define relational attributes like "the potentiality of a game 
to be of absorbing non-practical interest to either participant or spectators" 
are, themselves, family resemblance notions. So the terms they might define, 
like game," are as well.4) 
Political scientists have expended enormous energy trying to define 
power. Sociologists have done the same with status. The results have been 
frustrating insofar as they tried to develop a clear definition that can be 
stated axiomatically and consistently operationalized. The source of such 
frustration lies in the structure of these concepts. The concepts are not 
axiomatic in structure—their meaning cannot be stated in an axiomatic 
definition the way Euclid gave the meaning of "straight line." As they are 
employed by social agents to understand and structure their activity, these 
notions simply are not straight line concepts. 
We can see now not only why the Galilean quest for mathematical 
theories of social reality has met so much failure but also why in one case, 
economics, it seems to have met with some success. In most arenas of life, 
the concepts that social reality are not axiomatizable and so the reality they 
define cannot be characterized in the neat, quantitative formula of algebra. 
But there is one arena in which people define reality with numbers and speak 
the language of mathematics, namely when they are producing and 
distributing quantities of goods and services. Because business people speak 
mathematics, economists studying them can and must employ mathematical 
language to describe and explain their activity. 
Other social scientists often hold up economics as a promising 
example of the kind of Galilean theory they seek in their own fields. This is 
a fundamental mistake. Economics is "the exception that proves the rule" 
because the reason that the use of algebraic formulae in it is successful is 
precisely the same reason why the use elsewhere must fail. Researchers must 
employ the language of the people they study. In economic activity it is 
mathematical; elsewhere it is not. Based on economists’ successes, 
sociologists studying street people should draw this moral: Their theories 
should employ street talk. 
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To sum up this chapter: Competent social research requires a 
participatory understanding. It requires a mastery of the language the 
community uses to structure its own activities. Competent understanding of 
that language requires participation in the activities of the community 
speaking it because it is only through such practice in varying contexts that 
we can learn to navigate our way about the networks of resemblance and 
contrast that constitute the meanings of terms. And participation is required 
for a second and even more important group of reasons as well. Crucial 
features of the contexts that determine proper usage for terms are non-
verbal. Proper assessment of them requires knowledge by acquaintance, 
expressive understanding, and know-how. 
Overall, at this stage, two points should already be clear and a third 
should follow rather plainly. First, we cannot understand someone’s account 
of his or her activity in piecemeal bits; the meanings of terms and claims and 
values are context-dependent, the meanings of sentences are holistic. 
Second, to understand the ground level elements of people’s views of what 
they are doing and why, we must acquire non-propositional knowledge 
(knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding, and know-how) 
which requires participation. These two points can be summed up by saying 
that to understand the intentional structures of meaning that are constitutive 
of people’s activity, we must enter into their world. 
A third point follows from these. To make peace with others, we need 
to understand them and their social world by entering into it with them. 
Peacemaking requires participation in other people’s communities. Until we 
begin to take part, we cannot even understand what they are doing and why, 
let alone learn how to reconcile their differences and ours. 
To say that a participatory understanding of the language and practice 
of a community is required for competent understanding is not to say that 
such understanding is sufficient. A simple participatory understanding does 
not provide fully adequate descriptions and explanations of social activity. 
But it does provide the necessary starting point—the understanding which 
must be critiqued and revised in ways we are about to consider. 
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CHAPTER 12 
 
 
The Understanding Required for Peace: 
Critical Participatory Research 
 
 
 
ne way to solve you problems at home is to leave. One way to eliminate 
conflict with others is to break off all relations with them. But, in most 
contexts, the peace we would like to make is not the kind in which we are 
simply left alone. It is the kind in which we attempt to arrive at an 
agreement—the sort of an agreement we might call "an understanding." 
Such "understandings" in the special sense require understanding in the 
more inclusive sense. So, to intelligently make peace with others, we need to 
understand them. 
Further, regardless of what we want to do with others, whether it is a 
matter of swinging real estate deals or making war, the better we understand 
them, the better our chances for success. We seek such understanding day in 
and day out. The art of acquiring insight into others—the kind we pursue for 
our personal ends—is a basic coping skill in life. The background 
understanding we require may be rather simple or quite complex. But 
whether this understanding required is minimal or detailed, when we try to 
acquire it we start to engage in a kind of social research. In that sense, we 
are all social researchers. 
How should we do such research? How can we best cultivate our 
understanding of others? A participatory understanding of them on their own 
terms is a start. But it does not go far enough. Their own understandings of 
themselves are rarely, if ever, adequate. 
People’s own understanding of their activity is typically flawed in five 
sorts of ways. It is vague, implicit, inconsistent, incomplete, and inaccurate. 
So, as social researchers, we must seek to remedy these flaws in order to 
adequately understand what people are doing and why. This is true whether 
our research is aimed to provide us with knowledge of peacemaking, 
warring, or simple knowledge for knowledge’s own sake. However, 
something surprising and important turns out to be the case. It concerns a 
relationship between research and certain kinds of peacemaking. 
To remedy the five sorts of flaws that infect people’s participatory 
understanding of themselves, researchers undertake an activity which 
O 
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involves them in making certain kinds of peace between themselves and the 
people they study. It also involves researchers in making a kind of peace 
among the people themselves who are studied. In social research, certain 
kinds of peacemaking are indispensable steps toward understanding. This 
point has nothing to do with the ethics of research—as though once we 
completed our research we were somehow obliged to use it to make peace. 
The point is that a limited but important kind of peacemaking is an intrinsic 
element of research itself, a part of its methodology—even if our interests 
are purely cognitive. 
 
 
THE VAGUE AND THE IMPLICIT 
 
People’s self-understandings are always vague or implicit to some 
degree, and this feature cannot be eradicated. This is a basic feature of 
general beliefs and knowledge by acquaintance, expressive understanding 
and know-how. It serves, in part, to explain why participatory understanding 
is required. But this is not to say that such vague and tacit understanding is a 
virtue. Often self understandings are vague or implicit in ways that place 
unnecessary obstacles in the path of an activity. 
Police officers may have knowledge by acquaintance of types of 
disorderly people and disruptive conduct. It may be a knowledge by 
acquaintance which they have learned from familiarity with paradigm cases 
and tips from fellow officers. But the researcher wants to understand in as 
explicit a way as possible, just what the significant features of these 
paradigms are and what the meaning of these tips and hints is. And the 
officers themselves may have an interest in trying to acquire more explicit 
understanding of this sort so they can improve the speed and accuracy of 
their responses to situations, justify them more readily, and teach new 
officers to make proper identifications for themselves. 
For similar reasons, political orators, lawyers, and arms negotiators 
seek more definite and articulate accounts of what they are doing and why 
they are doing it. Because clear and explicit formulation is one of the 
hallmarks of understanding, researchers must seek these things as well. 
In this regard, researchers and their subjects stand in a "win/win" 
relation to each other. The more clearly and explicitly the subjects of the 
research understand themselves, the easier the task of the researcher is. The 
clearer and more explicit the account that the researcher arrives at, the more 
useful it can be to the subjects themselves. There are, of course, cases in 
which people have an interest in deceiving themselves or others, a point to 
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which we will return. But apart from these cases, subjects and researchers 
share in a common interest in understanding. Their differences are not points 
of conflict between competing agents, they are problems or puzzles to be 
solved by joint inquiry where each benefits from a furthering of the other’s 
interests. 
The joint character of the inquiry bears emphasis. Each brings 
something distinctive to it. The subject brings the activity to be understood. 
The researcher brings a new or different perspective which raises questions 
the subject might never have asked or which suggests answers the subject 
might not have thought of proposing. Something rather analogous to this 
occurs, of course, in studies of natural phenomena. But there, the researcher 
"interrogates" things by manipulating them. In social research, the 
interrogation can occur in a literal dialogue. Moreover, it must. 
In explicating someone’s practices or values or beliefs, the researcher 
must propose what seems to be a clearer and more explicit account and then 
inquire of the subject: "Is this what you are saying and doing?" "Is that what 
you are really after?" In large part, this is because what gives the agent’s 
activity its determinacy is the self-understanding with which he or she 
determines it, the intentional interpretations which make an arm movement a 
wave to a friend instead of a signal to another motorist. Apart from the cases 
of deception, if the subjects refuse to adopt the researchers proposed 
explication, then the researcher is simply wrong—though this is not to deny 
he may be on the right track. Since the researcher is trying to explicate the 
subjects’ self-understanding and their activity which is structured by it, their 
assent to the researcher’s account provides a crucial index of its accuracy. 
The researcher/subject relation is just like that between a commentator 
and an author of a text. The commentator may criticize an author’s words, 
suggest implicit assumptions are being made, diagnose vague passages, and 
propose clearer and more explicit formulations of what the author is trying 
to say. But—again, apart from deception— the author remains the final 
authority on what he was trying to do and say and what values he was trying 
to realize. 
This means that in normal cases the researcher and the people she 
studies are related to each other not as a manipulator to a group of things or 
"objects" but as one subject to another subject, as I to thou—as participant in 
a dialogue. And it is a dialogue which in its own limited way provides a 
paradigm of peacemaking. For here human differences are conceived of not 
as latent conflicts between people with opposed interests but as shared 
problems to be resolved in mutual agreement. 
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INCONSISTENCY 
 
A second flaw common to self-understanding is incoherence. People 
often have practices, beliefs or values which are inconsistent with one 
another. In this respect, they are in conflict with themselves. 
A racist may have a practice of seeing blacks as animal-like and 
treating them as inferiors to be ordered about—and yet also have a practice 
of seeing doctors as imposing figures of authority and treating them as 
superiors to be obeyed. Then, one day, as a draftee in the army, he is placed 
under the care of a black doctor. He becomes anxious and unsettled. He is 
forced to respond to conflicting visual cues. Incompatible gestures and 
actions are elicited. He "cannot believe his own eyes" and does not know 
whether to look up with respect or look down with a sneer. He is incapable 
of responding automatically and without hesitation. He remains undecided 
when he thinks about what to do. He is undecided because he is confused, 
and confused because the norms governing his own perceptual categories 
and patterns of gesture are inconsistent in this case. 
To take another example, a general formulating nuclear strategy might 
work with the assumptions that there is no defense against the Soviet’s 
nuclear weapons and that we can win a nuclear war—and yet find, in the 
end, that these two beliefs are inconsistent. They cannot both be true. Or a 
labor leader might commit himself to bringing about import quotas that will, 
in the long run, raise his people’s wages, increase the number of jobs in their 
field, and not cause inflation—and then find that these may be inconsistent 
goals, since they cannot all be achieved. 
Inconsistencies of these sorts are a problem for the people themselves 
as well as the researchers studying them. The subjects have not made up 
their minds, they have not decided which of the two logically incompatible 
practices or beliefs or values are the ones they actually want to adopt. They 
literally do not know what they are doing. Their activity itself is unsettled 
and indeterminate. For the researcher, this means that the reality she is 
studying is itself incoherent and not determinate and consistent account of 
what is going on can be offered. So both the researcher and the subjects have 
an interest in eliminating the incoherence. They have a joint interest in 
making a kind of peace—the kind involved in putting an end to conflicts 
internal to the subjects’ own activity. 
There will, of course, be a variety of ways in which this can be done. 
The racist may reform his treatment of blacks, change his manner in dealing 
with doctors, or introduce a new category—the black professional—who is 
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to be dealt with in some third way. The general may decide to drop his belief 
that a nuclear war can be won or his supposition that no defense is possible. 
The point is simply that until some revision of this sort is made, the racist 
and the general and the union officer simply do not know what they are 
doing or what they believe and value. 
Qua social theorist, the researcher has no interest in which way her 
subjects make up their minds. But she does have a cognitive interest in 
getting them to make their minds up in one way or another. Her cognitive 
interest is in getting them to render their activity determinate so it can then 
be understood in a coherent and determinate way. Metallurgists have an 
interest in purifying ore so that they have homogenous metals whose 
properties can then be known. Similarly, the social researcher has an interest 
in promoting the elimination of internal conflicts in the subjects she studies 
so that a coherent account can be developed. 
This point applies to conflicts internal to communities as well as 
individuals. The norms by which a community regulates its activity may be 
incoherent. A classic case is that of the tragic Antigone in the play by 
Sophocles. She is obliged by kinship to bury her parents properly and yet 
obliged by citizenship to obey her lord Creon’s order to leave their bodies 
outside the city walls. Because most of us are involved in multiple roles and 
multiple sets of institutional norms, such conflicts are a matter of daily 
difficulty. We find ourselves thrust into situations in which we face 
incompatible obligations as teacher and friend, or as doctor pledged to 
promote health at all costs and as a hospital employee under contract to 
maximize profits. 
These conflicting roles place us in relations of opposition not only 
with ourselves but also with other members of such institutions who are 
obliged to monitor and enforce the performance of such duties. These are not 
simply personal conflicts between people who simply differ in their 
preferences. They are inconsistencies in the corporate norms adopted by the 
community itself. Antigone’s problem is one which any member of the 
community might face if placed in her position and one which all do face 
indirectly as bystanders forced to choose some way of treating her. They 
must decide whether to make an exception to the norms of kinship or those 
of citizenship or else revise one or both in some way that will eliminate the 
inconsistency. Until this is done, the community has not collectively "made 
up its mind." It has not determined what are the proper norms for judging 
people in such positions and dealing with them. 
The incoherencies in this first group involve conflicting ends. They 
derive from conflicts in the ways in which the community institutionalizes 
  91 
ends such as family solidarity and civic loyalty or the promotion of health 
and profit. But incoherence can take a variety of other forms. 
Some are only discovered once we begin to look at unexpected cases 
that come up. Others involve inconsistencies that seem to make virtually 
every case confusing. Parents lay down rules and then kids discover the rules 
are inconsistent. Judges are continually confronted with cases where two 
laws apply and each prescribes the opposite decision. The members of a 
community share the goal of building trust and decide to all follow a rule of 
"complete honesty." But then they discover that "complete honesty"—at east 
the kind they had in mind—causes pain, anxiety, and withdrawal. 
Other inconsistencies may involve "double binds" that seem to apply 
to almost every case and make it confusing. A child in the back seat is told: 
"Shut up and enjoy the trip!" Colleges are required to integrate by using 
goals but not quotas and they are required to favor the admission of one 
group without disfavoring the admission of others or practicing "reverse 
discrimination." Parents may feel they must let their children grow into 
independent adulthood by making their own decisions and make sure that 
the right decisions about drugs, sex, and career choices are the ones the child 
makes, In a very similar way, the leaders of a superpower may find 
themselves committed to promoting the independence of countries in their 
sphere of influence and maintaining supremacy in their sphere. 
There is a host of other types of inconsistency that can characterize 
the policies of communities or nations. Many arise because these corporate 
entities are pressured from within by groups with inconsistent values or 
goals. The Pentagon dreads getting involved in a war in Central America, 
the CIA sees the area as a manageable arena for exercising U.S. might, 
fundamentalist churches want to fight the spread of communism in El 
Salvador, and Catholics demand that the killing of their missionaries stop. 
The result is a recipe for inconsistent foreign policy in the area. 
Or farmers in Kansas want to sell wheat to the Soviets, machinists in 
Connecticut want to build weapons for McDonald Aircraft, doctors in 
Massachusetts want to halt the arms race, and ethnic groups in Wisconsin 
want to get tough on communism. In this case, as we shall see in Chapter 18, 
the sources of inconsistency are especially complex and profound. But be 
the reason what they may, it should be clear on the face of it that policy 
makers in both the Soviet Union and the United States find themselves 
caught in a web of conflicting goals and norms. They have incentives both to 
deploy new weapons in order to strengthen their position and make demands 
on their opponents and to take the initiative in halting the arms race in order 
to cut its economic cost and the potential danger it brings. 
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The nuclear arms race is difficult to understand because the 
participants are operating under conflicting norms. In that sense, they do not 
themselves know what they are doing. If a Soviet backed army invaded 
Saudi Arabia, would the United States respond by using tactical nuclear 
weapons? If so, how would the Soviets respond? No one knows. This is not 
because the answer is a well kept secret. It is because the norms the 
superpowers operate under are inconsistent and their own intentions and 
future actions are indeterminate. This means that the social reality that arms 
researchers wish to understand is itself indeterminate. To know it more fully, 
researchers would need to get it to become more fully determinate. Out of a 
purely cognitive desire to know in an accurate and determinate way, 
researchers must attempt to formulate more consistent policies and get 
participants involved to adopt some such set of coherent policies. 
It is important to emphasize that this interest of the researcher is a 
cognitive one, not a moral interest, and it has important limitations. As 
regards the researchers’ cognitive interest, it does not matter how the 
inconsistencies are resolved, it only matters that they are resolved. If our aim 
is simply to understand the activities of people, a consistent racism or 
integrationalist view—or a consistent militarism or pacifism—will each do 
equally as well. Each will provide a determinacy to the beliefs and the plans 
and actions of the people studied. The point is simply that until some such 
consistency is achieved, the object of the researcher’s inquiry will remain 
incoherent and indeterminate—and it will not be an object capable of being 
fully understood. 
The subjects themselves share the researcher’s cognitive interest in 
consistency. This point is important and basic, but it is easy to overlook. 
There is a temptation to suppose that consistency is just a preference 
logicians and theorists have—a bias other people may not share. And in one 
kind of case, something like that is true: if I demand that your beliefs be 
consistent with mine, then I am imposing my values on you. However, self-
consistency is a universal value that everyone holds. 
The reason is that there is always one person a human never wants to 
disagree with, namely, himself. This is not because people have an innate 
dive to obey some law of logic that tells them to only hold consistent beliefs. 
And it is not as though there is even some single, standard, uniform concept 
of consistency that everyone ought to adopt. Inconsistency is, itself, an open 
concept—a family resemblance notion. The central thread of the idea is, 
roughly, that two inconsistent statements are ones that mean two things that 
cannot both be true. We cannot believe both; we must make up our minds to 
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believe one or the other. But different concepts of meaning, truth, and mind 
will give us different concepts of precisely what inconsistency involves. 
At a week-long conference in Hawaii, a western philosopher talked 
with an oriental one for days—with mounting frustration. "You keep 
contradicting yourself!" he finally shouted. "Well, in a sense, yes..." was the 
reply. "But you just can’t do that!" There was a pause, and then a smile, and 
then the oriental philosopher replied: "Oh, but we have been doing this 
successfully for hundreds of years!" To take another example of which we 
have already considered in some detail, maieutic reasoners have a different, 
much more fluid notion of inconsistency than eristic reasoners because they 
suppose that meaning is holistic, truth is emergent, and mind is communal in 
character. 
But whatever we mean by meaning, truth, and mind, there remains 
some basic conception of successfully believing something that provides us 
with a notion of self-consistency that we ourselves are committed to. 
Inconsistent beliefs are simply those that we cannot—given our views about 
the nature of belief—successfully believe together. We may thoughtlessly 
think we believe both and carelessly say we do but we cannot succeed. Until 
we choose one or the other we simply have not made up our minds and we 
do not yet know what we believe at all. 
With regard to consistency, the researcher is, again, related to the 
subjects being studied in the way a commentator is related to the author of a 
text. If author voices inconsistent views, we cannot understand her because 
she does not understand herself. She has not made up her mind as to just 
what it is that she holds. As commentators, we can propose alternative ways 
of rationally reconstructing her views. But unless she adopts one, and until 
she does, we cannot determine what she really thinks because she does not 
yet really think anything. She is undecided. The words and deeds of social 
agents likewise provide a kind of text to be interpreted and understood 
through explication and rational reconstruction. And the activity of 
rationally reconstructing such inconsistent views and getting agents to adopt 
consistent ones constitutes a limited kind of peacemaking which is an 
intrinsic part of the method of proper social research. 
Besides explicit clarity and consistency, two further hall marks of 
understanding are completeness and accuracy. The ways people understand 
their own activity are typically deficient in both. 
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INCOMPLETENESS AND INACCURACY 
 
In trying to understand social reality we want to avoid adopting 
accounts that are only partial or inaccurate. We want the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth. Neither is easy to come by. 
Partiality is pervasive. When we humans act, our understanding of 
what we are doing is littered with two sorts of incompleteness. On the one 
hand, there are physical facts and natural laws that provide the complex 
physical setting we must interpret and take into account. On the other hand, 
there are the interpretive activities of other people which we need to 
understand and deal with. We are continually trying to expand our 
understanding of both things, and continually falling short in our 
achievement. 
So far as the physical facts and laws go, I need to have at least some 
minimal understanding in order to make my way about the world at all. 
When I act, I aim to intervene in nature, to change the course of the physical 
events. I adopt some view of what the physical facts are and what the 
physical consequences of my acts will be. But the causes of those facts 
extend back indefinitely, and the consequences of my acts extend into the 
future with a similar unknown and indefinite ramification. 
This is as true of the corporate actions of a community as it is true of 
the individual deeds of a single person. To understand either fully, we want 
to push two questions as far as we can: 1. Why is this being done? And 2. 
What is being done? The first leads us to look for the causes of the facts 
taken into account by the actors. A tribe is migrating because of crop 
failures. Very well then, what caused the crops to fail? Climatic shifts? The 
activities of new parasites? But then what caused these? 
The second question leads us to look for the unintended consequences 
of actions—the aspects of what is being done that were not "meant." What, 
for example, are the effects that practices of monoculture have on the soil? 
What consequences do these effects have for the nutrient cycles and other 
aspects of the physical environment? We may be able to find out what 
people are attempting to do without pursuing such questions, but we will 
need to pursue them at length if we want to know in full what it is they are 
actually doing. 
Such questions arise—and call for explanations drawing on natural 
science—even when the physical environment is artificial. Whether we are 
in a prison, a factory, or a class room, we will find that noise, heat, and 
humidity affect people’s moods and behaviors. Prisoners, workers, and 
students are not unaware of these. But when a riotous activity break out and 
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we subsequently try to find out why, we are led to look back at the earlier, 
unknown physical events that made the machinery break down or made the 
moisture accumulate. Similarly, if people smoke in a conference room or 
burn high sulphur coal in heating plants, a full understanding of what they 
are doing should include and account of the physical consequences of these 
things—consequences of which they may be unaware. 
It is obvious that we will never understand all these causes and 
consequences, but it is just as obvious that the more we understand, the 
better. One of the tasks of social researchers is to seek complete 
understanding in just these ways—ways in which the self-understanding of 
the research subjects will typically be glaringly deficient. 
So far as the social setting of our action goes, we are in the same boat. 
It is a boat balanced on the tip of an iceberg extending far beneath the water 
level of our understanding. We cannot make our way far in the world 
without at least some minimal knowledge of the intentions of others and the 
customs and institutions of the communities with which we deal. But a 
social researcher seeking to fully understand what we are doing (and why) 
needs to explore the iceberg of social reality. To understand the complex 
network of interchanges occurring when Cuban immigrants riot in Miami or 
strike breakers attack union members at a Kentucky coal mine, an account of 
one person’s—or one group’s—side of the story does not suffice. A 
critically refined holistic and participatory understanding of other people’s 
activities is also required. 
This point is basic and obvious. But in trying to take it into account, 
people commonly make two fundamental sorts of errors. One error appears 
often as the "common sense" of people who are not professional researchers. 
It is the mistake of supposing that every story has two sides. An informal 
study was made by former ambassador Harlan Cleveland while he was 
working at the state department. He examined all the issues that came across 
his desk in the course of one representative week. He found that the average 
issue had not 2 sides, but 5.6 of them. Perhaps failure to note how many 
sides a story can have is common because of a money fetish. We say "every 
coin has two sides," and then generalize. The saying ignores the obvious fact 
that if you look closely at a newly minted coin you find that it has edges all 
over and a wondrous multiplicity of angles. The events of our lives are no 
different. What we want is an understanding that is not merely bi-partial, but 
im-partial—an understanding that grasps each part of the story and fits it into 
a larger whole. 
The second error is one often made by professional researchers. It 
consists in the mistake of supposing that impartiality is a matter offering 
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value free explanations in a sanitized terminology. Neutrality is sought by 
refusing to use the value laden terms employed by the people being studied. 
So researchers speak of "incidents" rather than brawls or battles and talk of 
"body counts" rather than dead soldiers and corpses of children. 
We have already seen that such efforts at sanitizing language are a 
mistake. They keep social theory emotionally sterile only by avoiding 
bringing it into contact with the reality it ought to describe and explain. Here 
the point to note is that the completeness of understanding we should seek in 
doing social research does not require sterility in order to be "objective." It 
requires, instead, a synthesis of multiple partial perspectives in order to 
achieve the impartiality or "multi-partiality" that can give us a fuller 
understanding. 
The synthesis of multiple perspectives leads to a kind of structural 
understanding of social interactions that goes well beyond a mere clumping 
together of partial accounts. In a sense, if economists only sought 
impartiality in their research, they might simply compile the accounts of the 
various workers and capitalists and consumers engaged in transactions. But 
if economists aim at completeness of understanding in a fuller sense, then 
they will try to determine what are the systematic social antecedents and 
consequences of individuals’ actions. 
If one seller in a market dominated by a handful of oligopolies lowers 
prices, what decisions does this motivate others to make? If all lower prices, 
how does this change the interests and decisions of investors and 
consumers? Much of economic theory is, in effect, a kind of systematic 
calculus for understanding structural patterns in the ways in which changes 
in the marketplace alter the motives relevant to people’s decisions and lead 
them—if they are economically rational—to alter their decisions. 
Economic "laws" differ from the laws of physics because they only 
characterize how agents ought to behave if those agents adopt a certain type 
of rationality. Such "laws" do not describe how people must act. Economic 
theories provide systematic predictions of social consequences that can be 
expected, rather than natural effects that are inevitable. Yet, because 
participants in the economic system are in fact usually socialized to reason 
and decide in economically rational ways, these "laws" provide a much more 
complete insight into the dynamics of the marketplace than individual 
economic agents can, themselves, normally offer. 
In sum, researchers who undertake to develop a critical participatory 
understanding of social activity should seek completeness, then, by studying 
the physical causes of the natural setting in which people act as well as the 
physical consequences of those actions. And they should likewise seek 
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completeness by aiming at an impartial understanding of the social 
interactions as well as a structural understanding of the social antecedents 
and social consequences of actions. 
In seeking completeness of understanding, the social researcher finds 
herself involved in activities of peacemaking again—in two sorts of ways 
earlier discussed. On the one hand, she stands in a win/win relation with the 
subjects insofar as they themselves seek more complete understanding so as 
to increase the efficacy of their actions. On the other hand, she has a 
(limited) cognitive interest in reconciling inconsistencies between partial 
views of different participants. If they have conflicting ways of perceiving 
and defining actors and deeds, and conflicting ways of responding, then the 
characteristics of the people and their acts remain indeterminate. To 
illustrate this, consider a contrast. 
First take the case of a biennial negotiation between union officials 
and corporation officers. In such a case, the participants usually understand 
each other rather thoroughly—they are going through the moves of a 
complex game or ritual familiar to each side. People will not, of course, 
usually lay all their cards on the table at the start. But each side knows what 
sort of cards are there to be played and what the import of each move in the 
ritual is. In contrast, consider a case in which the people involved have 
fundamentally different views about what the negotiation is about. Suppose 
they differ as well in their perceptions of each other’s motivations and 
actions. What one intends is not what the other observes. Perhaps the U.S. 
State Department is trying to negotiate with some Iranian students. Or 
perhaps two spouses are trying to reconcile very fundamental differences. In 
such cases, it is difficult for a researcher to say who is doing what because 
there is a lack of shared conventions which the subjects themselves can use 
to define their own activity. 
I am having a fight with my spouse. Lots of different issues are 
brought up and the argument becomes agonizingly overheated. I try to be a 
good sport and end it all with a handshake or a hug so "the game of marriage 
can play on." But she understands marital disputes by analogy to the 
Catholic doctrines of sin and redemption—not by analogy to sports. So my 
gesture of a kiss or a hug cannot come out as I intended. 
In looking at me she sees the gesture as that of a penitent kneeling 
before a priest. I see my own gesture as something like a competitor’s 
handshake which is simply intended to let bygones be bygones. So she will 
not respond as I expect and I will be uncertain as to how to complete the act. 
She will be in the same boat. My gesture comes off as neither penitence nor 
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egalitarian reconciliation per se. It is a bit of both, a bit of neither, and 
something more as well—something yet to be defined. 
In trying to understand such action, the social researcher has a 
cognitive interest in reconciling our views so as to make acts like this more 
determinate and intelligible. The point applies to differences in ways people 
like my wife and I view verbal insults, slaps, and intensive silence. The 
researcher has a cognitive interest in pursuing a limited form of 
peacemaking—the limited sort involved in getting us to agree on the ways in 
which we disagree. Only when we settle that difference can we know what 
we are doing to each other and give our actions a definiteness that makes 
them determinate, intelligible objects of cognition. 
Here again, the subjects of the research are, at least in normal cases, 
in a win/win relation with the researcher. For they themselves seek to know 
what they are doing just as much as the researcher does. It may be, of 
course, that the most fundamental desire of each spouse is to hurt the other. 
But even then, they will want to eliminate conflicts in their understanding of 
each other’s words and deeds. Each will want to understand the other as well 
as possible—in order to be as effective as they can in realizing their sadistic 
ends. 
This is true, at least, in normal cases. But "in normal cases" is, 
perhaps not quite the right way to qualify the point. Clearly some sort of 
qualification is needed, however, because there are important sorts of cases 
in which researchers and subjects do not share a common interest in 
promoting the understanding of what is being done and why. 
People can have an interest in deceiving others or themselves. When 
they do, their relation to the researcher is one of conflict. The case of those 
trying to deceive others is clear. The conflicts of interest between the 
researcher and the liar or propagandist are rather straightforward, at least at 
the start. (Once each begins to try to manipulate, then things can become 
rather complex.) The researcher wants to know what is actually going on; 
the deceiver does not want it—or at least all of it—to be known by others. 
The relation of the self-deceiver to the researcher is usually more 
ambivalent. This is because self-deception is ambivalent in essence. 
Consider a working class conservative who deceives himself about his 
chances for upward mobility. Or take the case of a national security officer 
(with past and projected future ties to corporate interests) who deceives 
herself about her motives in promoting a new weapons system. Each is in 
the peculiar position of both knowing the truth and not knowing it. If both 
simply knew it, then they would not have deceived themselves. If they did 
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not know, then they would not have deceived themselves—for deceit 
presupposes knowledge of that about which we lie. 
This split in awareness is usually coupled with a split in interests. The 
working middle class conservative may be aware at some level that he 
stands to gain much—in the long run—by coming to terms with the fact that 
his chances for upward mobility are insignificant, Yet he may also be aware 
at some level that the pain involved in doing this is—in the short run—great, 
and perhaps the effort is not worthwhile. 
In a case like this, the researcher may find that her diagnosis of the 
self-deception meets resistance from the subject and yet that he, at some 
level, also acknowledges its truth. (One may find insistence in his words, but 
resignation in his eyes. 
On the other hand, lying to oneself may be quite beneficial in some 
cases. The national security officer may lose much and gain little by 
admitting to herself that her efforts at the Senate Hearing on nuclear 
weapons are motivated by interests in her own future employment 
opportunities rather than concerns over recent developments in Soviet 
armaments. 
In both cases, the researcher faces a very difficult problem. To some 
extent, a diagnosis can be formulated in terms of observations of the subject 
and verified independently of the subject’s assent. There are a variety of 
ways in which we can tell when people are kidding themselves, including 
characteristic types of gestures, postures, emotional responses, 
inconsistencies in words and deeds and discontinuities in reasoning. But it is 
very difficult to say exactly how they are kidding themselves. For their own 
understanding of what they are doing is tacit—you cannot purposefully and 
explicitly lie to yourself unless you have a genuinely split personality of the 
pathological sort. So the diagnosis of a self-deception involves the 
explication of some tacit understanding. And this, as we saw earlier, requires 
the assent of the subject for its full confirmation—or perhaps it would be 
better to say that such assent is required for its fully determinate and explicit 
instantiation or actualization. Tacit understandings and intentions cannot be 
fully known because they are not fully determinate. 
This means that the researcher has a cognitive interest in eliminating 
self-deception. Psychotherapists cannot fully understand their patients until 
they have cured them. Social theorists cannot fully understand the false 
consciousness of a class, sex, or ethnic group until they get its members to 
raise their consciousness. Just as metal ore freed of random impurities is a 
more intelligible object of cognition, similarly people liberated from mental 
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illness or false consciousness are more intelligible subjects of research. They 
are more knowledgeable. 
Deception of self or others is a species of a more general type of 
inadequacy in research subjects’ self-understanding, namely: inaccuracy. 
Other sorts of inaccuracy—arising from errors or shortcomings in 
observation, judgment, or reasoning—are ones the subjects themselves have 
an interest in eliminating. With the researcher, they share an interest in 
learning what these inaccuracies are, how they have arisen, and how they 
can be prevented in the future. In that regard, this inadequacy is like the 
other four we have considered. 
The criteria we have been discussing separately apply conjointly. The 
webs of interpretations people use to understand their own activities usually 
have all five flaws we have discussed. In part, this is because such webs are 
networks of holistically related interpretations in which flaws in any one part 
inform—or, rather, misinform—the other parts. But in many cases, a 
particular focus of our thought or our response to a situation is infected 
directly with all five flaws at once. This is perhaps most often the case with 
the responses we tend to classify as emotions. 
Someone honks a horn or shouts at us and in anger we honk or holler 
back. Or one nation’s ambassador performs the diplomatic equivalent of 
shouting and the ambassador of another answers in kind. We are vague 
about why we are angry and what we intend to accomplish with the shout. 
We are perhaps tacitly acting as though we believed that no one should ever 
shout like that and that shouting only escalates irrational confrontation and 
so, in accusation, we—inconsistently—shout back. We have only a partial 
understanding of why they honked or hollered and how they will interpret 
our response. And we inaccurately believe they did it deliberately to cause 
us pain or humiliation—rather than as a response to their own blind panic or 
as an attempt to warn us of an oncoming collision of cars or military forces. 
In cases such as this, a more adequate understanding will alter our 
behavior significantly. And researchers who believe they have a more 
adequate understanding can put their theory to the test by trying to persuade 
people to adopt their account—and seeing if the behavior is altered. 
So far, then, the upshot of our discussion in Part III has been this. To 
make peace with people, we need to understand them. To understand them, 
we need to engage in a holistic and participatory research which treats social 
reality as structured in purposive, value-laden, institutional and non-
axiomatizable ways. 
Further, our research must be a critical participatory one. It must seek to 
remedy the inadequacies of participants’ own self-understandings which are 
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vague, tacit, inconsistent, partial and inaccurate. It must seek to do so 
through explications, rational reconstructions, elaborations that yield 
completeness, and critiques of inaccuracies that result from deception or 
error. 
As researchers undertaking such inquiry, we find ourselves— except 
in cases of deception—in win/win relations with the people we are studying. 
Further, we have a cognitive interest in the kind of peacemaking involved in 
eliminating conflicts in their own practices, beliefs, and values as well as 
conflicts between their own understandings of social reality and those of the 
people with whom they interact. In the first respect, our cognitive activity is 
intrinsically peaceable. In the second, we find peacemaking (of a limited 
sort) is an intrinsic part of our cognitive enterprise. Even if our extra-
cognitive interests are those of warmakers rather than peacemakers, we find 
that the limited forms of peacemaking specified above are an integral part of 
the proper method of social research itself. In cases of self-deception, we 
have a cognitive interest in liberating the people we study from their mental 
illness or false consciousness. (In cases in which they wish to deceive others, 
our cognitive interests place us in conflict with their practical interests.) 
A key test of the adequacy of an account offered by a social 
researcher is the success she finds in getting subjects to assent to the account 
offered and adopt it in practice. An explication or reconstruction of 
someone’s activity may be resisted by them, especially insofar as they are 
engaged in self-deception. But apart from this adoption, the account remains 
tentative at best. For the structures of the agents’ actions are provided by 
their own self-understandings. It is the agents’ intentions that constitute the 
social reality that the researcher seeks to describe and explain. 
This last point applies to the book you are reading now. The book 
aims to offer a kind of holistic and participatory understanding of the 
practices connected with peace. If the explication, reconstruction, 
elaboration, and critique offered in these pages is rejected by readers such as 
yourself, this indicates the account is either false or has been misunderstood. 
The account of social research and understanding which we have 
developed here differs markedly from the Galilean view which has 
dominated mainstream social science. Correlative to this difference in views 
of understanding is a difference in views of the nature of rational action. As 
we will see in Part IV, the distinctive, emerging views of understanding on 
the one hand and action on the other provide a framework for developing a 
conception of peace as a positively distinguished activity. 
The two are closely related to one another. Mohandas K. Gandhi did 
extraordinary amounts of patient research in the course of his satyagraha 
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campaigns, but his inquiries were not searches for Galilean understanding of 
the sort aimed at by contemporary social scientists. And the research he did 
yielded a different approach to action—one which was distinctively non-
instrumental in character. 
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CHAPTER 13 
 
 
The Process of Action: 
Rational Activity as Cultivation 
 
 
 
The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there 
is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the 
end as there is between the seed and the tree. 
M. K. Gandhi 
 
 
 
ction is born of understanding. While Galilean understanding prescribes 
one kind of action (the instrumental), critical social research prescribes 
another. Some of its peculiar features are already clear. For example, critical 
social research calls for certain (limited) kinds of peacemaking. It makes 
these a part of the research process itself. But there are even more profound 
differences as basic as those between an acorn and a catapult. Both can put 
oak in the air, but in very distinctive ways. One grows it upward, the other 
flings it toward the sky. 
The Galilean view holds that we act rationally only when we know 
how we believe the world works, what we want (our ends), and how 
(through what means) we plan to cause our desires to be realized. Our 
beliefs about these things can, of course, be wrong. Rational actors can make 
mistakes. But we need to have clear beliefs about these things in order to be 
in the rational ballpark of people who are trying to rationally 
(instrumentally) manipulate means to achieve their ends, We surely will not 
receive grants from the National Science Foundation and we will probably 
not be viewed as rational agents if we cannot give clear answers to questions 
like: "What are your objectives, that is, what are you trying to accomplish? 
Also, what means do you plan to employ to achieve these goals?" 
Many of us often have difficulty answering questions like these. In 
part this is because we are not perhaps as smart as we would like. But often 
the problem is more basic. There are many times when these sorts of 
questions seem inappropriate. 
A 
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Suppose I am trying to write a novel or invent a new scientific theory, 
if someone wants a detailed account of it ahead of time—or he or she will 
only fund this activity if I say precisely what I am going to do—then I might 
as well not bother to apply for the grant. After all, if I already knew what the 
novel or theory was going to be I would not need a grant to spend time 
dreaming it up. 
Consider another example. Suppose I lean over in bed and kiss my 
spouse goodnight and she turns and looks and asks: "Just what are you 
trying to accomplish?" I might very well find her question inappropriate. It 
is as though she has missed the whole point of the gesture. I was not trying 
to use the kiss as a means to accomplish some end. Instead, I was simply 
expressing something. Expressing what? Well, it may be rather hard to say. 
Perhaps it was an expression of affection for a loved one and coworker at the 
end of a long day—coupled with a sense of sympathy for her tired and 
aching body and a sense of how the stream of busy activity has reached the 
closure which bedtime brings. I might find it difficult to put this sort of thing 
into words. That’s precisely why I kissed her. 
The kiss provided a complex gesture that expresses what it was I had 
to "say." To ask me to translate is to suggest that she has missed the point. It 
is as though someone has just heard Beethoven’s "Moonlight Sonata" and 
then asked: "What is he trying to say? I mean what, exactly, is he trying to 
accomplish?" 
Peacemakers are often accused of acting in naive or even irrational 
ways, and plainly they often do so—like most of us much of the time. 
Gandhi, for example, made gestures and undertook projects that were not 
well thought out and proved to be counter-productive. And he frequently 
revised that complex practice he called satyagraha because it needed 
revision. But even his detractors often found themselves most admiring of 
those of his actions which seemed least sensible to them—the ones they 
would have never considered undertaking. Viewed instrumentally, his deeds 
seemed foolish. Yet they also seemed to have a peculiarly admirable 
foolishness—one that somehow showed up the wisdom of the more worldly 
instrumentalist actors around him. Paradoxically the seemingly irrational 
peacemaker’s deeds can seem somehow to also be admirably sane or even 
saintly. 
This apparent paradox loses its edge of oddness once we see that, in 
general, these "foolishly wise" actions exemplify expressive activities, 
projects, and practices that do not fit the instrumentalist model of rationality 
well. 
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This is not to say that they are irrational. In fact, if the assumptions of 
critical social research are right, then expressions, projects and practices are 
much fuller and in many ways more adequate examples of rational action 
than are instrumentalist actions (such as pushing down the lever on your 
toaster in order to brown your bread). They are distinctive because they 
involve emergence, internal reactions, and objective values. But this is 
precisely what one would expect of rational action once we admit that: (1) 
Intentions need to be made clearer and more explicit (by getting them to 
emerge). (2) Social reality is holistic in character. (3) Values are constitutive 
elements of the meanings that structure the social reality objectively out 
there. 
If, in these respects, action is an organic process, then rational action 
will be like those activities of stewardship in which we try to facilitate 
organic processes like the growth of a garden or a forest—things which we 
speak of "cultivating." We speak, also, of "cultivating" shared insights, job 
opportunities, friendships, the cohesiveness of a seminar group, law 
practices, and language proficiencies. Notice, then, that just as instrumental 
manipulation provides us with one model of rational action (on the Galilean 
view), cultivation provides us with another (which draws on the critical 
social research conceptions of knowledge and social reality). What, then, are 
expressions and projects and practices and how, as forms of cultivation, are 
they related to one another? 
 
 
EXPRESSION 
 
When a creative poet or musician sits down to compose, she does not, 
at the outset, know what the result will be. There is no pre-envisioned poem 
or melody she is trying to make. Many artists, of course, have little or no 
interest in expressing anything and their work starts, typically, with a 
technical puzzle or possibility that their media offers. But the artist aiming at 
expression starts, instead, with a kind of experience not unlike the sort 
William James ascribed to babes, namely, "a blooming, buzzing confusion." 
There is a confusion of which she is aware but not fully conscious in any 
clear way. 
In the process of attending to this flow of inchoate experience—and 
stabilizing and organizing it—she comes to find out what she feels and 
believes. A recurrent word finds its place in a phrase, a vague theme takes 
shape as a melody line. Images are gathered and their interrelationships are 
developed in an increasingly coherent pattern. A word choice reveals a tacit 
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judgment that is explored and linked to other thoughts. In the process, an 
artistic structure emerges which offers an interpretation of the confusion 
with which she started. It is an interpretation or "reading" of her feelings and 
thoughts which synthesizes them in an organic flow. 
If you compare this process to a standard instrumental act like putting 
bread into a toaster in order to make breakfast, the non-instrumental 
character of such expression becomes clear. The cook has a clear and 
determinate conception of the end he would prefer to achieve: lightly 
browned whole wheat toast. The artist has, at best, only a vague sense of hat 
the finished poem or musical composition will be—precisely because this 
act is a creative one, an act of expressing a confusion which she becomes 
fully conscious of only in the course of attending, stabilizing and organizing 
the confusion with which she starts. The cook has well defined types of 
materials (bread) and tools (a toaster) to work with, means whose natural 
properties he knows well. The artist is uncertain of how this or that word or 
phrase or dab of paint added here or there will affect the resulting piece. 
This process of expression is one of self-discovery. In it, artists find 
out who they are, what they feel, how they think the world hangs together, 
what they want and how they are trying to get it. But they find these out in 
the process, as they engage in the activity of expression. They do not and 
cannot have precise understandings of these things at the start—the way the 
instrumentalist model of action requires. The activity of expression does not 
presuppose such self-understanding, it provides it. And such understanding 
is emergent and holistic, moving from vague and tacit awareness to the 
increasingly clear and explicit integration of elements in an organic whole. 
These features are shared by other forms of cultivation as well, projects and 
practices. A further feature common to these modes of cultivation is that 
they are regulated by objective values. 
The sense in which the values that regulate expression are objective is 
rather minimal, but significant. There is, of course, a clear sense in which the 
values expressed in art seem so subjective as to be at a polar extreme 
opposite to the objective claims made by science. In physics we must 
confront public facts that either match our interpretations of reality or do not. 
In art it seems as though we are free to use interpretations to express 
whatever we feel like expressing. And this is true. But we cannot choose 
interpretations that express what we do NOT feel like expressing. What we 
cannot do in art—at least not if it is to express well—is to choose 
interpretations that express what we do not feel. Our feelings are unfixed, 
unstable, inchoate and open to alternative readings. But they are there, there 
to be expressed. The process of art is one of self-discovery, not self-
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invention ex nihilo. In that sense, feelings are like the facts a scientist 
observes in making experiments. They are not arbitrarily invented, they are 
found. 
These feelings we find in confusion and try to express are not publicly 
observable fact. Others can learn what they are only insofar as we are 
successful in expressing them. But if we lapse into cliché or repress 
associations or force transitions or compose works mechanically, others can 
tell. What they can tell is that we have failed to adequately express our 
feelings—whatever they were. We have failed to adequately attend to them, 
stabilize them, and organize them. In the process, we have deceived 
ourselves, and it shows. It is not, of course, as though there is some simple 
and perfectly reliable test that is foolproof. But people who are not fools can 
get reasonably reliable results by employing "lie detectors" of a wide variety 
of kinds—not just machines that measure galvanic skin response but 
perceptual and linguistic skills that enable us to spot the evasive glance or 
the pat phrase that indicates someone is avoiding coming to terms with a part 
of reality. The values that regulate expression are thus objective in a minimal 
but twofold sense: what is to be expressed is given or discovered and not 
merely invented, and that it has or has not been expressed is something that 
can be determined by others in reliable ways. 
Like other forms of false consciousness or self-deception, the kind 
that occurs in failed expression takes place in a curious no-man’s-land, at the 
border between vague awareness and focused attention. We are not fully 
conscious of the feelings we have not adequately expressed—to become 
fully conscious of them we would have had to express them successfully. 
Yet we are not wholly unaware of them—if we were, they would not have 
formed part of the blooming buzzing confusion there to be expressed. So 
there is a choice made when we deceive ourselves about our feelings—by 
choosing to gloss over their detail with cliché or obsessively focus on some 
at the expense of others. But the choice is not a rational deliberate one; it is a 
spontaneous decision to attend further or flee, to come to terms with who we 
are or hide ourselves from ourselves. 
The spontaneous decision to lie to ourselves involves a corrupting of 
our consciousness. Like cold deliberate lies, these self-deceptions at the edge 
of our attention tend to require extra lies to be maintained. This is true not 
only in art works made by professionals but true as well of the countless 
gestures made each day in which we seek to express ourselves. We greet 
someone or gesture as we converse in a meeting, pacing our words to 
achieve apt expression of the feelings and thoughts we are trying to share. 
And we find that the false smile requires false handshakes and false words to 
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be sustained. With his gift for (perhaps overly) strong and pointed 
statements of insights, R.G. Collingwood pointed out the significance of this 
in a way that indicates its relevance to our understanding of self-deception or 
false consciousness in social affairs at large: 
 
Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes 
is a work of art. It is important to each one of us that in making 
them, however much he deceives others, he should not deceive 
himself. If he deceives himself in this matter he has sown himself 
a seed which, unless he roots it up again, may grow into any kind 
of wickedness, any kind of mental disease, any kind of stupidity 
and folly and insanity. Bad art, the corrupt consciousness, is the 
true radix malorum.2 
 
Self-deception about our feelings leads to a distortion of our self-
understanding and must be sustained through patterns of avoidance and 
suppression whose dishonesty breeds irresponsibility—and all the manifold 
forms of sins of thought and action that irresponsibility breeds and 
nourishes. If the spontaneous choice to decline the expression of feelings is 
not the root of all evil, still it is certainly the root of much. It is the ground 
level form of lack of integrity and fidelity to truth, the germs form of failure 
to understand and act upon our own values in responsible ways. 
Expression of the unstable and inchoate elements of experience begins 
a process that can bear fruit in other kinds of activities—projects and 
practices—which are also non-instrumental in character. The non-
instrumental features of expressions are worth reaffirming with one further 
example, before going on to consider these others. 
Anwar Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was widely and rightly viewed as an 
expressive act. But the notion of expression many people had in mind was 
different from the one developed here. He was reported as "sending signals" 
and "making a bold statement," as though his trip was a series of bits of 
information that could have been encoded in a computer disk and mailed to 
the Israelis. What was the point of actually going instead of simply sending 
such disk or a letter? One view would be that it simply served to give force 
to the statement, to show he really meant it. 
Alternatively, we might view his act as expressive in the sense 
characterized above. Viewed thus, Sadat was someone who did not know 
very clearly how he expected things to work, who he was, what he wanted to 
achieve or how he was going to accomplish it. Surely he had some notions 
about these things. But if we view his trip as an expressive activity, we see it 
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as one in which he was busy finding out answers to these things in the 
process of making the gesture. In the activity of greeting, speaking, 
responding, choosing appointments, composing his face and waving his pipe 
he was synthesizing his blooming and buzzing notions and feelings—he was 
engaged in a kind of self-discovery which could have failed. His diplomatic 
gesture could have failed not only in the sense that it could have led to no 
breakthroughs in the peace process. It could have failed by lapsing into 
cliché, mechanical gesture, and suppressed feelings—the way attempts to 
make works of art may fail. 
Many of the activities popularly associated with peace work 
(especially forms of "witnessing" such as holding vigils, demonstrations and 
rallies) can succeed or fail in the same ways—as non-instrumental 
expressive processes that aim to structure and communicate self-
understanding that synthesizes experience of a complex, fluid situation. 
 
 
PROJECTS 
 
Often, as we become conscious of our feelings and thoughts in 
expressions, we are led to try to make the larger world of fact more 
adequately reflect our values. So we undertake projects aimed at altering the 
shape of our environment. Sadat’s visit to the Knesset led to the project of 
the Camp David peace talks. Often expressive letters to congressional 
representatives or expressive conversations with friends provide a self-
understanding and consciousness of concerns and beliefs that lead to 
projects such as a petition campaign, the starting of a school, or the writing 
of a book. 
Projects of this sort involve cultivation at another level of explicitness 
and clarity. We are as yet still unsure of precisely what we are doing and 
why, but we do have some tentative definitions and working hypotheses. 
What distinguishes such projects from tidy instrumental acts are the ways in 
which we "work with" such notions and the ways in which the projects take 
on a life of their own. We work with our general ideas about what we are 
doing and why. We also try to get such notions to further emerge in less 
vague and tacit ways and critique them for consistency, completeness, and 
accuracy. Such emergence is an organic process. As we will see, it typically 
involves the pursuit of multiple ends in ways that (in contrast to instrumental 
acts) involve internal relation between means and ends—and values that are 
objective in more than the minimal way characteristic of expressions. 
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Suppose, then, that you are beginning some project such as a petition 
drive or a set of negotiations and you are rather vague about just what you 
aim to achieve and how you intend to accomplish it. How might you go 
about trying to get your ideas to emerge and get your project to take shape? 
Studies of group dynamics and problem solving provide one 
important source of insight. They have not yet yielded any mathematical 
laws of group dynamics which can be applied by social engineers. But these 
sorts of studies, along with critical reflections on consciousness raising 
techniques like those developed by feminists in the late 1960's, have resulted 
in the cultivation of clusters of skills that can often be very effective in 
making our values and beliefs clearer and more explicit and enable us to 
critique them for consistency, completeness and accuracy. Role playing, 
playing devil’s advocate, and brainstorming are not just little gimmicks 
people can use; they—as well as a variety of other techniques—have been 
cultivated as subtle and effective arts. 
Aesthetic theories provide another important resource. One way to get 
our values and beliefs to emerge is to critically reflect on our expressive 
activities—viewing them as works of art to be analyzed in order to make 
values and underlying beliefs more explicit. (Why did I begin the letter with 
those words? Why did I wear those clothes to the meeting?) The aesthetic 
categories used in studying novels and dramas are especially useful because 
a project is, of course, not reading another person’s story; he is "writing" or 
acting out his own. But he can project a tentative script with key themes, 
characters, definitions of the setting and plot, and if he is pursuing the 
project intelligently, he will. 
For example, suppose I am trying to negotiate a peace settlement 
between the government of El Salvador and the guerillas of the FMLN. 
Perhaps I have a few informal initial meetings with representative from each 
group and some third parties. I may find that my physical gestures and eye 
movements turn out, upon reflection, to suggest certain themes that also 
emerge in the verbal metaphors I employ. Perhaps they are themes of 
circular tables for negotiation, circles of overlapping communities, and 
reciprocal relations between religious and economic and political interests 
which are non-aligned rather than standing in bipolar oppositions. 
Alternately, I might find myself led to focus on themes of integration 
and metaphors of spiral structures—perhaps seeing the key issues as turning 
on problems in integrating the peace process in El Salvador into the larger 
patterns of development in Central America and the Americas at large. I may 
loosely typecast myself in a role like that of Athena who, in Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia, brought an end to blood feuding by establishing an independent 
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jury who could decide the case in an impartial way. Or I may picture myself 
in a role like Carter in the Camp David talks, going back and forth between 
parties to mediate by developing a single text that both could consent to. 
I may conceive of the setting of my work as being located in the larger 
arena of international diplomacy or I may view it as occurring in a local 
frontier in the no-man’s-land between two warring factions. With regard to 
the plot structure of the project, I may, with Kissinger’s shuttle trips in the 
Middle East in mind, project a series of episodic dialogues that will escalate 
in frequency and intensity until they reach a climatic resolution. Or I may 
project a plot more like the one that led to the denouement of the Vietnam 
story. 
Or it may be that after projecting themes and characters and settings 
and plots like these, I may reflect on them in a self-critical way and come to 
the conclusion that the scenario I envision presupposes an authorial point of 
view which it is inappropriate for me to adopt. Perhaps racist assumptions or 
cultural chauvinism have led me to picture myself as a kind of Shakespeare 
writing in the lines for others when in reality my own role will have to be 
much more modest and peripheral—more like that of a secretary merely 
taking notes at a meeting, making sure the coffee pot is full, and running 
errands when asked. 
We cannot impose narrative structures on reality in arbitrary ways. 
But we can project them as tentative ideas, as working scripts which we 
revise as we go along. Furthermore, we not only can project such scripts, we 
do, and we do so continually. Indeed, we have to do so. Without some 
general narrative that relates our immediate actions to the past and future we 
cannot make our own moment to moment deeds intelligible to ourselves. 
The question is not whether or not to act in terms of such scripts. The 
question is simply whether we are going to do so blindly or in a self-critical 
and reflective way that aims at getting our projects to emerge in clearer and 
more orderly patterns. 
If we adopt the latter alternative, cultivating their emergence, we find 
that distinctive kinds of structures emerge, ones in which means and ends are 
internally related to one another in organic ways—in ways that traditional 
action theory and traditional ethics fail to illuminate. For those theories 
suppose that rational action is, at a minimum, instrumentally rational. 
In Kantian or utilitarian ethics, actions must be described before they 
can be evaluated and the descriptions of individual rational actions are 
thought to characterize them in terms of circumstances in which some means 
adopted provides an efficient cause of the end desired. Means and ends are 
externally related. There is nothing in the definition of an end (such as 
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lightly browned toast) that tells you what means (a toaster or a fireplace?) is 
required to achieve it. 
In contrast, when we are cultivating a business partnership or a 
marriage or are engaged in some other project, it is typical to find internal 
relations between means and ends. Often these internal relations are 
conceptual rather than casual in nature. For example, suppose I want to 
establish a relation of trust or love with a partner or spouse, or achieve a 
legitimate peace accord between warring parties. If so, then I must pursue 
these in trustworthy or loving or legitimate ways. 
This is not so much a matter of empirical fact as a conceptual truth. 
Part of what it means for a relationship to be loving is that it was developed 
and sustained in loving ways. Part of the definition of a legitimate peace 
accord includes the requirement that it be arrived at in a legitimate way. The 
same goes for business contracts. If my partner wants me to sign a voluntary 
and legally binding agreement, holding a gun to my head simply will not do 
the job. The illegitimate coercion would make the contract invalid in a court 
of law—and if he wanted a voluntary agreement, then coercion could not, by 
definition, be employed to get it. 
In general, means and ends are internally related in a conceptual way 
when the ends we seek are defined in terms of the process by which they are 
brought about. This is a point that Gandhi was much struck by. He thought 
of his brand of non-violence as a kind of "truth force" that could be a seed 
that would provide the means for growing a free society governed by free 
consent. And he saw that free consent could not—by definition—be coerced. 
It is this basic insight into the relations of means and ends that motivated 
much of his theory and practice. 
Projects also involve internal relations between means and ends that 
are of a different sort, ones that are not conceptual. These arise because our 
projects typically involve the pursuit of multiple ends. 
Suppose you have begun some political project like a petition 
campaign. Usually there will be a variety of values you are seeking to 
realize. Perhaps you want to educate voters, influence politicians, motivate 
involvement, build an organization, promote communal solidarity, and 
cultivate citizens’ democratic political skills. As the petition campaign gets 
rolling, elements of the project may begin to support each other. What is a 
means to one end may turn out itself to be another end of intrinsic value on 
its own—one which is promoted by the use of other means or the 
achievement of other ends. 
For example, to secure a petition signature you find with some 
individuals that it is necessary to talk at length and educate them on the 
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issue. In doing so, you may find that such talk serves as an important 
channel for recruiting active membership for the organization sponsoring the 
drive. To take another slant on these kinds of connections, notice that if you 
build an educational component into your business meetings this may make 
it possible for members to be more intelligently and actively involved in 
running the organization itself. This in turn will make it possible, perhaps, to 
operate in a less hierarchical manner and to arrive at decisions through a 
process of genuine consensus. 
The adoption of consensus procedures in governance (as distinct from 
mere majority rule) may lead people to demand fuller understanding (and 
education) on an issue before they assent to a plan and it may also provide 
an opportunity for more diverse points of view and sources of information to 
enter into the decision process. The result may be not only better decisions 
but also greater individual commitment and organizational solidarity. Here, 
education, governance by consensus, and a strong sense of community may 
each be valued as intrinsic goods but also as means—each being a means to 
the other. 
Of course things do not always work out so neatly. In fact, sometimes 
educative sessions make people realize how little consensus they share—and 
how unwilling they are to identify themselves with each other. But organic 
relationships of the sort described here are not only common, they are 
usually the moving force that gets a project to "take off" and take on a life of 
its own. Anyone trying to start a school or begin a business must seek to find 
and foster just these sorts of interconnections. But there are sorts of things 
that give projects integrity. In planning projects or envisioning them, this is 
the sort of thing that leads us to say that the project "makes sense" as a 
whole: its parts are both goods in themselves and reciprocal means as well—
each being means to the other. 
The emergent and organic features of projects give a distinctive kind 
of objectivity to the values that regulate them. The values pursued in projects 
can, of course, be objective in the minimal sense that values found in 
expressions are: they are discovered rather than merely invented and their 
discovery can be successful or fail in ways that disinterested observers can 
check. But there is a kind of objectivity involved in projects. 
Suppose you are planning a petition campaign like the one just 
discussed. You value both education and governance by consensus. Very 
well, but what precisely are they? You will surely have at least some rough 
conception of these when you start. But it is also very likely that you will 
find your understanding of them developing as you work on the project. At 
first, perhaps your idea of education is that it is the flow of information from 
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the knowledgeable to the ignorant. And you may conceive of consensus as a 
kind of voting system that simply requires a majority vote not of 50% plus 
one or ⅔ or ¾ but of 100%. As you work on the project, however, you may 
find two sorts of things happening. 
On the one hand, you may find your understanding of each of these 
central values changing. Sometimes the change will just consist of the 
rejection of a former view in favor of an entirely new one. More often the 
change will occur as a development in which critical reflection on your 
actual use of the idea in practice leads you to make aspects of it more 
explicit—and perhaps view things formerly overlooked as the most essential 
features of the values. For example, you may find that the most important 
thing in successfully persuading potential petition signers is not giving them 
information but getting them to think through their own convictions for 
themselves through dialogue with others. In the process, you may find that 
your conception of the thing you valued, an "educated citizen," shifts. It may 
shift from the notion of a "citizen supplied with the facts" to a "citizen who 
has acquired the skills and concerns relevant for thinking through his or her 
own convictions." 
Probably you would want to say you had both notions at the start and 
still hold to both. But a shift in emphasis has occurred. You have come to 
view the second, formerly tacit notion as more essential. Likewise, you 
might find that in working on a consensus basis you are led, increasingly, to 
view consensus as something other than a voting rule that requires 
unanimity. You arrive at the view that it is a process that requires shard 
understanding and agreement on the details and merits of a proposal. Again, 
this discovery may involve continuities in your earlier and later conceptions 
of the value of consensus. Shared understanding was, perhaps, a tacit part of 
your earlier idea and you may still think that consensus requires that no one 
say no to the proposal. But, that said, it may remain the case that a basic shift 
has occurred, a shift in what you consider to be the most essential to the 
value. 
The other kind of thing you are likely to find is that as the means and 
ends you pursue become more internally related, your understanding of each 
begins to inform the other. You begin to think of education as a shared 
dialogue that cultivates understanding and moves toward consensus. 
Conversely, you begin to understand governance by consensus as inherently 
educative activity—rather than seeing it as a rule regulating a political 
bargaining process. 
Such developments in your understanding of you values take the form 
of discovery. We find these things out; we do not make them up out of thin 
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air. In projects, this sort of discovery is typically a social rather than private 
process. Most of the values we seek to promote concern joint activities, and 
the values are features of these activities—they are not just private feelings 
or personal preferences. This gives values a kind of objectivity that involves 
an independence from our individual wills. The notions of education and 
consensus with which you start are ones you learned from others and they 
are constitutive meanings—values define the practices shared with others. 
To discover what is most essential about them is to discover something 
about these shared notions and shared practices, not just something that is 
true "for me" or "for you" as an individual. To discover that internal 
relations between practices of education and consensus develop is to 
discover something about the ideals that regulate the community of which 
you are a member. It is not just a discovery about your own "utility 
preference curves." 
In making important decisions about work, marriage, business 
ventures, and community plans, people often find themselves guided by 
shared values that are emergent. They may speak of "having a leading," 
"finding a calling," acting according to their "lights," or listening to "a still, 
small voice." And they speak of following these as though they were 
engaged in a journey whose destination they do not know but which they can 
discover as it emerges from beyond the horizon. 
If you look for discussions of these emergence-centered notions in 
twentieth century discussions of ethics you will look largely in vain. To a 
utilitarian or Kantian who adopts a Galilean notion of knowledge and an 
instrumentalist account of action, such notions are essentially unintelligible. 
They come off (at best) as vaguely superstitious notions concerned with 
experiences beyond the pale of rational deliberation and clear-headed overt 
action—as though people with leadings, voices, callings and lights lived in a 
pre-scientific world of dryads, naiads, and extra-sensory powers. But once 
we begin to think of activity in terms of cultivation that is guided by 
participatory understanding, these notions of emergent values seem neither 
superstitious nor irrational. They are central to the experience of rationally 
pursuing open-ended projects. 
Once a project is completed, or even well underway, it is often 
possible to give a clear and explicit account of its rationale in reasonably 
near instrumental terms. In retrospect, we can develop "rational 
reconstructions" of what we were trying to do. But this permits us to give a 
rational account of the product of the activity, not its process. It tells us what 
we figured out in the course of pursuing our project, but not how we figured 
it out. To understand the process itself as a rational one—and to cultivate 
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such projects in a rational way—we need to employ non-instrumental 
categories. 
To sum up for the moment, we see in the notion of a project that we 
have a conception of a rational human activity that involves the cultivation 
of: (1) emergent structures of experience, (2) means and ends which are 
internally related in conceptually ways and in reciprocal organic relations, 
and (3) values which are objective not only because they are discovered (like 
the feelings we express) but also because they are discovered to be 
constitutive features of a shared social reality regulated by values that are 
independent of our individual wills. 
Projects of these sorts often result in the development of 
institutionalized activities which share the same features of emergence, 
holism and objective values but which introduce further distinctive 
characteristics as well. These provide a third type of non-instrumental 
activity, a third kind of cultivation. 
 
 
PRACTICES 
 
Some human activities require practice and repetition if we are to 
perform them well or even if we are to learn to perform them at all. This is a 
central feature of what is meant here by "practices." Examples would 
include law, medicine, chess, tragic drama, diplomacy, teaching, and 
scientific research. A second feature of this is that they, like projects, involve 
the pursuit of multiple ends which are internally related to the means to 
them. A third characteristic is that they have practitioners who have already 
achieved some notable degree of excellence. In this sense, they have a 
tradition, one which is typically borne by participants in institutions of a 
formal sort (such as the ABA, the AMA, and the local chess clubs). Such 
traditions usually require that someone learning the practice undergo an 
apprenticeship. But as apprentices become masters, they learn that the 
tradition not only can be passed on, it can be extended and deepened. It can 
be cultivated in new directions and with greater profundity. 
Practices grow out of expressions and projects. In some cases, like 
that of the origins of Greek drama, their genesis is largely unknown. In other 
cases, a fairly detailed—though almost inevitably complex—history can be 
given. 
For example, there are many things that would need to be included in 
a complete account of the origins of Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha, but 
two key parts of the story would concern an expressive gesture he made and 
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a political project he undertook. The expressive act occurred when he was 
riding a train in South Africa and was ordered to leave the first class 
compartment which was reserved for whites. He refused to leave but 
passively let himself be thrown off the train without a fight. The particular 
way he made this gesture (and the particular ways in which it echoed and 
elaborated earlier experiences and coalesced his attitudes toward the British) 
made the act a kind of seed, a seed of insight and commitment. It, among 
other things, led him to undertake a political project—organizing the South 
African Indian community for a petition campaign. And in the course of 
pursuing this project and finding it take on a life of its own, Gandhi began to 
develop a number of the key doctrines and techniques that were later 
gathered in that subtle and complex practice referred to as satyagraha or 
"truth force." 
Practices emerge out of expressions and projects and they are 
sustained by continued expressions and projects that make up a part of their 
fabric. So they share the same non-instrumental features that expressive 
activities and projects have. But practices also introduce other significant 
types of holism, emergence and objectivity in values. 
One of these concerns holistic and organic (or internal) relations. In 
practices, there are reasonably definite kinds of episodes which are the units 
of repetition in which the practice is rehearsed (or practiced in the narrow 
sense) and performed. The central unit of activity in a practice is not the 
means employed to achieve an end but the rehearsal in which we practice for 
a performance. 
Unlike instrumental means and ends, rehearsal and performances are 
internally related in a way as yet untouched upon. For often rehearsals are 
themselves performances, and performances are themselves, in turn, 
rehearsals for subsequent performances. People practice law by practicing at 
law, and when they are practicing at law they are—usually—practicing law. 
In the narrative process by which we would recount the story of someone 
involved in a practice there are, then, internal relations of two distinct types. 
Not only are there organic relations between the means and ends employed 
in each episode, there are also organic relations between the episodes that 
make up the narrative. 
Two distinctive types of emergence also come to prominence with 
practices. One is glacial and sometimes hardly noticed. It is the kind of 
evolution by incremental changes that occurs in the development of 
traditions—but which cannot occur in projects because they are of such short 
duration. The other is of more importance. Typically a tradition of practice 
gets reflected on in relatively systematic ways. Participants begin to develop 
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a body of theory to explain the functions of the practice, how it could best be 
taught, and how it can best be cultivated. I am not referring to academic 
theories here, but to the critical participatory theories that practitioners 
themselves are led to develop. 
These theories—and the debates that they elicit—do two things. First 
they accelerate the process of the critical cultivation of the activity by 
making it an explicit aim that is undertaken in a reflective way. As a result, 
they may lead to the more rapid emergence of less tacit and more consistent, 
complete, and accurate accounts of the practice. In doing this, the theorists 
typically are led to draw on earlier expressions, projects and episodes of 
performance that form the basis for their tradition. Cezanne’s work is of 
importance to later painters not simply because it is good work but because 
it is exemplary in crucial ways, ways that reveal things about what the 
painting as a practice is about. Similarly, the actions of early Quakers 
provide a testimony that is a continuing source of revelation for 
contemporary members of their Religious Society of Friends and Gandhi’s 
work provided exemplars for the civil disobedience of Martin Luther King. 
Second, such theories usually bring to light tensions in the tradition. 
They highlight inconsistencies and alternative visions of the direction in 
which the practice should develop. They often even serve to create 
tensions—by being inadequate and yet attractive theories of the practice. In 
doing so they may generate dialogue and a creative interplay between theory 
and practice. Much of the history of early twentieth century painting could 
be narrated as a series of attempts to remedy the gap between inaccurate 
theory and actual practice by altering the practice. Likewise, much of the 
development of satyagraha can be understood as the attempt to wax 
eloquent in high sounding moralisms that laid Gandhi open to charges of 
hypocrisy—which he remedied by revising his practice. 
The dialogue about theories which members of a tradition use to 
cultivate their practice is, in many ways, the paradigm of rational activity. 
But it is not a speculative activity; it is an eminently practical one. And yet it 
is not a string of instrumental acts. To elaborate the point, consider the 
activity of reasoning together in dialogue. If we try to think of a dialogue as 
a sequence of interactions in which people use words to manipulate one 
another in order to cause their desired ends to occur, then… well, we simply 
are not talking about dialogue any longer. For it is the very essence of 
dialogue that we not know what we are trying to achieve and how we intend 
to accomplish it. The point of dialogue is to raise questions and seek 
answers, not act on answers which we already know. Once we stop sharing a 
quest, the discussion is over and all that remains is propaganda or 
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advertising—both of which are, of course, clear examples of instrumental 
acts. 
Now notice that rational dialogue is itself in many ways a definitive 
example of both rational activity and of a practice which can be cultivated. 
Then note that the non-instrumental features of dialogue are shared by other 
practices which are central to rational thought and action such as scientific 
research, legal practice, and business negotiation. Finally, draw this 
conclusion: cultivation provides a conception of rational thought and action 
which is superior to the Galilean and instrumentalist models. 
This is not to say that the latter are bankrupt, but only to insist that 
they are fairly limited accounts that need to be placed in the larger 
perspective provided by a theory of cultivation that takes into account the 
intelligent but non-manipulative activities that are central to inquiry and 
action. 
Practices, then, involve distinctive forms of emergence and internal 
relations. They also involve values which are objective in ways that go 
beyond those characteristic of expressions and projects. Architects and 
natural scientists can evaluate their peers’ work in terms of the critical 
theory, guiding visions, and past exemplars of excellent achievement which 
provide standards for assessment that are independent of the feelings of 
individuals or the specific emergent values regulating a particular project in 
their tradition. 
Objective values also come, in practices, to take the form of 
prescriptive rules and virtues which require participants in a tradition to 
undergo self-enlargement and self-transformation. 
Most traditions of practice come to be defined by rules that 
characterize the standard episodes of their performance, rules that enable us 
to tell what counts as an argument in a court of law or what counts as a move 
in chess. These rules are prescriptive in the sense that they tell us how one 
ought to act if she is going to obtain legal standing as an attorney for the 
defense or how he can and cannot move a pawn if he is going to continue 
playing chess. But they are also descriptive in the sense that they 
characterize what the practice does, in fact, involve. These rules have a 
conventional character in the sense that they can be revised. But they are not 
arbitrary in that they are not expressions of any individual will. They are 
objective features of social reality that provide prescriptions that are 
constitutive of the practice. 
Another sort of prescriptive style—with a similar sort of objectivity—
enters in whenever practices are associated with institutions. And typically 
they are. For institutions that monitor performance, certify practitioners and 
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promulgate sound training are, for many complex practices like medicine 
and law, indispensable. Without such institutions the practices cannot 
flourish. Such institutions must employ rules to define membership, govern 
themselves, award prizes and honors, and so on. The value of having such 
rule, and the reasons for obeying them, are something that Kantian and rule 
utilitarian arguments have made commonplace. If people violate the rules 
that these institutions rest upon, then the institutions break down. If 
borrowers habitually lie to banks, then lending becomes impossible—unless 
some remedy to prevent such lies is found. 
Communities that seek to promote a practice and secure its flourishing 
need to train the characters of their initiates. They need to get them to 
internalize the values that structure the practice and make its cooperative 
pursuit possible. This means that they must teach virtues. And typically, 
apprentices can learn to excel at the practice only by internalizing these 
values and acquiring these virtues. Such education of character usually 
requires a process of self-enlargement and self-transformation. 
The game of chess is defined, in part, by certain rules that prohibit 
cheating. The child who cheats has, in an important sense, stopped playing 
chess. The same is true of natural science. The researcher who falsifies data 
is no longer pursuing science per se. In most games and practices honesty is 
a virtue that participants must acquire if they are to perform well and if the 
practice is to survive. (Games like "I doubt It" in which players are supposed 
to lie provide exceptions, of course.) 
The child or scientist may be tempted to cheat in order to win candy, 
tenure or other sorts of external rewards. But both must acquire the strength 
of character that enables them to resist such temptation. They do so by 
growing. They internalize the values of playing fair and remaining honest 
because these are values that are internal to the practice and define it. 
Honest assessments of performance are likewise required for the 
mastery of a practice. The would-be artist must learn to give and take in 
"crits" in an honest way. He cannot simply prefer works because they were 
made by friends or because he fears the counter-attacks that will be made on 
his own work. To be unjust or cowardly in these ways is to refuse to 
cultivate the kind of honest and accurate judgment that is the life blood of 
successful evaluation and performance. So courage and justice provide 
virtues that (at least usually) must be internalized by the participants in a 
tradition. 
There are a variety of other virtues that are more specific to particular 
traditions. The student of law who has not internalized the values of due 
process or respect for evidence has, in an important sense, not really become 
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a lawyer. He or she has not yet full internalized the role of lawyer which the 
practice defines. Kindergarten teachers must acquire the virtue of being 
disposed to give warm and loving support. College teachers must acquire the 
virtue of being respectful and challenging. Surgeons must acquire the virtue 
of cleanliness. 
To speak of acquiring these virtues is to say something not just about 
the specific actions these people perform but the kind of characters they 
acquire—characters defined by the sorts of motives that dominate their 
decisions. The beginner may enter law or research for the glory or go into 
medicine for the money. If so, he is motivate by external rewards that could 
be gotten in other ways and that can, at times, be gotten by violating the 
rules of the practice. There are cases of scientists winning significant status 
with falsified data. But typically, to perform the practice well you must learn 
to "be at home" in the practice, "live" in it, "be" a lawyer or researcher. You 
must enlarge the number of things you value by internalizing the values that 
regulate the practice. You must transform yourself.3 
However, the worth of internalizing such roles and virtues and the 
value of following prescriptive rules that are constitutive of practices or 
institutions can be called into question. This kind of question has, in fact, 
been the sorest sticking point in ethics since the Enlightenment: If I stand to 
gain by violating the rule (by cheating at chess, say, or lying in a court of 
law, or fudging my data in a scientific paper), then why should I care if my 
violation will make my act not count as a legitimate performance of the 
practice—or undermine the institutions that help the practice flourish? If I 
can enrich myself without enlarging myself, why acquire virtues? If I can go 
uncaught, why not get away with murder? What’s in it for me? 
People who would reason in this way are egoists. Because Kant and 
the utilitarians thought that, as a matter of natural fact, people are, by nature, 
egoists, they found it difficult to deal with this question. There is, however, a 
rather striking argument that Ralph Barton Perry, an early twentieth century 
American philosopher, offered to refute egoism. It may at first seem glib but 
turns out, upon reflection, to catch hold of some important truths—ones that 
reveal something important about practices. 
The egoist holds that what is good is precisely what is good for his 
own self. Period. Perry’s refutation was simple and direct: There is no self, 
ergo egoism is false. 
The conclusion does not seem to flow. If I have no self, then plainly I 
cannot define the good as that which is good for myself—unless I simply 
mean to say that there is no good. But what could it mean to say that there is 
no self? Or, even more puzzlingly, to say that I lack a self? Who is this me 
  122 
that is doing the lacking? Stated this way, the question makes such a 
refutation of egoism sound silly, or at least paradoxical. But suppose we 
counter with another question: Very well then, who (or what) are you? At 
that point the shoe on the other foot begins to pinch. Clearly the egoist needs 
to answer the question: What is a self? 
There are two sorts of answers that can be given to this question, each 
of which must be taken into account. For there is, in some peculiar way, both 
a self that I am and an I that is this self. The one is an object of thought. It is 
the self that think I am—or discover I am—when I ask: What (or who) am I? 
The other is not an object of thought but the subject, the thinker who, in the 
first person singular, asks himself: Who am I? 
Another way to get at this distinction is to note that I may try to find 
out things about my self by taking a look at my self. I may look in a mirror 
at my body or I may look at my speech patterns and gestures as they appear 
on tape or as they are reflected in responses other people make. Or I may 
look at actions or my habits or my personality traits or my peak experiences 
or my roles in various institutions. In all these cases, there is the self that I 
discover when I do the looking—the one that is the object of my visual gaze 
or my reflective self-examination. But in each case there is also the I that is 
doing the looking. 
This subject-self, the I that views myself as an object, is difficult to 
define—and for a very good reason, that Martin Buber came squarely to 
grips with in his study of I and Thou. As soon as we try to define the I, we 
are viewing it as an object of thought—as an "it." So the very thing we 
wanted to describe disappears—by becoming a "thing." Buber concluded 
that I cannot acquire a spectator’s knowledge of the "I." I can only cultivate 
my self-awareness of the I that I am by participating in the activity of 
thinking and acting with others and the larger world that encompasses me. In 
doing so, I inevitably lapse into thinking about myself and others—and 
viewing me and them as objects. Nonetheless, when this happens I can shift 
gears and reestablish an active orientation as I think and dialogue with others 
like you. 
The notions of "I" and "you" are not, then, descriptive concepts that 
can be accounted for by Galilean social science. They are words that serve to 
acknowledge and avow a participatory understanding of the nature of 
dialogue and the process of cultivation. These words also provide an 
indispensable core of our understanding of what it is to be a person worthy 
of respect rather than a mere thing available for manipulation. And this 
notion of personhood is at the heart of much of our talk about the kinds of 
values many people take to be the best candidates we could offer for that 
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special status of genuinely trans-historical objective values. The notions of 
universal human rights and cross cultural moral truths are often tied to just 
this notion of persons as I’s and you’s. And yet the notion seems 
indefinable—by definition… so to speak. Is there any way in which this 
puzzling notion could provide the basis for discovering values (such as basic 
human rights) which are trans-historical and objective in the strongest sense 
of the term? 
This is a question to which we will return later. The answer is yes, but 
the reasons can best be understood once we have gotten clearer about the 
nature of peace as an activity and, in particular, its limitations. 
And this is something we are ready to do. We now have conceptions 
of reason, social knowledge, and action which permit us to fundamentally 
rethink the nature of peace—because they offer us models of rational human 
life which are not conflict centered. 
Maieutic reasoning provides us with an account of how people can 
reason together without viewing their differences of opinions as oppositions. 
They may view them as parts of an emergent consensus in which an 
understanding organic relation between insights and facts is cultivated. 
Critical participatory reasoning provides us with an account of social 
knowledge that pictures researchers and the subjects they study as engaged 
in a cooperative inquiry (except in cases of deception)—a dialogue aiming at 
an understanding that often requires significant (though limited) forms of 
peacemaking. Cultivation provides us with a model of rational action in 
which people are not instrumental agents seeking to manipulate each other 
but participants in the activities of shared expressions, projects and practices. 
Natural scientists who engage in joint research projects employ—and 
exemplify—all three of these basic networks of categories. In choosing to 
reason maieutically to cultivate a tradition they themselves reflect on 
critically as participants, they choose to do so without appeal to guns. They 
resolve their differences by treating them as parts of problems to be solved 
rather than conflicts to be fought over. 
It should also be clear that the categories of reasoning, social 
knowledge, and rational action developed so far are intimately connected. 
Each adopts common views of the nature of meaning, truth, feeling, reason, 
values, the self, and community. Is there an activity of peacemaking in the 
realm of social concerns that adopts this same network of categories and 
would enable us to deal with our differences in the ways in which natural 
scientists do rather than in the manner of propagandists, legal prosecutors, 
authoritarian parents, and diplomats whose ultimate appeal is not to reason 
but to conventional weapons and "peacekeeper" missiles? 
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THE PROCESS OF PEACE 
 
Part IV 
 
 
 
Peace is a dynamic thing; the detection, even the forestalling, of 
occasions for the quarrels; the checking of the process by which 
the non-agreements thus constantly generated harden into 
disagreements (not without the use of force) are softened into 
non-agreements; and the dialectical labor whereby occasions of 
non-agreement are converted into occasions of agreement 
 
R. G. Collingwood1 
 
 
There is no way to peace. Peace is the way. 
 
Motto of the Fellowship of Reconciliation 
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CHAPTER 14 
 
 
The Opening Way 
 
 
 
o argue that the nature of peace has been obscured by our dominant 
culture of conflict is to assume that there is something positive and 
distinct—"real peace"—which is there to be obscured. Is there? 
 Part III has brought us closer to an affirmative answer. It developed a 
network of categories that provide alternatives to the conflict-related ones 
discussed earlier. The relevance of those non-conflict categories should be 
commencing to clarify. 
 For example, the accounts of critical participatory understanding, 
maieutic reasoning, and cultivation characterize social research, reasoning, 
and action as having cooperative aspects essential to them as activities. In 
the discussion of research methods, we have even seen that some significant 
(though limited) forms of peacemaking are an inherent element of research 
as a cognitive enterprise. Might peace be a kind of cultivation that employs 
maieutic reasoning and critical participatory research? 
 Before considering this, note that regardless of how we answer that 
question the arguments of Part III can stand on their own. Whether or not the 
answer is yes and whether or not that makes any difference to you, you 
ought consider the independent merits of the models of research, reasoning 
and action developed here. If you find peace of no interest, or even if you 
view it as a positive evil, the arguments of Part III claim to show you ought 
to adopt those accounts anyway. 
 The central core of the arguments springs from three key theses about 
the nature of the human understanding by which social reality itself is 
structured, namely, that it is: (1) holistic, (2) participatory, and (3) emergent. 
In effect, what the earlier discussions did was draw out the consequences 
these claims have for our views of research, reasoning, and action. Because 
these latter views rest on a common core of theses, they are in strong affinity 
with each other. If you adopt the critical participatory account of social 
research, then you will be led to view rational activity as a process of 
cultivating expressions, projects, and practices. If you adopt the cultivation 
model of activity, then you will find yourself committed to views of 
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meaning, feeling, reason, value, truth, and the nature of the self that provide 
you with a maieutic (rather than eristic) view of reasoning. 
 These ideas are general in the sense that they are basic. But they are 
not abstractions that only concern intellectuals who busy themselves with a 
technical subject matter. They are categories that are rooted in everyday 
experiences we all share and disciplined practices we can all pursue. They 
provide the recipe for a systematic transformation of our culture. Insofar as 
we commit ourselves to cultivating these ideas and their consequences, we 
take up tasks that affect the way we raise children, create art, pursue 
business projects, revise our religions practices, formulate public policy, 
reason with our spouses, evaluate the performance of employees, and read 
books. 
 The integrity of the resulting network of categories constitutes one of 
its significant merits. And this serves, indirectly, to make the central theses 
of Parts I and II plausible. In and of itself it does not, of course, show that 
there is something we could call "real peace" which is there to be obscured. 
But it does show that there is a systematic and arguably better network of 
categories that can be adopted in place of the ones shown, in Part II, to 
commit us as well to the correlative conception of peace as a static (though 
perhaps "tranquil") absence of vigorous and conflict-ridden life. We now 
have alternative notions of social knowledge, reasoning, and action; can they 
supply us with an alternative (and less obscure) concept of peace? 
 Among the activities of cultivation people can pursue, we would have 
to include expressions of hatred, projects of oppression, and practices of 
warfare. Notice, furthermore, that there is no reason why a team of high-
ranking officials could not employ maieutic reasoning to plan strategies for 
nuclear confrontation. And one of the better examples of critical 
participatory research is Clausewitz’s classic, On War. To say that the 
conceptions of cultivation, maieutic reasoning, and critical participatory 
research commit us to views of activity intrinsically involving cooperative 
elements is not to say that they commit us to thoroughly peaceful views of 
activity. The questions still remain: With whom shall we cooperate? In what 
ways? For what purposes? 
 We may, in the end, want to conclude that peace is a positively 
distinguished activity, a kind of cultivation that employs maieutic styles of 
reasoning and critical participatory understanding. But to do so, we need to 
distinguish it as a species of cultivation distinct from other member of its 
genus. What distinguishes the campaigns of war from the campaigns of 
peacemaking or satyagraha undertaken by Gandhi? Furthermore, how do we 
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decide which of these species of cultivation is, in any particular historical 
context, the best to pursue? 
 In turning to consider what peace is and when it is wise, we move 
beyond the question Part I began with: What is actually meant by people 
when they use the word "peace"? The aim at this point is rather to ask, in a 
critical fashion: What should you and I mean by the term? 
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CHAPTER 15 
 
 
How Should We Define Peace? 
The Peace That Is a Way 
 
 
 
hat should we take "peace" to mean and what theory of peace should 
we adopt? One upshot of Part III concerns the kind of thing we are doing in 
formulating a theory of peace and the appropriate method for going about 
this project. 
 Notice, for example, that we should expect that in actual usage the 
term "peace" functions as a family resemblance notion, the way "politics," 
"status," "sex," and—most relevantly—"war" do. We should expect that its 
usage is not governed by an unchanging and axiomatic essence but is, 
instead, held together by overlapping threads of characteristics rooted in 
diverse practices. 
 If we were lexicographers, "word cartographers" of some sort, we 
would want to develop a kind of detailed map of the term’s terrain—
comparing and contrasting the varied actual usages of the term in phrases 
like "peace of mind," "world peace," "making peace with one’s maker," "the 
peace that passeth understanding," "peaceable," "peace offering," "peace 
pipe," "peace at any price," "peace time," "Peace!", "at peace," "come in 
peace," "peace treaty," "peaceful relations," "officer of the peace," "keeping 
the peace," "peacemaker," and "Prince of peace." We would also want to 
carefully map out the diverse concrete contexts in which we use variants of 
the term and related words like "pacific," "pacifier," and "pacification." 
 But we are not professional lexicographers. We are attempting to 
explicate and critically reconstruct a central set of notions and practices 
which interest us as participants in our culture. In the end, the question is not 
so much "What does ‘peace’ really mean when people use the word?" as: 
"What is it that we are trying to mean when we talk of peace?" We should 
expect that common usage is imperfect and that our concern should be to 
answer for ourselves the question: "What ought we to mean by ‘peace’?" 
 There is no need to be obsessive about the usages we choose to 
emphasize and adopt. Many disputes and confusions can be eliminated by 
simply distinguishing different usages of the word and marking them off in 
some way. Furthermore, many of the various usages may turn out to simply 
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involve what Aristotle would have called "derivative" or else "equivocal" 
senses of the word and its cognates. We can, for example, characterize 
"peaceful" and "peacemaker" as notions derived from "peace" in the same 
way we view "war-like" and "cold warrior" as terms derived from "war." 
Further, we may obviously mean rather different things when we use the one 
word, "war," equivocally to refer to things more properly distinguished by 
phrases like "world war," "gang warfare," "class warfare," and "the war 
between the sexes." Analogous phrases can be used to sort out distinct 
notions of peace. 
 But Aristotle himself supposed that for a key term like "peace" or 
"substance" or "the good" there was always some central and privileged 
sense, one from which the others were derived and which made relations 
between various usages intelligible—"substance properly so called" or "the 
good per se." 
 As an empirical hypothesis in lexicography the assumption that there 
are such primary and essential meanings is quite dubious and probably false, 
at least in most cases. However, if we treat it as a methodological maxim for 
critical social theory it does provide a useful regulative ideal. It tells us to 
seek to systematize our usage by coordinating it in terms of some one or a 
few central meanings that illuminate relations between different ways of 
talking and acting. 
 In the case of "war," it would seem that we ought indeed to think in 
terms of a central or core sense of "war property so called" or "war per se"—
one that consists in the notion of an activity of battle in which nations 
engage in acts of armed conflict. If no community of people had ever sought 
to shed the blood of another in order to impose its will upon them, we might 
well altogether lack the concepts of war and all its cognates. In any case, the 
various things we speak of in terms of war can probably be most clearly 
coordinated in terms of their relations to this central notion. It is only 
because we can use this primary sense as a starting point that we find it 
helpful to see riots as episodes in a "class war" and see squabbles between 
couples as part of the "war between the sexes." That brings us to the puzzle 
we started in Chapter 1. 
 There, we gathered various strands of usage around a core conception 
of peace that turned out to seem fundamentally obscure. In sorting out the 
primary and central concept of peace, we arrived at a view in which there 
was a missing term in a pair of ratios. Our notion of a state of war finds a 
correlate in the concept of an act of war, but for our notion of a state of 
peace there seems to be no adequate corresponding notion of an act of 
peace. We can talk of nations warring, but we do not seem to know what it 
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would mean for them to be "peaceing" and we cannot even speak of this 
without violating the grammar of English—and many other Western 
languages as well. The even more striking disparity between the two "ratios" 
is that the "denominator" of peace, the notion of it as a static condition, is a 
kind of obverse set, a conceptual zero or place holder which is defined (at 
least typically) in terms of what it is not, i.e., it is not war—or is an absence 
of conflict, hostility or aggression. 
 Despite the obscurity of this concept of peace, we found that it could 
serve to coordinate our talk of peace and it was intimately tied to a network 
of assumptions and practices that are dominant in our culture. If we accept 
the eristic view of reasoning, the instrumental model of action, the Galilean 
view of science, and the modern institutions in which these are entrenched, it 
seems as though we ought to adopt the conception of peace as a static 
absence. But if we reject those assumptions and practices of the culture of 
conflict and adopt the network advocated in Part III, then what core notion 
of peace should we adopt? 
 The notion of peace we should make central and primary conceives of 
it as a positively distinguished activity. We should think of "peace per se, 
peace proper," as something done. The case in favor of this "denominator" 
concept is a polymorphous one. It does not rest on some single knockdown 
argument. Its merits rest, instead, on a network of views and overall appeal 
based on the strength of its explication, reconstruction, elaboration, and 
critique of our talk and action associated with peace—as well as those 
glimmerings of meaning that come upon us from time to time when we are 
led as parents to shout "PEACE!" or when we reflect in a moment of 
solitude and feel our busy lives called into question by some vague 
awareness or distant vision of a more meaningful and humane life. We 
should not suppose that the account accurately characterizes what "peace" 
did mean once or actually does mean now. The point is simply that the 
account offered below explains what you and I should agree to mean by it in 
the future. 
We may start by recalling that negative definitions of peace provide 
an inadequate explication of what we are trying to mean by it because they 
end up being too broad. Ecocide would provide a state in which there is an 
absence of war, but we would not normally refer to a radioactively sterilized 
planet as a place of peace. We want to say, at a minimum, that peace 
involves an absence of war in which there is life—human life. 
Consider next the case of two communities of living humans who are 
on neighboring islands in the South Seas and who interact very little apart 
from occasional sharing of common fishing grounds. We might say they are 
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"at peace" but want to distinguish two sorts of situations. In the first, their 
conceptions of their interests and the ways they choose to pursue them make 
war likely, and in the second these do not. In the one case, they are war 
prone; in the other, their relations are peaceable. In the second case we could 
further ask: Just how "able" at peace are they? If they are able to sustain 
frequent and intense interactions without recourse to war, then we would 
want to say that they are more "peaceful" in some strong sense of the term. 
Notice, then, that nuances in our word use suggest that we want to say that 
peace proper involves more than just human life absent of war, human life 
which merely avoids wars through isolation of communities and disinterest 
in others’ actions. Peace in the strong sense of the term somehow involves 
living in peace together with others, not merely being "at peace" in an 
absence of interaction with them. 
Now it is also fairly clear that we would like to mean by "peace 
proper" something that somehow involves some notion of agreement, though 
it is not clear precisely how agreement is involved or what kind of 
agreement is at issue. But we think of peacemakers as, among other things, 
people who resolve disagreements. We think of peace treaties as agreements 
which are reached and we think of the kinds of peace made between spouses 
or unions and corporations in a similar way. Feelings we associate with 
peace (such as harmony or tranquility) are thought of, in a derivative way, as 
agreeable. One way of characterizing what is meant by making peace with 
oneself is to say that it consists of coming to terms with oneself, and this is 
another way of saying that it involves a resolution of inner conflicts arrived 
at as a kind of inward agreement. So it seems natural to think of peace as a 
state of living with oneself or others in agreement. But what precisely is 
agreement, and are there any limitations on the kind involved in peace 
proper? These questions take some sorting out. 
The way we tend to think about agreement usually assumes what 
logicians refer to as the "law of the excluded middle," the view that each 
belief or proposition is either true or false and cannot be both or some other, 
third, sort of thing. Adopting this view and the assumptions behind it, we 
tend to contrast belief with disbelief and agreement with disagreement. We 
tend to think of belief (or disbelief) as the readiness to affirm a proposition’s 
truth (or its falsity) and tend to think of agreement as a situation in which 
two or more people each affirm one or more propositions. Disagreement, on 
this view, is the other alternative, the opposite case—consisting in one party 
affirming what the other denies. 
This gives us a picture which is both too narrow and inaccurate. It is 
too narrow because it overlooks a third attitude we can adopt toward a claim, 
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namely, doubt. Rather than believe it or disbelieve it we may simply be 
uncertain as to whether it is true. Furthermore, and this is really rather 
important, we may very often even be uncertain as to what the claim means. 
Similarly, people may converse for a bit and yet remain uncertain as to 
whether each other’s claims are true or, even more commonly, uncertain of 
what each other means. In such a case they neither agree nor disagree. They 
are in what we can call a state of "non-agreement"—just as we distinguish 
both the rational and the irrational from the non-rational and differentiate 
between the moral, the immoral, and the amoral. 
Suppose someone says we need to start rehabilitating criminals and 
reforming our prisons and another replies by insisting that we need to start 
protecting possible victims and beefing up our penal system. So far, there is 
no single proposition about whose truth they disagree. They remain in 
apparent non-agreement. We might expect the first to reply in a hostile way, 
taking issue with the things said by the second person. But notice that the 
opposite scenario is equally intelligible. The first person might reply; "Well, 
I guess we are agreed on our goals then, and the question is, how can we 
achieve all these things you and I both believe need to be done." When two 
people are in non-agreement because they have simply affirmed things that 
could consistently turn out to all be true, then their continued dialogue can 
generate either disagreement or agreement. It is open to both. 
What is very often overlooked is the fact that many times we seem to 
be in genuine disagreement when in fact we are still in a state of non-
agreement. Suppose Jerry says, "We need to strengthen our penal system," 
and Angela says, "No, we don’t—that’s the last thing we need to do." It 
certainly looks as though they disagree. But do they necessarily? It all 
depends upon what each means by "strengthen our penal system." It may 
very well be that Angela takes it to mean we need to "make prison life 
harsher and make prison terms longer." But Jerry may, in fact, not be clear 
as to just what he means but basically have in mind a concern with increases 
in thefts and bad checks and desire to have the penal system work more 
effectively in preventing them. And if their discussion continued on in the 
manner of a genuine dialogue rather than a rhetorical confrontation, Angela 
might soon find herself saying something like: "Oh! Well, if that’s all you 
are really saying, I can agree with that. I just think it’s silly to spend $10,000 
a year putting low income women into brutalizing jail environments because 
they’ve cashed $273 worth of bad checks." And Jerry might reply: "Well, I 
can see what you mean about that, but the idea that we ought to just hold 
people’s hands when they can’t make ends meet because they’ve decided to 
get addicted to drugs is just a bunch of unrealistic liberal nonsense." And 
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Angela might reply: "But that’s not what I meant!" And the conversation 
might continue. 
Notice these phrases the conversation would turn on: "I see what you 
mean"; "Well if that’s what you meant"; "But I didn’t mean that!" Angela 
and Jerry are busy discovering that their apparent disagreement was in fact a 
non-agreement. Each meant different things by the sentences the one 
affirmed and the other denied. And in many cases, neither may be very sure 
as to just what she or he really meant. They may be figuring that out as they 
talk about their views. 
This is what we should expect. Unless we went considerably astray in 
Part III, it is wrong to think of meaning as coming in unchanging atomic 
propositions and to suppose that belief consists in the simple affirmation or 
denial of these. Meanings are emergent and holistic, and believing is an 
activity in which we commit ourselves to the cultivation of one direction of 
emergence rather than another. 
The implications of this are profound. It means that agreements are—
like beliefs—things cultivated. They are not neat little packets of 
propositions that come pre-packaged and which we simply choose to accept 
or reject. They must emerge in holistic ways from the indeterminate context 
of our ongoing activity—a context that is indeterminate because it is rife 
with implicit, inconsistent, and partial views of whose accuracy we 
ourselves are unsure. Jerry and Angela are likely to be in profound non-
agreement because each is unsure of precisely what his or her words mean 
and even less sure of what the other is saying. Until they cultivate their 
understandings of themselves and each other they can neither disagree nor 
agree. They can, of course, dislike each other’s words and shout angrily in 
reply. But until they have cultivated a common set of meanings and 
cultivated their own views sufficiently to be clear about what they do and do 
not believe, they cannot be said to have arrived at genuine disagreement or 
agreement. 
Instrumental action does, of course, have a place in the process of 
arriving at agreement or disagreement. We type a letter as a means to 
achieve the end of informing others about our views. We may introduce a 
stipulative definition as a means for achieving the goal of clearly 
communicating our ideas to others. But in trying to convert non-agreement 
into agreement or disagreement, we cannot know beforehand what the 
agreement or disagreement we are trying to arrive at will be or just how we 
are going to arrive at it. If we did, the job would have already been done and 
further dialogue would be unnecessary. The conversion of non-agreement 
into agreement or disagreement involves expressions of both concerns and 
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general views of reality, it involves projects of clarification and 
reconstruction, and it involves practices of research and negotiation. Notice 
then that activities of cultivation are at the heart of the processes by which 
we convert non-agreements into something else. 
At this point, it may be tempting to suggest that we have arrived at 
definitions of both "peace" and "peacemaking" as well. Peace, we might say, 
consists of living with people in agreement and peacemaking consists in the 
cultivation of such agreement. But, at a minimum, this would seem to be a 
misleading way of putting things. Also, it would fail to adequately narrow 
down our concept of peace. 
It would be misleading because despite the fact that it emphasizes that 
agreements emerge in a process of cultivation, it suggests that what emerges 
is a static and determinate thing. It makes it sound as though peacemaking is 
a kind of cultivation that gets us to "Yes" (as in the title of Fisher and Ury’s 
Getting to Yes) and as though peace itself is a state of "Yesness," so to 
speak. But if we view beliefs as commitments to a kind of process (rather 
than affirmations of static propositions), then we should view shared beliefs 
or agreements in the same way—as shared commitments to a process. And 
this does, in fact, match up with our experience. Agreements are not so 
much something we work out as something we work with. The signing of a 
treaty or contract (or the shaking of hands or the "sealing with a kiss") is 
simply one more moment in an ongoing process that will continue. We do 
not just negotiate a treaty. We must continue to negotiate its interpretation 
and application. We do not just cultivate a resolution of a marital dispute; we 
must continue to cultivate the living out of that resolution. 
In some contexts we have highly ritualized practices for highlighting 
rather decisive moments in the process of cultivating agreement. Wedding 
rites, signing ceremonies, and even the closing of a cash register drawer 
serve this sort of function. And our courts would become madhouses without 
acts like these that serve to give human relations definition. But notice that 
even courts recognize the dynamic and developmental character of 
agreements which is a vivid fact of everyday experience. A contract is 
acknowledged to be an agreement in intent which may be signified in a 
variety of ways and to a variety of degrees. 
At the level of international affairs, the official signing of a treaty 
provides a mechanism analogous to a wedding rite. But notice that we find 
ourselves led increasingly to talk not about arms treaties but about the 
process of arms limitation—concerned not so much with the SALT II treaty 
as with the SALT II process. In dealing with the Middle East we tend more 
and more to talk not of the peace we seek but about the peace process in 
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which we are participating—and the same goes for talk about the Contadora 
process in Central America. 
The point to note here is that "agree" is a verb. And it is what we 
might call a verb of ongoing activity rather than a verb of culminating 
activity. In this way it is like the verbs "to live" and "to love" which refer to 
activities that are successful only when they yield conditions appropriate for 
their continued performance. And in this way "to agree" differs from "to die" 
or "to win" which are verbs of culminating activity because they refer to 
activities that are successful only when they reach a final stage that brings 
the activity to an end. 
The moral to draw here is that we can keep a more accurate 
perspective on what peace involves if we do not think of it as a thing that we 
make or a state that we reach but conceive of it as a process we undertake. It 
is an activity in which we engage. It is not a position to be adopted but a 
movement along a vector. It is a process of agreeing—the cultivation of a 
shared commitment to common expressions, projects, and practices. 
But even if we think of peace as an activity of cultivating processes of 
agreeing, our conception may remain too broad because agreement can take 
different forms. The woman attacked by an armed rapist may agree not to 
shout. The prospective house buyer may agree to a purchase without 
knowing the termite-ridden timbers have been covered over. Such 
agreements are faulty—and, in a sense, are not genuine agreements at all—
because they lack free and informed consent. Notice that the rape victim 
might say in retrospect that she did not really agree to keep quiet, she just 
obeyed. And the house buyer might argue in court that she most 
emphatically did not agree to purchase a termite damaged house. 
Genuine agreement, in the strong sense of the term, involves a sharing 
of intent, a joint commitment based on voluntary and undeceived 
understandings that constitute "the understanding" on which we agree. But 
there is commitment only when there is the responsible exercise of choice. 
For this reason, children and others who are not judged to be competent and 
responsible agents cannot enter into legally binding agreements in the same 
way mature and sane adults can. 
Analogous points hold with regard to peace. We can "pacify" people 
by giving them drugs, manipulating them with propaganda, keeping them 
illiterate and uniformed, or terrorizing them. But this involves peace only in 
a weak and derivative sense of the term—we would be tempted to deny that 
people living quietly in blind or fearful submission are living in genuine 
peace. In the strong sense of the term, we would want to say that genuine 
  136 
peace involves an activity of cultivating freely and responsibly undertaken 
commitments. 
Once we acknowledge the dynamic character of agreement, this point 
doubles in force. It is perhaps tempting to think that the instruments at our 
disposal enable us to compel others to agree. But once we see peace treaties 
and contracts as moments in an ongoing process, we see that we cannot 
simply compel assent and then live with the agreements reached. We must 
get people to go on agreeing in the joint expressions, projects, and practices 
which they undertake with us. Unless we are prepared to manipulate them 
every step of the way—leading them by the nose—we must cultivate a 
choice on their part which commits them to working with "the agreement." 
We must cultivate a choice on their part which commits them to the 
voluntary, continued cultivation of these things. 
When people distinguish pseudo-peace from the real McCoy, they 
often have one of two cases in mind. In one, the parties involved may not be 
currently engaged in warfare, but they are busily cultivating disagreements 
and the means to resolve them through armed conflict. In such cases, 
"peace" really means "war-in-the-making"—as William James said of 
Europe in his own era and would have said of the cold war in ours. In a 
second sort of case, genuine peace may be absent because genuine 
agreements of a free and responsible sort are not being cultivated. Instead, 
one party is dominating the other rather than seeking its uncompelled assent 
and autonomous commitment. The relations between antebellum slave 
holders and blacks and, also, the interactions between the Polish government 
and the Polish people provide examples of this. 
This second kind of case is the sort at issue when Micahel Walzer 
distinguishes "peace-with-rights" as the sort of thing he is interested in and 
when Johan Galtung talks of "positive peace" as an absence of injustice, 
oppression, and forms of "structural violence." What they are after is the real 
McCoy. But they end up giving us a compound notion of "peace plus"—
peace plus rights, justice, liberation, or structural non-violence. They leave 
the concept of peace itself negative. This tends to obscure the fact that when 
injustice is imposed by oppressive resorts to violence and threats, then 
people are not genuinely agreeing with each other—and genuine peace (not 
just peace plus something else) is absent. Injustice is a symptom of the 
absence of genuine peace and oppression is a means of securing this 
absence. Peace proper, peace in the strong sense of the term, is best thought 
of, then, as a process in which people freely and responsibly cultivate shared 
commitments to common expressions, projects and practices. 
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This account of the core meaning of peace enables us to explicate 
equivocal and derivative senses of the term. Having defined peace in this 
way, we can characterize a state of peace as a situation in which this activity 
is occurring. Relations may be said to be peaceful insofar as they involve 
this activity or make it more likely or easier to engage in. Peaceable folks 
are ones prepared and inclined to engage in the activity. Peacemakers are 
ones who actually do so. 
Some of the weaker senses of the term and its cognates can be 
understood as privative versions of peace proper. They may be situations in 
which some contributory conditions or elements of the process are present 
but not others. Perhaps people are "at peace" because they are afraid to fight 
or "at least they’ve started talking to each other." Or perhaps they have been 
"pacified" by some concession. 
"Making peace with oneself" may be said to consist in cultivating 
personal commitments free of ambivalence—ones that no longer leave me 
"of two minds" or "at odds with myself." "Peace of mind" involves such 
cultivation and perhaps also "peaceful feelings" that consist of those kinds of 
harmony and tranquility associated with the successful pursuit of such 
activity. 
At this point we have arrived at a fairly rich notion of peace—albeit 
one whose riches need considerably more unpacking. One reason the notion 
is rich is that the analysis of Part III provides us with three networks of 
categories that can be used to characterize in detail the type of thing peace 
involves. In saying that it is a process of cultivating agreements, we are 
saying that it employs critical participatory research and maieutic reasoning 
to pursue shared commitments to expressions, projects and practices. And 
because of the groundwork we laid in Part III, these key terms say a great 
deal. 
For example, they serve to distinguish peace from things like 
traditional legal practice which employs eristic styles of reasoning. It also 
distinguishes peace from policy analysis and social engineering that adopt 
Galilean styles of research to pursue social knowledge. And it also 
distinguishes peace from simple instrumental acts (like pushing a toaster 
lever or shooting a duck in order to eat it) by characterizing it as a process 
that involves the non-instrumental features of cultivation which we 
examined in detail. 
What further distinguishes peace from maieutic reasoning among 
torturers, critical participatory research undertaken by war strategists, and 
cultivation of modes of oppression like slavery can be summed up by 
characterizing what it is that is cultivated—namely, agreement. Not 
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agreement of any old type arrived at in any old way but genuine agreements. 
These have five distinct characteristics: (1) They are voluntary. (2) They 
address common concerns. (They are not just forms of isolation that let 
people "live and let live" on separate islands.) (3) They rest on a 
knowledgeable and mutual understanding arrived at through critical 
participatory research. (4) These researches have yielded agreements that all 
parties find they not only do accept but believe they should. (They are not 
just "agreements" to submissively obey.) (5) These agreements or 
"understandings" are ongoing commitments to share in the further 
cultivation of joint expressions, projects, and practices. (They are not static 
conditions in which people simply share dispositions to affirm some set of 
propositions or act in some predetermined way.) 
To further unpack the meaning of the notion of peace we have arrived 
at, we need to consider some of the different forms these five characteristics 
can take. We should expect, after all, that key terms like "voluntary" will 
turn out to be family resemblance notions that mean different things in 
different contexts. We should expect this on principle because of the 
analysis of social reality offered in Part III. We should also expect it by 
analogy because other practices, such as scientific research, use key terms 
that mean significantly different things in different contexts. For example, 
"hypothesis" typically means something different when used by 
microbiologists interested in general theories than when it is used by 
geologists interested in explaining the origins of a specific mountain range. 
The concept of "experiment" at work when pharmacologists do "double 
blind experiments" differs in very important ways from the notion at work 
when astrophysicists perform "thought experiments." So we should expect 
that concepts central to our understanding of the methods of peace will 
likewise vary in significance when employed in different contexts. 
This turns out to actually be the case, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. There, we will look at some of the traditions of peacemaking which 
serve to give us a richer understanding of the various forms that the activity 
of peace can take. This will further serve to help us appreciate both the 
potential and the limitations of the process and go on in a subsequent chapter 
to consider when it is and is not wise to pursue the activity of peace. 
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CHAPTER 16 
 
 
Three Ways of Practicing Peace 
 
 
 
Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and re-awakens 
the love that was lying dormant in him; the two again begin to 
live in peace; nobody takes notice of this. But if the two brothers, 
through the intervention of solicitors or some other reason, take 
up arms or go to law—which is another form of the exhibition of 
brute force—their doings would be immediately noticed in the 
press, they would be the talk of their neighbors and would 
probably go down in history. And what is true of families and 
communities is true of nations. 
Thousands, indeed tens of thousands, depend for their 
existence on a very active working of this force. Little quarrels of 
millions of families in their daily lives disappear before the 
exercise of this force. Hundreds of nations live in peace. History 
does not and cannot take note of this fact. History is really a 
record of every interruption of the even working of the force of 
love or of the soul.1 
 
 
 
 
he activity of peace is not something novel and untried. The cultivation 
of shared commitments to expressions, projects, and practices is something 
people have practiced for a long time—though they have not always 
explicitly identified this activity as peace. Three particular traditions in 
which people have tried to cultivate excellence in this kind of practice may 
serve to illustrate the variety of forms that peace can take and suggest some 
of its possibilities and limitations. One is the Gandhian practice of 
satyagraha. A second is the Quaker process of consensus. 
The third is the process of "principled negotiation" which is being 
developed at the Harvard Law School’s Negotiation project and is described 
in Roger Fisher and William Ury’s Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In. Fisher and Ury’s work is representative of a very broad 
T 
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and diverse network of practices being developed by a variety of groups 
such as the Community Board Program of San Francisco, the Society of 
Professionals in Dispute  Resolution, the Mennonite Conciliation Service, 
the American Arbitration Association, Atlanta’s Martin Luther King Jr. 
Center for Nonviolent Change, the Family Center for Mediation and 
Counselling in Kensington in Maryland, the Counsel for the Facilitation of 
International Conflict Resolution in College Park, and other groups. (I have 
chosen Fisher and Ury’s book as representative of these because it is short 
and accessible and because at recent conferences at which members of these 
groups were present it was the one book consistently referred to as an 
introduction to the general approach to negotiation being developed by such 
groups.) 
These three are at least as different as astrophysics, pharmacology, 
and field biology. While each is a variation of the general type of peace 
process described in the preceding chapter, they differ in the kinds of 
problems they focus on, the cultural traditions they originate from, the 
specific ways in which they conceive the basic features of the process of 
cultivating agreement, and the particular techniques they attempt to perfect. 
Without attempting to do justice to any one of them, we can indicate what 
some of these differences are and then look at each in a bit more detail to see 
how each hangs together as a tradition of concrete practice. 
The Quaker process was first evolved as a method for collective 
decision making within a community of people who shared many common 
testimonies (such as simplicity) and who shared a common religious faith—
a kind of "primitive Christianity restored." In contrast, principled negotiation 
in the "Harvard style" has been experimented with as a method enabling us 
to resolve disputes with people and communities who have very different 
value systems and views of the world but who are willing to engage in a 
"back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you 
and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are 
opposed."2 
The initial impulse motivating the development of Gandhi’s 
techniques was a desire to devise a way to enable Indians to achieve the 
swaraj or "self-rule" of personal liberation, communal autonomy, and 
national sovereignty free of British oppression. It aimed to achieve this 
through "a method of securing rights by personal suffering" that consisted in 
a "truth force" of "passive resistance" which is "the reverse of resistance by 
arms."3 
The first and foremost concern of early Quakers was to find a method 
of resolving disputes within a single community. The focal interest of people 
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involved in the Harvard Negotiation Project was to deal with differences 
between often very different communities of people involved in negotiations 
with each other. Gandhian satyagraha aimed, in contrast, to provide a non-
violent way of settling differences when one of the parties (such as the South 
African Boers or the British) were ready and able to employ armed force 
instead of diplomacy. 
Regarding cultural differences, Gandhi’s roots lie, in part, in Hindu 
religion and British common law. The Quaker process of consensus finds its 
roots in the seventeenth century practice of the sect called the Seekers who 
met in silence to wait upon the Lord—as well as in early Christian notions of 
the presence of a Christ who comes to teach and lead his people. Principled 
negotiation was evolved in a late twentieth century Harvard milieu of 
humanists interested in negotiations taking place in the shadow of domestic 
and international law. These differences in cultural origin are reflected in a 
host of philosophical and practical nuances that distinguish the three. 
For example, members of the Quaker Religious Society of Friends 
and Roger Fisher might both describe the process of cultivating agreements 
as "seeking consensus." But Quakers would mean by this a process of 
"communal discernment" in which a group meets to jointly discover the 
Truth that speaks to Power and is grounded on the "light of God in every 
one." Fisher and Ury would, in contrast, explain their understanding of 
"seeking consensus" by talk of a process of negotiation in which different 
interests are (hopefully) resolved in an efficient, amicable and wise way that 
satisfies the parties concerned and does justice to the community at large. In 
the one case, the conception of a legitimate agreement is rooted in theology; 
in the other, it is rooted in a secular morality. The two roots are not, of 
course, incompatible in practice—as Gandhi’s habit of appeal to both makes 
clear. 
Such differences in philosophical and cultural background are 
reflected in the language used to express notions of cultivation, maieutic 
reasoning, and social knowledge—as well as in the way these notions are 
operationalized. For instance, so far as their models of action go, though all 
three employ biological metaphors associated with cultivation, Quakers and 
satyagrahis have a special affinity for metaphors drawn from nature—
especially the vegetable kingdom with its seeds, roots, and branches. 
Harvard-style negotiators tend to opt more often for the contemporary jargon 
associated with "exploring options," "project development," and "stages of 
analysis, planning, and discussion" that aim to "reach closure on an issue." 
These variations in dialect reflect, among other things, differences in 
views about who the key actors are and what temporal horizons inform their 
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work. The botanical metaphors reflect a perspective in which the key agents 
are not so much individuals as communities—whose central aims are long 
term and involve the evolution of the cultural ecosystem as a whole. Specific 
actions are undertaken as part of a peace process that witnesses to an 
alternative social vision and provides a way into the future. In contrast, the 
central emphasis in "principled negotiation" is on resolving present 
differences and answering the question: "Who should do what tomorrow?" 
While all three traditions involve types of maieutic reasoning, they differ in 
the terms they use to describe it and the particular ways in which they 
practice it. For example, Quakers most typically "follow leadings" that come 
in the Silence and "gather consensus" by patiently meditating on their 
concerns and the remarks of others. Harvard-style negotiators engage in 
"group problem solving" where people talk a lot, "brainstorm," and use 
newsprint pads to "multiply options" and keep track of their agenda. The 
wall full of magic marker scented paper is as characteristic of their process 
as the prolonged lapse into that great blackboard of the Silence is 
characteristic of Friends’ meetings. For Gandhi, in contrast, communal 
dialogue most typically took the form of public hearings sponsored by 
activist groups and government authorities or written correspondence in the 
form of personal letters and newspaper editorials and replies. (During the 
South African campaign, for instance, huge volumes of letters were 
published and publicly responded to in the satyagrahis’ paper, Indian 
Opinion.) 
Though each of the three traditions adopts a critical participatory view 
of social knowledge, they are not very self-conscious or explicit in their talk 
about research techniques used to improve their understanding of either the 
practice they are trying to perfect or the specific situations in which they 
employ it. Fisher and Ury simply note, for example: "Drawing on our 
respective backgrounds in international law and anthropology and an 
extensive collaboration over the years with practitioners, colleagues, and 
students, we have evolved a practical method for negotiating agreement 
amicably without giving in."4 They do, however, clearly and explicitly adopt 
the view that the kind of knowledge they seek is of a critical participatory 
character: 
 
What we have tried to do is to organize common sense and 
common experience in a way that provides a usable framework 
for thinking and acting. The more consistent these ideas are with 
your knowledge and intuition the better… No one, however, can 
make you skillful but yourself. Reading the pamphlet on the 
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Royal Canadian Air Force exercises will not make you physically 
fit. Studying books on tennis, swimming, riding a bicycle, or 
riding a horse will not make you an expert. Negotiation is no 
different.5 
 
Advocates of Galilean styled social science who have been critical of 
this kind of "subjective" or "cookbook" approach have not been addressed—
the cooks have preferred to keep their kettles hot and ignore epistemological 
issues. 
In many respects, Gandhi was more methodologically self-critical 
than the Harvard group or the Quakers. However, he did not formulate the 
principles of his "experiments with truth" by contrasting them to Galilean 
social science. Instead, he drew on—and revised—principles of inquiry 
found, for instance, in independent journalism, British-styled "reviews of 
grievances," and "prayerful self-introspection and self-analysis." Perhaps the 
most distinctive element he added was an insistence that the leaders of a 
movement must share the lives (the food, clothing and daily habits) of the 
people they sought to represent. In his view, wearing a khadi loin cloth was 
not just a political symbol of solidarity with the oppressed. It was part of a 
life style that provided an indispensable understanding of the social reality 
in which most Indians dwelt. 
The differences noted so far should not suggest that the assumptions 
and practices of these three traditions are incompatible. On the contrary, 
there is considerable congruity and overlap. But each offers distinctive 
resources for people who might want to practice peace and each is worth 
considering as a coherent body of practice in its own right. Since the Quaker 
tradition is, in some respects, the most limited in its applicability (being 
designed first and foremost for dealing with intra-communal differences) it 
is perhaps the best to focus on first. 
 
 
THE QUAKER PROCESS OF CONSENSUS 
 
A number of umbrella organizations within the Religious Society of 
Friends (such as the "yearly meetings" of Philadelphia, New York and 
London) have published books of "Faith and Practice." However, the 
Society is run in a grass-roots fashion without any hierarchy authorized to 
provide a definitive, official formulation of Quaker practice. What follows is 
simply an attempt to offer a critical participatory account of that practice 
which highlights issues of special interest to us here.6 
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It is a practice of democratic decision making which does not employ 
voting. Instead, concerns are raised, discussed, and prayed over until 
consensus is reached. This is an open-ended process and, at its best, the 
process is open in ways that lead to "openings"—new insights and 
perspectives that allow a "way to open" for the community to discern a truth 
held in common. It is an activity born of shared commitments and concerns 
rooted in a coherent set of ideas about things as basic as the nature of 
meaning and truth and practiced in a disciplined way that involves at least 
five distinct stages or levels of development. 
Regarding the commitments and concerns of Quakers, these are perhaps best 
understood in terms of historic testimonies and queries that "address" or 
"speak to" them as specific individuals and communities. For example, 
traditional Quaker concerns about peace are not laid out in a code of 
abstract, impersonal principles that provide orders everyone ought to obey. 
Instead, the tradition offers us personal witnesses of people like John 
Woolman—who found himself led to go and travel for a time among his 
Indian brothers. They offer questions that give pause and ask each person to 
consider with care: "Do you live in the virtue of that life and power that 
takes away the occasion of all wars?" 
Quaker attitudes toward their concerns—and toward the process by 
which they come to act on them—are rooted in fundamental beliefs about 
truth, meaning, reason, and the self. 
First, Quakers view truth as something that happens; it occurs. Truth 
is not a dead fact which is known; it is a living occurrence in which they 
participate when they "speak Truth to Power." The origins of this view lie in 
the conception of the Christ as a living truth which comes as a presence 
whenever two or more are gathered. 
Second, meaning is conceived of as a communal process. It is like a 
dance; there are individual bodies moving, but one dance is occurring. When 
Quakers gather the sense of a meeting in order to reach a decision, they do 
not speak of counting heads and to see who means what. Instead, they would 
say we should ask ourselves what we, collectively, mean. We may say many 
different things, and yet somehow speak with one voice. (George Fox, one 
of the seventeenth century founders of the sect, would have said that this one 
is the voice of Christ who "has come to teach His people Himself.") 
Third, feeling and reason are viewed as continuous with one another. 
In this respect, Quaker men and women provide a good example of a 
community in which there is relatively little sex-correlated difference in 
views of feeling and reason of the sort characterized in Part II’s discussion 
of eristic and maieutic styles of reasoning. 
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Fourth, the self is viewed as inherently social and transitional, 
becoming. However, Quakers find that their experience of communal 
discernment presents a reality that demands that we somehow acknowledge 
both the communal character of the self and the radical worth of 
individuals—free and responsible individuals addressed and conjoined in the 
paradoxical reality of relations between "I" and "thou" (or "me" and "thee"). 
Further, it would be a mistake to think that the Quaker tradition pictures the 
self as merely social—as though it were a secular artifact created solely by 
social forces. For they suppose that at the heart of the community in which 
they participate is a spirit—a spirit which grows out of each of us and yet 
also grows into each of us. Perhaps the paradoxical character of this notion 
is best captured by the early Christian metaphor that views individuals as 
distinct members of a unified body of Christ. 
The actual process of collective decision making is described in terms of 
five stages or levels: "quieting impulses," "addressing concerns," "gathering 
consensus," "finding clearness," and "bearing witness." The five can occur in 
worship, in meeting for business, in hassling things out with a spouse or 
employer, in working for a Nuclear Freeze… they can occur through all of 
life and it is thought that they should. We can focus on one of the five at a 
time, in which case they seem like stages or steps. Alternatively, we can 
look at any given moment of the process and be aware of the ways in which 
all five should always be present. In that case, they seem like levels or 
aspects. The first, quieting impulses might also be called "stilling lusts" or 
"entering the Silence’ ‘or "centering down." 
My typical and everyday frame of mind is fragmented. I am caught up 
by desires, fears, frustrations, angers, habits, role expectations and impulses 
of all sorts. Marxists would describe this in terms of alienation and 
oppression. Freudians would speak of sublimation and repression. George 
Fox would say that lamina state of sin, a slave of my lusts. And these lusts 
are the condition of all wars. They jut up through our chests and ball our 
brains into fists. They are mechanistic causes of our behavior. They do not 
lure us from ahead; they push us from below and behind. 
The first step is to quiet these—not by stifling them, but by having 
them let go of us and by letting go of them, distancing ourselves from them, 
freeing up. Sometimes the simplest thing to do is just to satisfy these urges. 
If your nose itches in meeting for silent worship, scratch it. Sometimes it is 
simplest to just go off from the things that stimulate and aggravate these 
impulses. When you are mad at your spouse, you might do well to simply 
take a walk. (Helpful spouses often recommend this!) Another alternative, 
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instead of going away physically, is to go away mentally. Many impulses 
require this. 
There are many techniques for getting such inner distance. One is 
simply to express your feelings. A loud scream can be a good start. An 
articulate and poetic expression gets us even farther. Rendering lusts more 
fully conscious serves to domesticate them. Another more difficult but often 
even more effective technique is humor. Laughing at ourselves brings 
distance, perspective. While Friends’ anecdotes and traditional "jokes" are 
typically so dry as to be virtually unintelligible as efforts in jocularity, their 
business meetings are often punctuated by comments that make great fun—
at the speaker’s own, self-acknowledged expense. 
Transcendental meditation is another technique for "quieting 
impulses." Other techniques include focusing on a flower or a goldfish or a 
passage from the Bible or a simple prayer. It is some such technique as these 
that many Friends seem to use at the start of meetings for worship when they 
are "centering down." People who practice the knack of this report the result 
with a variety of terms: warmth, loss of sense of self, sense of wholeness, 
sweetness, and even light. 
This warm engrossing sort of light is the kind on which Quakers focused 
during the eighteenth century period of Quietism. It has a great deal in 
common with the various lights experienced in a variety of mystical 
traditions. It can free us up in the depths of the Silence and provide a kind of 
raw power for creativity that makes radically new beginnings possible. It 
provides the experiential basis for what Lewis Benson calls "neo-Platonic" 
Christianity.7 People caught up in it in meeting for worship tend to breathe 
slowly and smile. 
There is a second sort of light more distinctive with Friends. 
Experience of it seems to have originated in the seventeenth century practice 
of Seekers who met in silence to "wait upon the Lord." It is central to the 
innovative corporate worship and group mysticism so distinctive of the 
Quaker tradition. It is not like a warm solar wave in which we are engulfed; 
it is like a beacon, or a variety of beacons, that beckon us on. In meeting, 
people called on by this second sort of light tend to grimace, change the way 
their legs are crossed—and occasionally feel their pulse accelerate as they 
find themselves about to speak. This beckoning light provides the 
experiential basis for what Lewis Benson calls "prophetic" Christianity. 
Most Quakers would hold that ultimately this light has the same source as 
the first (the Light), but for our purposes here it is best to think of the two as 
quite different. For the second leads to an experience of disturbed care—one 
  147 
which is not a result of impulse or lust but rather of feeling called into 
question in addressing a concern. 
After we quiet our impulses, we are ready to address concerns. These 
concerns may arise from events of the day; they may be raised by the words 
of another at a meeting for worship; they may simply come to us as words or 
images that keep coming back to mind—gnawing on us or haunting us. 
It may often be hard at first to distinguish genuine concerns from just 
plain old mechanical habits of mind or personal desires, but they do have a 
different quality. They lure us on. You can shake your head like a hound dog 
at a cross-road, shaking off the lusty smells, raise your head, catch the scent, 
and feel called on. Furthermore, there is the sense that in addressing these 
concerns we find ourselves addressed by them. It is a bit like being an early 
Hebrew, praying in the wilderness, raising your voice to God… and then 
you hear a voice, "Abraham!"—and, with some trembling perhaps, you 
respond: "Here I am Lord." The Quaker queries provide a repository of key 
concerns of this sort, the kind that continue to address people alive today and 
call us into question in central ways. Most Quakers report that meeting in 
worship with others often serves to markedly intensify the sense of being 
addressed by an issue and by the concerns of their community. They find 
themselves addressed by a powerful silence which waits upon us and listens. 
Once you have caught the scent and a glimpse of the light ahead or 
felt a "leading," the next step is to follow it. This is the stage of "gathering 
consensus" or "seeking clearness." You find yourself exploring different 
angles on an issue; others speak to it, filling in perspectives with fact and 
insight. Insight and understanding get deepened and connected. 
The gathering of consensus is more than a political method for 
reaching decisions—one that simply requires that no one says no. And it 
should not be thought of as a process of brokering votes until everyone is 
ready to vote in favor of a proposal. Rather, its aim is to explore concerns 
and the reality we live amidst and seek until we find a view that does justice 
to the complexity of reality and rightness. In the Quaker tradition, consensus 
is viewed as a practice of communal discernment that yields not only 
agreement but truth—a truth grounded in something beyond us. 
Such seeking can yield an understanding of many different points of 
view—both theoretical and practical—which have much insight to offer. It is 
assumed that we should draw on them all, trying to get each to "speak to" 
the other. It would, in many ways, be nice if there were some decision 
procedure for sorting these out—something like the greatest happiness 
principle of the utilitarians or the categorical imperative in Kantian ethics. 
But Quakers act on the assumption that there is no overarching principle for 
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adjudicating such differences; there is no master rule to put everything in its 
place. The trick is just to keep alternative points of view in dialogue until a 
genuine consensus is reached—one that, in business meetings, for example, 
is usually characterized as the "sense of the meeting." Such dialogue 
requires us to bridge between different languages and to create new 
language. It is for this reason that poetic metaphor is so commonly employed 
in the reasoning process. The tacit assumption is that to answer to that of 
God in others, we must draw on the Creator in ourselves. 
The fourth stage or level of the Quaker process is what might be 
called "finding clearness." This is the stage of resolve, the stage at which 
people find themselves standing in the conviction of some truth. The 
function of this stage is like that of the moment of choice in other sorts of 
decision processes, but finding clearness differs from ordinary choosing in 
two ways. First, it is not a matter of subjective preference, of deciding of 
your own will between two competing alternatives. It is more a matter of 
discovering objective moral truth, of finding your destiny, your calling. 
Second, this finding has the character of discovering you are in the grip of 
something. It is a bit like a state I once heard a minister avow to his 
enthusiastic congregation on the radio. His refrain was: "I got somethin’ in 
me! I can’t shake it loose!" Such conviction involves a sense of being 
compelled. But not by being pushed from behind as with impulses. Instead, 
it is a matter of being pulled from ahead, or being irresistibly drawn on, 
lured with necessity by a destiny. It is the kind of feeling many people had in 
hearing Martin Luther King, Jr.’s "I Have a Dream" speech. When clearness 
is reached, something is experienced as a truth known by direct revelation. It 
is seen. The followers of George Fox believe in continuing revelation and 
think that, like him, they can know such moral truths "experimentally," that 
is, through direct experience. 
There is no strict and infallible test to determine in general when a 
group has reached genuine clearness, but some indicators are useful. 
Clearness usually involves a sense of openness, the sense that we are aware 
of a wide variety of perspectives on an issue. This openness involves, 
further, a sense of wholeness, an integrity that comes when all the different 
positions are given their due and respected. A third indicator is unanimity. 
(The lack of this can, of course, take different forms. Someone may actually 
"stand in the way" of proposal or they may merely ask to be "minuted in 
opposition" or even simply remain silently uncertain but uninterested.) 
Fourth, there is a sense of presence. This sense comes from the present 
moment having a thickness of awareness; we have much on our mind and it 
is all coordinated. It is as though we are actors in a play which has many 
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levels of meaning, levels which we are aware of all at once. Socrates’ many 
layered awareness near the close of Plato’s dialogue, The Crito, would 
provide a good example of this. 
These four indicators can be reflected in, and enhanced by the 
postures and gestures of our bodies—in the openness of hands and facial 
expressions, in the wholeness and integrity of the flow of our gestures, and 
in the general physical alertness and vital presence of our bodies. When 
experience achieves these features, we sustain a kind of inclusive focus in 
our activity. This inclusive focus is what many Quakers have come to mean 
by simplicity. Clearness simplifies. Such simplicity is not a matter of a lack 
of complexity in what we think about. Instead, it is a unity of our thoughts 
and deeds, a gathering of clear focus. 
Such clearness can compel activity. This brings us to the fifth stage, 
bearing witness. The activity people find themselves led to may be verbal. 
For instance, they may find their breath and pulse rates accelerate and feel 
called to speak in a meeting for worship. Or they may find themselves led to 
do things in public or private life. 
Such activity is not best understood as "action" in the instrumentalist 
sense of the term—the adoption of some means to achieve some goal. When 
George Fox refused to take off his hat before a judge, he knew it was likely 
to accomplish two things, make the judge mad and get George jailed. But he 
was not trying to accomplish either. Many tax resisters have good reason to 
believe they are not going to prevent the government from getting their 
money. Petitioners for the Nuclear Freeze may believe their activity may not 
do much directly to halt the arms race in the immediate future. What 
motivates the activity of such people is not, primarily, the hope of achieving 
some end such as peace (though they would not, of course, exclude that!) but 
rather it is, primarily, the conviction that they must bear witness to the truth. 
It is not, of course, that they lack ends or fail to employ effective means; it is 
that they think of these in a distinctive way—as parts of a process of 
cultivating expressions, projects or practices. 
The guiding concern of people bearing witness is to live rightly, in 
ways that are exemplary. Insofar as they have an end they aim at, it is 
perhaps most helpful to think of it as the aim of cultivating their souls and 
converting others. They are not so much trying to find a way to get to peace 
as bear witness to the conviction that there is no way to peace; peace is the 
way. And this way of peace is one of bearing witness to those truths found in 
clearness when impulses are quieted and leadings are followed in the 
gathering of consensus. 
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Quakers are convinced that genuine leadings all proceed from a 
common ground, springing from a unity which they seek and find. It is a 
ground that they experience as a presence—not unlike the presence Martin 
Buber tried to indicate (but could not define) in his discussion of "I and 
Thou." This ground or source is experienced as having a style. It has a style 
of conciliation rather than aggression, of inclusiveness rather than 
dominance, of organism rather than mechanism. Further it has the character 
of care; it is respectful. Also, Quakers find themselves addressed by it. In 
these ways, it differs fundamentally from an ethical principle and is much 
more like a person. 
Friends differ in their views about the metaphysical relationships 
between Jesus of Nazareth and this inclusive, organic, caring, respectful 
presence that addresses us. (Many find it difficult, for instance, to describe 
this presence adequately using only male pronouns.) But the significance of 
these speculative philosophical differences seems largely beside the point 
when contrasted with the common experience of this person-like presence 
which George Fox found himself describing with the words: "Christ has 
come to teach his people himself." 
The foregoing description idealizes the Quaker process and is not 
meant to accurately report what Quakers everywhere actually do but only 
give an account of what many of them believe are the norms that regulate 
what they ought to be attempting. In the three hundred years it has been 
worked with, the process has met with some significant success as well as 
some noteworthy failures. But to say this is, in a sense, simply to note that it 
is not a theory but an actual practice employed in this world by real live 
human beings. 
Many of the theologically tinged notions—such as "bearing 
witness"—are applicable to—and have roots in—very different religious 
traditions. Furthermore, much of the Quaker practice can be abstracted from 
its theological context and employed in every walk of life in which people 
attempt to reach decisions. The skill of "centering down," for instance, has 
been found to be useful in committee meetings and confrontations of all 
sorts. To take another example, in the early 1950’s, Morris Llewelyn Cook 
described how the Quaker practice of "taking the sense of a meeting" (rather 
than counting votes) had been found to work well in business and 
government contexts.8 This phrase and the activity it describes have both 
come to be employed widely—often leading to the effective suspension of 
Robert’s Rules of Order when a committee chair or a faculty senate 
president acquires the competence to act less like a parliamentarian and 
more like the "clerk" of a Quaker meeting. 
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For people interested in drawing on the Quaker tradition, two further 
points are worth noting. First, the use of the practice tends to transform 
individuals and communities in ways that make them more competent and 
committed to further use of consensus. The process tends to breed the 
conditions for its own further success. Second, because many elements of 
the practice have organic relations with one another, people who employ 
part of its techniques often begin to find themselves rediscovering and 
adopting others. 
But the process can be abused in an inexperienced community when 
some of its members use the rhetoric of consensus to mask Machiavellian 
politics. Furthermore, though it can be employed in contexts where people 
are radically at odds with one another (as in divorce proceedings), it 
functions best where all parties involved are making honest efforts to arrive 
at the corporate decision that contains the fullest measure of Truth—
regardless of its impact on their personal welfare. But how can peace be 
practiced efficiently and successfully when the parties involved are not 
already that peaceable? Roger Fisher and William Ury’s account of 
"principled negotiation" offers a set of alternatives. 
 
 
PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION 
 
Suppose that I am making good faith efforts to reach an agreement for 
ending a family feud, settling an insurance claim, merging two companies 
passing a piece of legislation, or establishing a military ceasefire but the 
other guys, well… they are more powerful and they may not want to play 
ball at all, and if they do they’ll use dirty tricks! What do I do then? 
In Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Roger 
Fisher and William Ury are interested in just these sorts of cases. But they 
start their analysis off with a somewhat simpler sort of difficulty. 
Suppose I am negotiating with someone who turns out to be a 
"positional bargainer" of the tough guy sort described in Chapter 8. I seem to 
have two rather unattractive options. I can play tough in turn. But this may 
very well result in costly bluffs that result in a settlement that pleases neither 
of us—it results in a settlement at all. Or I can play softy. But that is likely to 
make me lose in a big way this time and probably give me a very 
undesirable reputation of being a patsy. 
"Principled negotiation" provides a fundamentally different 
alternative—one that changes the basic rules of the game. It does so by 
rejecting some of the underlying assumptions of positional bargaining and 
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employing a variety of techniques that have proved successful in reaching a 
wise agreement in an efficient and amicable way—an agreement that "meets 
the legitimate interest of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting 
interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account."9 
Positional bargaining assumes that life is a zero-sum game with a 
fixed pie split between winners and losers. Principled negotiation assumes 
that the pie can often be expanded in size by finding out what interests are 
hidden behind people’s bargaining positions. Two sisters fight over who gets 
an orange. They finally cut it in half and one squeezes her half to make juice 
and the other uses the rind of her half to cook with—and both throw their 
remainders away. What looked like a fixed pie (or orange, in this case) was 
not—and in a sense, both were losers. I may offer you only $50,000 for the 
house you are asking $58,000 for because I have short term cash flow 
problems and am interested in keeping the down payment low. If you find 
this out and offer to help me with the financing I may be happy to pay a 
higher price and we both may benefit. 
We tend to think of differences as sources of conflict. But notice that 
it is precisely because people often have different interests and resources 
(usually hidden behind their opening offers) that it is often possible to invent 
options where both stand to gain. So two prescriptions follow: 
1. Focus on interests, not positions. 
2. Invent options for mutual gain. 
And Fisher and Ury catalogue a variety of ways of doing these two 
things such as: asking people what they want, exploring their preferences for 
alternative kinds of agreements, imaginatively stepping into their shoes and 
adopting their perspective, talking about your own interests, defining 
interests in terms of problems (that might be solved in a number of ways) 
and brainstorming—and here "brainstorming" does not refer to mere random 
groping but a technique that can be practiced as high art.10 
Positional bargaining also assumes that negotiation is a test of wills to 
see who can hold out the longest before "moving" on their offer, and it treats 
emotions as playing cards or bargaining chips—where a fit of frustration 
betrays weakness and a tirade signifies unswerving commitment. And this 
leads us to invest ourselves in our positions and confuse the "who’s" and the 
"what’s," the issues concerning the people who are negotiating and the 
issues concerning what they are negotiating about. We have a more accurate 
picture of what’s going on and are likely to be more successful if we follow 
a third rule: Separate the people from the problem. 
Both need to be dealt with. But often the emotions that are part of the 
"people issues" at stake are simply psychological responses to bodily 
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distress, perceptions of a situation, or beliefs about it. Furthermore, they tend 
to become obstacles to clear communication and productive thinking. If I 
simply respond to your emotions emotionally (with an "Oh yeah? Well, it’ll 
be a cold day in hell before I’ll…"), then the obstacles multiply. 
If physiological distress or a body load of steam is what is at issue, I 
would do better to perhaps offer you a glass of cool water or simply listen 
attentively while you let off steam. If perceptions are the issue, then I need 
to examine them in a critical and dispassionate way. For example, if you 
perceive my posture as arrogant and are responding in kind, it may perhaps 
be that I am acting arrogant and I ought to stop—or it may perhaps be that I 
just have a stiff back from a bad fall and you ought to revise your perception 
of me. If beliefs are at issue then they need to be evaluated in terms of 
relevant evidence. For example, in a divorce mediation, if you feel 
threatened by the possibility that your wife (who has been violent in the 
past) might pull a gun from her purse and shoot you, then perhaps we ought 
to have a look in her purse.11 
What I should not do is uncritically assume that your distress or 
arrogance is a token of the weakness or strength of your commitment to a 
bargaining position. Nor should I uncritically respond to that with emotional 
tokens of my own firmness of will. 
A fourth prescriptive rule of thumb brings us to the real heart of 
principled negotiation: Insist on using objective criteria. Positional 
bargaining assumes that there are no objective truths about what would be a 
fair price, a reasonable solution, or a just settlement—or that even if there 
are, these are irrelevant. All that matters is winning as much as possible by 
hanging tough as long as you can. But, at least usually, there are objective 
standards that can be agreed on and we are much better off employing them. 
For example, if you are negotiating a settlement with an insurance 
adjustor who is offering what you think is too little for your destroyed car, 
you can appeal to a variety of standards that are out there to be observed and 
which exist independently of your wills: blue book value, original price 
minus depreciation, typical prices asked at local dealers, or the going price 
asked in local papers for similar cars. In divorce settlements and a wide 
variety of other contexts, legal court precedents or government standards can 
be used to determine what would count as reasonable, fair, or just. 
Even if no substantive standards are ready to hand, often an 
objectively fair procedure for arriving at a settlement can be devised such as 
taking turns, drawing lots, or letting a respected third party decide—perhaps 
using "last-best-offer arbitration" in which the final position of one of the 
two parties must be chosen and so each has a marked incentive to make a 
  154 
reasonable offer. There are a variety of other procedures that can yield an 
objectively fair decision by using an objectively fair method: 
 
Consider, for example, the age-old way to divide a piece of 
cake between two children: one cuts and the other chooses. 
Neither can complain about an unfair division. 
This simple procedure was used in the Law of the Sea 
negotiations, one of the most complex negotiations ever 
undertaken. At one point, the issue of how to allocate mining 
sites in the deep seabed deadlocked the negotiation. Under the 
terms of the draft agreement, half the sites were to be mined by 
private companies, the other half by the Enterprise, a mining 
organization to be owned by the United Nations. Since the 
private mining companies from the rich nations had the 
technology and expertise to choose the best sites, the poorer 
nations feared the less knowledgeable Enterprise would receive 
a bad bargain. 
The solution devised was to agree that a private company 
seeking to mine the seabed would present the Enterprise with 
two proposed mining sites. The Enterprise would pick one site 
for itself and grant the company a license to mine the other. 
Since the company would not know which site it would get, it 
would have an incentive to make both sites as promising as 
possible. This simple procedure thus harnessed the company’s 
superior expertise for mutual gain.12 
 
But, of course, this kind of principled settlement is difficult—and at 
times impossible—to reach if one party is more powerful than the other, 
refuses to negotiate on principles, or uses dirty tricks. What should we do 
then? 
The nature of power is often misunderstood—especially when we 
think in positional bargaining terms. We tend to suppose that power is a kind 
of fluid or energy that comes in varying quantities and that the guys with the 
big bucks, the fancy offices and the pin stripe suits are the ones who have 
the most of it. They are the ones with the confidence (justified by the 
POWER behind them) who can hang tough in a test of wills with the little 
guys. But this assumption completely misunderstands the nature of 
negotiation. 
When people negotiate with me, they are trying to get me to choose an 
alternative—the one they are offering. What determines my choice does not 
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have (or at least should not have) anything to do with their wealth, their high 
rank, or their office full of status symbols. For me, the question is: Is their 
alternative better than the others available to me? If I have a more attractive 
option, then I will turn them down—regardless of how much "power" they 
may have. 
What this means is that the way to gain power or "leverage" in a 
negotiation is to explore and develop your options and weigh offers against 
your "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" or "BATNA." To talk your 
employer into a higher salary, develop some concrete alternative job 
possibilities. To talk a banana company into keeping more of its profits in 
your country and investing them in economic infrastructure, explore the 
possibilities of taxing it, dealing with another firm, selling to the Yugoslavs, 
or growing more coffee. 
 
In one case, a small town negotiated a company with a 
factory just outside the town limits from a "goodwill" payment of 
$300,000 a year to one of $2,300,000 a year. How? 
The town knew exactly what it would do if no agreement 
was reached: It would expand the town limits to include the 
factory and then tax the factory the full residential rate of some 
$2,500,000 a year. The corporation had committed itself to 
keeping the factory; it had developed no alternative to reaching 
an agreement. At first glance the corporation seemed to have a 
great deal of power. It provided most of the jobs in the town, 
which was suffering economically; a factory shutdown or 
relocation would devastate the town. And the taxes the 
corporation was already paying helped provide the salaries of the 
very town leaders who were demanding more. Yet all of this 
power, because it was not converted into a good BATNA, proved 
of little use.13 
 
A further point that examples like these demonstrate is that it is a 
mistake to think (as positional bargainers typically do) in terms of a "bottom 
line offer" below or above which we will refuse to go. A "trip wire" figure 
can be helpful to keep in mind ("If it looks as though we can’t get at least 
$900,000, then we’ll have to stop and reconsider") but my "bottom" or "top" 
offer should not be $900,000 or any other pre-determined figure. It should 
be an offer I consider comparable to my best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement. 
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But what if they ought to budge but won’t? What if people stick to 
their positions and refuse to negotiate on principle? There are a variety of 
things that can be done. It may be that they simply don’t know how to play 
this second sort of game (principled negotiation), and you simply need to 
explain what you are doing and why. (Fisher and Ury note that, unlike other 
strategies, "if the other side learns this one, it does not become more difficult 
to use; it becomes easier. If they read this book, all the better."14) 
However, it may be that some "negotiation jujitsu" is called for. For 
example, if they make a vicious verbal attack, it may be best to sidestep it—
ignoring it, letting the air clear, and focusing on the questions it raises 
concerning the facts of the case and the standards that might be used to settle 
it. Or it may be helpful to get a third party to come in and use the "one text 
procedure" in which they, as relatively disinterested bystanders, develop a 
proposal that they submit back and forth to each side for criticisms that can 
be used to revise it until it becomes attractive to both parties—or until the 
third party concludes that no agreement between the two can be reached 
which would be more attractive to them than their respective BATNAs. 
There are a variety of dirty tricks the other side can pull. For example, 
they can present phony or unverified facts, lock themselves into a position 
by making public promises, lie, or use personal intimidation—sometimes 
followed up by the introduction of a second negotiator who is consoling and 
plays the "nice guy" in the "tough cop/soft cop" interrogation routine seen in 
a number of old movies. Most tactics of these sorts can be dealt with by 
exposing them for what they are and then negotiating over the legitimacy of 
their use: 
 
Above all, be hard on principle. "Is there a theory behind 
having me sit in the low chair with my back to the open door?" 
Try out the principle of reciprocity on them. "I assume that you 
will sit in this chair tomorrow morning?" Frame the principle 
behind each tactic as a proposed "rule" for the game. "Shall we 
alternate spilling coffee on one another day by day?"15 
 
None of this is to suggest, of course, that we should negotiate by 
always "sticking to our principles" if that means treating a principle like a 
position from which we will never budge. Rather, the point is that everything 
is negotiable, even the rules of the negotiation themselves—but the 
agreements should be sought by pursuing a joint inquiry that appeals to 
reasons rather than by digging in to positions. 
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Variations on the kind of principled negotiation practiced by Fisher 
and Ury’s have been proliferating. The four basic rules discussed in Getting 
to Yes are not writ in stone and they do not supply a mechanical procedure 
for reaching agreements. What they do do is simply provide one way of 
organizing a general set of guidelines and making them explicit—and these 
are guidelines for a practice in the rich sense of that term developed in Part 
III, a practice with an evolving tradition that has already achieved some high 
levels of excellence and promises more in the future. 
However, there are times when this way of cultivating peace does not 
seem to answer all our needs. In particular, there are times when we are 
dealing with people who are sufficiently well armed to feel that they can 
offer us what they like and disregard the justice of the terms they are trying 
to make us accept. This is precisely the kind of case that Gandhi confronted. 
 
 
SATYAGRAHA 
 
Because Gandhi was so skinny, bony, bare and bald it is difficult to 
think of him without having the idea come to mind of someone who fasted 
so frequently as to qualify in a treatment program for latent anorexics. 
Because he led so many newsworthy campaigns of mass civil disobedience 
it is natural to think of him as a kind of politically powerful Sister 
Suffragette or mild mannered union leader who closed down the government 
offices and retail stores by Oiling them—and the jails—with his followers. 
Because he was so eccentric and disarmingly gentle it is difficult to think of 
him as an ordinary person like you and me. He seems to qualify for the 
sainthood his popular status as mahatma or "great soul" conferred upon 
him—a status that places him outside the realm of realistic politics and that 
invalidates him as a role model for the rest of us mere mortals. 
These three popular images of Gandhi—as faster, passive resister, and 
saint—obscure a great deal. Once we get behind them we find someone who 
managed to combine a great many paradoxical or even contradictory ideas 
by cultivating them as elements of a complex practice he came to refer to as 
satyagraha. 
The connection between the mahatma and fasting was reinforced by 
one of the most probing studies ever made of him, Erik Erikson’s Gandhi’s 
Truth. Erikson’s work goes well beyond the limitations of a psychoanalytic 
developmental study and does not reduce Mohandas K. Gandhi to a 
megalomaniacal anal retentive. But the book is structured around key 
developmental "Events" in Mohandas’s life. And for methodological reasons 
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Erikson adopted a hypothesis which he revised without fully rejecting—that 
a crucial Event was Gandhi’s fast during the Ahmedabad struggle over the 
working conditions in the textile mills. 
Yet Gandhi himself saw fasting as an activity of relatively minor 
importance, really only one of the forms of the practice of bramacharya or 
self-purifying continence that itself was really only one element in the 
complex network of practices he was developing. The central function of a 
fast was to provide a time of physical and spiritual cleansing that permitted 
someone to reflect on his past errors and contemplate the appropriate ways 
in which to change himself in the future. In practice, however, such fasting 
was complicated by two things. 
First, Gandhi, as a leader, assumed responsibility for the actions of his 
followers. He took their sins upon himself, and when adolescent students 
engaged in premarital sex or followers began to riot, he himself would often 
fast to cleanse himself of this guilt by association. But because the students 
and followers loved him dearly they would often change—and often not 
because they had seen the error of their ways but because they feared for his 
life. In a de facto way this gave the fast a coercive element—a form of 
discipline that (like the woman’s threat to cry until she got her way) might 
bring obedience in much the same way an appeal to threats of corporal 
punishment might. Second, the others to whom Gandhi was representing his 
followers might act out of loving fear for his well-being (as in the 
Ahmedabad case) or, more often, out of fear that self-inflicted harm to 
Gandhi would result in riots or worse. 
Though he often was unable to find a way to avoid the indirect 
introduction of these coercive elements, Gandhi characteristically tried to do 
so when fasting because the heart and soul of his method was designed to 
win people over in fundamentally non-coercive ways. This point is easily 
obscured by the second popular image of him, the image of a leader of mass 
acts of civil disobedience. 
Civil disobedience or "passive resistance" and related activities like 
protest demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes have often been employed as 
weapons of the weak. Suffragettes chained themselves to gates when they 
lacked the economic and political clout to impose their demands. Union 
workers struck when the robber barons had more guns. The Czechs "non-
cooperated" by refusing to sign or publish Soviet proclamations and by 
changing the street signs when the Red Army marched through Prague. 
In such cases the actions are not violent but they are coercive; they 
employ the weapons that are available. And if sufficient quantities pf others 
were ready at hand—including guns and bombs—they would probably be 
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used as well. Sol Alinsky has argued that Gandhi was a crafty fellow who 
used mass civil disobedience only because that was the most effective 
weapon available: "From a pragmatic point of view, passive resistance was 
not only possible, but was the most effective means that could have been 
selected for the end of ridding India of British control." Further, "if Gandhi 
had had the weapons for violent resistance and the people to use them, this 
means [armed resistance] would not have been so unreservedly rejected as 
the world would like to think."16 
A similar (though less Machiavellian) perspective on Gandhi is 
offered by the theory Gene Sharp develops in his massive The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action. Sharp argues that "governments depend on people, that 
power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on 
many groups for reinforcement of its power."17 Furthermore, the bases for 
rulers’ power "depend intimately upon the obedience of the subjects."18 
Rulers have a basic need for the acceptance of their authority. Gunmen and 
torturers cannot lead the mass of a populace about from moment to moment 
imposing the ruler’s will. Without the at least minimal acceptance of 
governmental authority the state simply cannot function. So far as the ruler 
is concerned, it follows that  
 
...loss of authority will have serious consequences for his 
position and power. Just as subjects may accept a ruler’s 
authority because they believe it is merited on grounds of 
morality and of the well-being of their society or country, 
subjects may for the same reasons at times deny the ruler’s 
claims to authority over them… 
 
If the subjects deny the ruler’s right to rule and to command, 
they are withdrawing the general agreement, or group consent, 
which makes possible the existing government. This loss of 
authority sets in motion the disintegration of the ruler’s power. 
That power is reduced to the degree that he is denied authority. 
Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular 
government is threatened.19 
 
Seen this way, non-violent action can serve two basic functions, the 
unarmed exercise of coercive power and the displacement of authority. 
On the one hand, sit-ins and strikes can serve to directly impede the 
function of existing institutions and indirectly threaten their collapse in the 
face of a loss of functional legitimacy. The non-violent activists can coerce 
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with the threat: "Accede to our demands or else!" On the other hand, the 
establishment of a parallel economy or government may threaten—or 
succeed—in effectively displacing the ruling institutions of the society. They 
may do this, for example, with organized boycotts and other forms of non-
cooperation that establish new institutions for driving people to their jobs (in 
private cars instead of on city buses) or settling legal disputes (through 
private arbitration boards instead of in the official courts). 
It is a matter of historical fact that Gandhi’s campaigns of non-violent 
action almost always had coercive side-effects (which many, and perhaps 
most, of his followers saw as the essential element in their efforts), and his 
own writings make it clear that he often pursued the goal of displacing 
British rule by establishing alternative institutions and a parallel 
government. BUT… 
Gandhi’s intention was to displace the rulers by enabling the masses 
to assume responsibility for themselves, liberating them by teaching them 
self-disciplined autonomy—not by overthrowing the current government. 
And his intention in suffering beatings and arrests was to "melt the heart" of 
his opponents—not to strike fear into their souls. His conceptions of self-
liberation and self-suffering were at the very heart of the driving vision that 
motivated all his innovations, and an appreciation of them is essential to an 
understanding of the practice of satyagraha he developed. 
Gandhi claimed that he got into politics for religious reasons and that 
the overriding passion of his life was "to see God face to face," to achieve a 
state of moksha or blessedness. His conception of this state was based on his 
distinctive reading of "the Indian Bible," The Bhagavadgita. Blessedness 
was to be achieved through liberation—liberation of the self from the 
illusory strands of causality that catch us up in this world and make us 
misunderstand who we are and why we suffer. We mistakenly suppose that 
our true selves are these personalities that hold offices and these bodies that 
get beaten. So long as we believe this, we remain unfree—buffeted about by 
the carrots and sticks that cause these personalities and bodies to behave as 
they do. To liberate ourselves, we must drop this delusion and act 
independently and autonomously—choosing without regard to the promises 
and threats that beset us. 
The Gita teaches that this does not mean we should withdraw from the 
World—because in doing so we will only submit to another set of worldly 
impulses, fears of threats and desires for tranquil escape. Instead, we should 
continue to act in the world, but act with "non-attachment." Krishna, as the 
incarnation of the divine, counsels: 
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The seers say truly 
that he is wise 
Who acts without lust or scheming 
For the fruit of the act: 
 
His act falls from him, 
Its chain is broken, 
Melted in the flame of my knowledge. 
 
Turning his face from the fruit, 
He needs nothing: 
The Atman is enough. 
He acts, and is beyond action. 
 
Not hoping, not lusting, 
Bridling body and mind, 
He calls nothing his own: 
He acts, and earns no evil. 
 
What God’s Will gives 
He takes, and is contented. 
Pain follows pleasure. 
He is not troubled: 
Gain follows loss, 
He is indifferent: 
Of whom should he be jealous? 
He acts, and is not bound by his action. 
 
Unity with God is achieved not by withdrawal from the world but by 
allowing the illusory self to participate in the world of Maya—while 
remaining calmly non-attached by seeing things as they truly are. 
Gandhi’s crucial theological innovation sprang from his conviction 
that the most profound forms of attachment were rooted in fears of armed 
authorities. So long as we submit to oppressive governments we can be sure 
that we have not achieved the blessedness of non-attachment. It followed 
that he—and any who chose the path of enlightenment he discerned—could 
only pursue the religious aim of moksha by practicing a politics of 
liberation. 
It further followed that this political liberation would have to take a 
definite form. It would not suffice to simply throw off the chains of the 
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oppressor by achieving a "negative freedom" from coercive control by other 
people. What would be required is the achievement of the "positive 
freedom" of autonomy, a self-disciplined self-rule that would liberate us 
from all the carrots and sticks this world presents—regardless of whether 
they are employed by other people or pressed upon us by inhuman events. 
This autonomy would have to be achieved at every level. Individuals 
would have to be masters of themselves. Communities would have to be 
self-regulating and independent. Nations would have to achieve sovereignty. 
Gandhi believed that if he declined to work for these kinds of autonomy the 
reason would prove to be that he remained in a state of fearful attachment to 
his own worldly welfare. 
Many of Gandhi’s multifarious projects remain largely unintelligible 
and downright eccentric in appearance unless they are interpreted in light of 
this overall understanding of his goals. For example, he initiated a number of 
projects aimed at achieving economic decentralization and self-reliance for 
India such as the massive reintroduction of hand spinning and the use of 
native Indian products. At the time, many people viewed these as 
economically anachronistic programs motivated by a naive infatuation with 
John Ruskin and other nineteenth century romantics. (Now that the concept 
of "appropriate" or "intermediate technology" has made small seem more 
beautiful, estimates have shifted rather markedly.) But Gandhi was 
convinced that the modern integrated economy and the modern integrated 
state precluded communal autonomy and that economic decentralization was 
a prerequisite for liberation. It was of a piece with a network of programs he 
started to educate people and prepare them to organize themselves 
collectively at the local level. 
This is not to say that he was an anarchist—at least not in the popular 
sense. He thought people should cooperate at a host of levels all the way 
from the familial to the international. But he believed they should cooperate 
voluntarily as responsible and autonomous individuals, towns, regions, and 
nations. He further held that such voluntary autonomy had to be 
reciprocal—and that is what led him to his very distinctive conception of the 
role of non-violent self-suffering in the struggle for political liberation. 
If I coerce your compliance with my desires I remain attached to those 
very desires. It does not matter whether I manipulate you with threats of 
whippings and death or with threats of non-cooperation, non-violent 
obstruction, or civil disobedience. If I employ the latter the way labor unions 
do—as weapons to achieve my demands—then I have not liberated myself 
from the lust-ridden persona that is attached to those demands. To liberate 
myself I have to change your mind by an appeal to your own free and 
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deliberate will, not through coercion. Gandhi believed that such appeal 
might involve two elements. 
The first was reasoning of a sort in many ways similar to the kind of 
principled negotiation that Fisher and Ury advocate. He required that 
satyagrahis begin their campaigns with a careful examination of the facts of 
the situation, a rigorous self-examination that aimed not only at self-
purification but a clear separation of attitudes toward the oppressors as 
people as distinct from the oppression as a problem, a careful consideration 
of the real interests that motivated the positions that government figures 
adopted, an exhaustive attempt to explore options for agreement that would 
involve mutual gain, and a sustained good faith effort to find objective 
criteria that could be used to settle the dispute.20 
But what if the other side continued to refuse to negotiate on principle 
because their weapons were ready and their hearts were hardened—as was 
the case of the Boers in South Africa and the British in India? Then it might 
prove necessary to "melt" their hearts and restore them to their moral senses 
by offering them a peculiar kind of argument. It would be a "demonstration" 
of the moral principles at issue that "proved" their truth by "showing" their 
power over men’s souls. It would be an argument (hat did not rest on verbal 
testimony but was offered in a deed that witnessed to the principle by 
"clinging to the truth" in an act of self-suffering. 
Gandhi coined the neologism satyagraha to refer to such actions. 
Though he continued to sometimes use other terms, this was the one that he 
believed best captured his conception because its etymology expressed his 
view of the relation between his theology, his theory of political liberation, 
and the practice of self-suffering. 
 
The word Satya (Truth) is derived from Sat, which means 
"being." Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why 
Sat or Truth is perhaps the most important name of God… 
 
Devotion to this Truth is the sole justification for our 
existence. All our activities should be centered in Truth. 
 
Generally speaking, observation of the law of Truth is 
understood merely to mean that we must speak the truth. But we 
in the Ashram should understand the word Satya or Truth in a 
much wider sense. There should be Truth in thought, Truth in 
speech, and Truth in action. To the man who has realized this 
Truth in its fullness, nothing else remains to be known, because 
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all knowledge is necessarily included in it. What is not included 
in it is not Truth and so not true knowledge; and there can be no 
inward peace without true knowledge. 
But how is one to realize this Truth, which may be likened 
to the philosopher’s stone or the cow of plenty? By single-
minded  devotion (abhyasa) and indifference to all other interests 
in life (vairagya)—replies the Bhagavadgita… For the quest for 
Truth involves tapas—self-suffering, sometimes even unto death. 
There can be no place in it for even a trace of self-interest.21 
 
Etymologically, the term "satyagraha" combined the notions of divine 
Being, the Truth whose understanding provided liberation, and the devotion 
to this truth with a self-suffering "firmness" (agraha) which "engenders and 
therefore serves as a synonym for force."22 Gandhi often translated the term 
as either "truth force" or "clinging to truth": 
 
Its root meaning is holding on to truth, hence, truth-force. I 
have also called it Love-force or Soul-force. In the application of 
Satyagraha I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth 
did not admit of violence being inflicted on one’s opponent but 
that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For 
what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be error to the 
other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to 
mean vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the 
opponent but on one’s self.23 
 
Gandhi was convinced that self-suffering undertaken in the proper 
spirit could "vindicate" truths and persuade opponents of the rightness of 
moral principles in a way that would win their free and uncoerced consent: 
"Satyagraha is a most powerful process of conversion. It is an appeal to the 
heart."24 
This kind of persuasion is perhaps best likened to certain non-
inferential arguments used in philosophy and mathematics—ones which 
appeal to insight rather than verbal reasoning. For example, if people doubt 
the existence of an external world and minds other than their own, I may 
punch them in the arm or get up and start walking off in order to "bring them 
to their senses." While this is not an argument in the standard sense of the 
term, it does provide a form of persuasion that appeals to their own faculty 
of rational choice. The experiences of pain and loneliness can make us 
"see"—in a way verbal premises cannot—that there is indeed a world and a 
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realm of other human beings beyond the confines of our own minds. Perhaps 
an even more appropriate analogy would be the kind of mathematical 
argument Plato rehearses in his Meno. 
In that dialogue, the character of Socrates gets a slave boy to 
understand a theorem of geometry which says that if one square’s sides are 
equal to the diagonal of another then it will have exactly twice the area of 
the other. He does this by having the boy observe a diagram composed of 
triangles and squares like this: 
 
After this, he gets the boy to see that if the diagonal of the inner square is 
indeed the length of the side of the outer square, all of the triangles are equal 
in area. And then Socrates points out that there are exactly twice as many 
triangles in the outside square as there are in the inner one. At this point, the 
slave boy realizes that the outside square must have twice the area of the 
inner one. In cases like this, it would not be accurate to say that we simply 
focus on the premises and draw a conclusion. Instead, we attend to a part of 
our experience and then reach an insight. Our new knowledge does not come 
as a belief that is compelled by assumptions but as a realization that is 
grounded in a new insight. 
Wittgenstein writes of Indian mathematicians said to offer 
demonstrations by drawing figures and then simply saying: "Look at this. 
Now look at this. See?" Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha was intended to 
provide an Indian ethicist’s demonstration of moral principles in something 
like the same way—in a way that appealed for voluntary and autonomous 
assent without in any way compelling the will with external coercive force. 
"Satyagraha is gentle, it never wounds. It must not be the result of anger or 
malice. It is never fussy, never impatient, never vociferous. It is the direct 
opposite of compulsion. It was conceived of as a complete substitute for 
violence."25 
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Gandhi was fully and painfully aware of the enormous difficulties 
involved in trying to actually practice satyagraha in an entirely non-coercive 
way—especially when large numbers of people were involved. He usually 
found it necessary to restrict the masses to relatively less painful forms of 
self-suffering—such as boycotts—that could more easily be undertaken in 
the proper spirit. And he required his cadres of satyagraha leaders to commit 
themselves to regimens of prayer, abstinence, self-examination, and rigorous 
self-discipline. He also had a fairly realistic estimate of the difficulties his 
opponents would have in letting their hearts melt and he believed that great 
patience would often be required. 
But despite these imperfections and problems, the historical record 
indicates that Gandhi’s method often worked and worked in something like 
the way he intended. And he usually found that when it did not, a 
retrospective critical examination could enable him to ferret out many of the 
reasons why and enable him to revise his practice in light of the discoveries 
he made in his "experiments with Truth." 
What emerged was a complex and subtle practice for cultivating 
voluntary and freely adopted shared commitments to expressions of respect 
for Indian sovereignty, projects to develop communal autonomy, and 
practices of governance that enabled Indians to rule themselves. It was a 
practice of peace that combined many of the elements characteristic of 
Quaker consensus and principled negotiation. But it added a theory of 
personal, cultural and (perhaps most importantly) social change that squarely 
addressed the problem of cultivating genuine agreements with armed 
oppressors who were initially unwilling to negotiate on any issues that 
seemed to threaten their self interests. 
Was Gandhi’s method the most effective and efficient available? To 
what extent can it work in other contexts? The first question can be 
considered at this point; the second will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
The questions of effectiveness and efficiency have to be assessed in 
light of the ends at which we aim. If Gandhi had sought an independent 
India governed as a Maoist communist state he might have found a guerrilla 
movement would have done the job and done it rapidly. But that simply was 
not his aim. Given the aim he did have—personal, communal, and national 
liberation that achieved a self-regulating stale of independent non-
attachment and blessedness—a guerrilla movement would have been not 
merely less effective, it would have been wholly unsuccessful. In Hind 
Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, he replies to a reader who argues: "Why 
should we not obtain our goal, which is good, by any means whatsoever, 
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even by using violence? Shall I think of the means when I have to deal with 
a thief in the house? My duty is to drive him out anyhow." Gandhi’s reply is: 
 
Your reasoning is plausible. It has deluded many. I have 
used similar arguments before now. But I think I know better 
now, and I shall endeavor to undeceive you. Let us first take the 
argument that we are justified in gaining our end by using brute 
force because the English gained theirs by using similar means. It 
is perfectly true that they used brute force and that it is possible 
for us to do likewise, but by using similar means we can get only 
the same thing that they got. You will admit that we do not want 
that.26 
 
What the English got was a colonial government whose authority 
rested on coercion rather than the voluntary consent of the governed. An 
armed rebellion could only enable a nationalist party to achieve authority as 
a government through reliance on military might. It would liberate India 
only by replacing a foreign elite by an indigenous one—without, in the 
process, teaching the citizens of India to liberate themselves and act 
autonomously as individuals and communities. It is at just this point that 
Gandhi makes the comment quoted in Part III in the discussion of the 
organic relations between elements of practices: "The means may be likened 
to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same-inviolable connection 
between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree." 
We can no more grow a tree of genuine liberation from the seeds of war than 
we can plant an acorn and grow a maple. 
Gandhi’s claims here are not, I think, analytic truths. It seems 
conceivable that an army could liberate a nation and then lay down its arms 
and create a participatory democracy of the kind Gandhi sought. It could 
even be argued that something very roughly resembling this may have 
occurred in Costa Rica in 1948. But empirically, Gandhi’s view has an 
enormous weight of data on its side. Evidence abounds for the negative 
claim that the seeds of war do not bring genuine liberation. Evidence for the 
positive claim, that satyagraha can achieve genuine liberation, is not so 
much scanty as impure. We probably lack any clear and unambiguous 
examples of the sort of government he sought. But we have a number of 
approximations to it and it can be plausibly argued that there is a significant 
correlation between the extent to which a government is genuinely liberating 
in Gandhi’s sense and the extent to which it came to power and maintained 
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its authority not through mere force of arms but through types of non-violent 
action that approximate the kind of satyagraha that Gandhi cultivated. 
These discussions of three different traditions of the practice of peace 
serve to illuminate both the variety of forms peace can take and the 
compatibility of methods whose cultural origins are often quite different. 
Notice, for example, that while all three aim at voluntary agreements, 
their conceptions of voluntariness—though not incompatible—really form a 
family of notions rather than any single, neat, Platonic essence. For Fisher 
and Ury the operative notion is essentially that employed in courts of law. 
Mature, sane adults uncoerced by external threats of violence are responsible 
for their acts, and if they agree to a thing they do so voluntarily. In the 
Quaker tradition, genuinely free or voluntary action must spring from an 
inward peace that comes when we center down and distance ourselves from 
impulses of fear and desire. This is something like what Gandhi would speak 
of as non-attachment, though Quakers might, perhaps, be hesitant to use that 
term because it seems to suggest a de-tachment rather than the drawing 
closer to the Light that Quakers would speak of or the clinging to the Truth 
that Gandhi himself would insist upon. As for Gandhi, he operates with an 
especially rich and multi-faceted conception of voluntariness that includes 
both the legal and theological notions as well as a network of cultural, social, 
economic and political concepts of liberation as self-mastery, self-discipline, 
self-reliance, and self-regulation. 
These differences in conceptions of voluntariness reflect—and are 
reflected—in variations in the three traditions’ conceptions of other key 
aspects or levels of the process of peace. For example, all three suppose that 
peace-makers or negotiators need to disengage themselves from emotions 
that might cloud their own thought processes. But whereas Quakers speak of 
this in terms of "centering down into the Silence," the notion gets 
operationalized in principled negotiation by talk of "separating the people 
from the problem." Quakers aim at a frame of mind which is rightly attuned 
to "leadings" of "the Spirit," whereas Fisher and Ury aim at an analogous but 
distinct frame of mind which is sane by virtue of being rationally 
dispassionate rather than being "sane" by virtue of "living in that condition 
which takes away the occasion of all war." Gandhi’s operative notion here is 
that of bramacharya, a network of techniques (such as fasting and sexual 
abstinence) which "purifies" or "cleanses" the self so as to prepare one to act 
without "attachment." 
Each tradition has developed ways of viewing situations in terms of 
parts of a human problem to be solved rather than in terms of oppositions to 
be fought over. But Fisher and Ury talk of this as a process of "focusing on 
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interests rather than positions" whereas Quakers talk of "addressing 
concerns." The first phrase expresses the notion in a way that emphasizes 
categories we associate with discussion of "enlightened self-interest"—
needs, wants, and desires that each party may happen to have. The second 
phrase expresses a similar idea but in a way that emphasizes the sense in 
which questions of righteousness and truth may come into play as genuine 
"concerns" in which we care for others. It also is indicative of the network of 
Quaker ideas about how "leadings" may "address us" and "call" us to action. 
These two idioms are compatible, of course. They simply serve to highlight 
different aspects of the things that may be parts of the problem being dealt 
with—-just as Gandhi’s frequent talk of making "a review of the grievances" 
serves to highlight the questions of justice and personal dignity that may be 
at issue. 
At the start of this chapter, differences related to these were noted—
differences in views about what it is to be committed to an agreement, what 
it is to share an agreement with another, and what it means to cultivate 
expressions, projects and practices. What we find, then, is that there is not 
one neat cut-and-dried thing which peace is but that there is an open-ended 
family of practices which can be pursued at high levels of excellence and 
which are open themselves—as practices—to further cultivation. But to 
what extent will the perfection of such practices enable us to dispense with 
the alternatives of physical force, armed threats, violence, and war? 
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CHAPTER 17 
 
 
The Horizons of Peace: 
Violence, Faith, and Trans-Historical Objective 
Values 
 
 
 
 
s every farmer knows, some dogs won’t fetch and some seeds don’t 
grow. Are there times when people interested in cultivating peace should 
conclude that it is impossible or unwise to do so? It is surely very tempting 
to insist the answer must be that there are—though, for reasons that will 
become clear, this is a question we may choose to live with rather than 
simply answer and set aside. But on the face of it, there are a number of 
practical difficulties that can arise. They include linguistic or cultural 
barriers to communication, profound hostilities rooted in ancient quarrels, 
and plain old lack of time to adequately negotiate. 
Perhaps more importantly, there seem to be at least two situations in 
which peace cannot be cultivated at all or is not as worthy a choice as other 
alternatives in light of the results it is likely to yield. On the one hand, the 
quest for objective criteria to employ in settling disputes may seem pointless 
because there appear to be no such objective values—or at least none that 
will be mutually accepted by the parties involved. On the other hand, we 
may have to deal with brutal people who are so unwilling to negotiate that 
even the purest and most perfect form of satyagraha leaves their hearts 
untouched. 
The consideration of these problems brings us back to questions 
earlier postponed—questions about the objectivity of values, the nature of 
the self as I or It, pacifism, and relations between the practice of peace and 
alternative coercive practices such as those cultivated by the military and 
police. 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
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VALUES AND PERSONS 
 
The relationship between the practice of peace and questions about the 
objectivity of values needs some careful spelling out. There are important 
connections between the two, but the connections are more complex than 
they might seem at first. This is because both peace and objectivity can take 
a variety of forms. 
Notice first that the practice of peace need not necessarily presuppose 
the existence of objective values of any kind. You and I can cultivate an 
agreement even if the values that motivate each of us are entirely different 
and are pure and unadulterated personal preferences. I have an apple, you 
have an orange, we each would prefer the other and we agree to an 
exchange. We may have absolutely no desire to make each other better off 
and we may disagree entirely in our tastes—and this subjective difference of 
opinion about what is of value is precisely what makes the agreement 
possible. 
However, suppose that you like both apples and oranges and propose 
to simply take my piece of fruit by brute force and hang on to your own. I 
might not think this fair. And it is precisely at this point—when questions 
about fairness, reasonableness, legitimacy, justice, and so on come up—that 
the objectivity of values becomes an issue. 
Here again, it may turn out that we can cultivate an agreement that is 
mutually satisfactory even if we remain profoundly opposed in our views 
about what the relevant objective standards are—or even if we deny there 
are any. In dividing possessions in a divorce settlement, Michaela may 
believe things should go to the person who originally bought them with his 
or her salary money, Monte may believe that justice demands that they be 
split down the middle. In spite of this fundamental difference of opinion 
about what a fair procedure would be, they may be able to reach an amicable 
settlement if it turns out that both procedures would yield the same 
substantive result. People do not, in short, have to agree for the same reasons 
in order to agree. 
However, in many cases, perhaps most, the prospects for reaching a 
substantive agreement are much better if all the parties involved are willing 
to commit themselves to the same kinds of reasoning. If they all believe that 
there are objective values or principles that provide criteria for deciding the 
substance of the agreement, then the process of cultivating such an 
agreement is made enormously easier and is much more likely to succeed. 
To what extent are there such objective standards that can, should, and will 
be accepted by people? 
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Much depends here on what we mean by "objective." Objectivity is an 
open concept employed in a variety of contexts that are related by strands of 
family resemblance. For example, when we speak of good art critics whose 
tastes have the merit of objectivity, we often mean those whose tastes are 
relatively normal rather than eccentric, and relatively cosmopolitan or broad 
based rather than parochial. In law courts, objectivity most often refers to 
the disinterested impartiality of someone’s judgment. In discussions of 
natural science, it often refers to physical objects to which objectively true 
beliefs correspond. 
There are two central strands, however, that run through these various 
uses of the term and that find their origins in the post-Cartesian period of 
philosophy that began in the seventeenth century. Descartes wanted to know 
what—if anything (or anyone)—existed outside his own subjective 
consciousness. His difficulties in answering this question structured the 
framework in which subsequent philosophers worked. His method was to try 
to doubt every belief he could until he arrived at a core set of beliefs which 
were indubitably certain and then build a system of beliefs upon that 
unshakable foundation. 
This way of approaching things led philosophers to conceive of 
objectivity in terms of two criteria. Something was understood as being 
objective if it existed independently of my own mind. It could be known to 
be objective if a belief in it imposed itself upon my will—if I simply could 
not, upon due consideration, doubt its independent existence. The various 
uses of objectivity to characterize normal, broad based, or impartial 
judgments or ones that correspond to physical objects all provide variants of 
these two core ideas: that the objective exists independently of subjective 
wills or consciousnesses and that the fact of its objective existence has the 
power to compel belief. 
Though the second aspect of objectivity presents special problems, on 
the first score we have already found (in Part III) that there are a variety of 
values which are objective—objective in the sense that they exist 
independently of our subjective wills. We found that feelings we try to 
express are discovered rather than invented and that they exist independently 
of our wills in that minimal sense—though they do not exist independently 
of our subjective minds which are having the feelings of disgust, delight and 
so on. 
Further, we found that as projects are cultivated they begin to acquire 
a public and organic character. This results in the existence of values that are 
structures of social reality independent of our individual minds and that take 
on a life of their own which becomes independent of our individual wills. 
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Institutionalized rules for proper conduct, shared definitions of community 
goals and norms, and reciprocally conducive means and ends become values 
that social researchers can study, analyze, and critique as observable 
constituents of the world in which we participate. Practices, because they are 
cultivated from expressions and projects, incorporate those types of 
objective values and add others: past exemplars of high achievement in the 
practice, compliance with and strengthening of the institutions that are 
indispensable for the flourishing of the tradition, and virtues of character that 
normally need to be internalized if practitioners are to achieve excellence. 
All of these types of values are objective in ways that can enable 
people to cultivate agreements by "negotiating on principle"—by appealing 
to criteria which are "objective" in the sense Fisher and Ury have in mind in 
Getting to Yes. But to effectively and rightly employ them in this way we 
need to recognize a basic limitation they all share. While they are objective 
in the sense that they exist independently of our subjective wills, they need 
not be objective in the sense that they can—or even should—compel assent. 
The most straightforward way to appreciate this is to think about 
moral reasoning in terms of one of the simplest of all argument patterns, one 
that many logicians would argue is the fundamental pattern of a rational 
argument—the modus ponens form of hypothetical conditional argument. 
Arguments of this form tell us that we should adopt some conclusion C 
because if we believe something else, B, then C follows and we do in fact 
believe B. For example: 
 
First premise: If the Anglo-Saxon practice of law is best, 
then we ought to obey its procedural rules. 
Second premise: The Anglo-Saxon practice of law is best. 
Conclusion: Therefore, we ought to obey its procedural 
rules. 
 
All of the objective values involved in expressions, projects, and practices 
exist as independently discoverable things that can be introduced into 
arguments of this form. But, at least so far, it would seem that all of them 
have a conditionality that the argument pattern makes explicit. They provide 
values that offer imperatives telling us how we ought to act. But the 
imperatives are all hypothetical. If I feel X or am committed to project Y or 
adopt practice Z, then I ought to adopt the values these things entail. But, if I 
have doubts about X, Y, or Z—or reject it outright—then the conclusion no 
longer follows and my rational assent is no longer compelled. 
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And, as a matter of fact, it seems clear that there are lots of times 
when I ought to reject X, Y, and Z—when they are, for example, expressions 
of brutal disregard for human rights, projects of enslavement through debt 
peonage, or practices of genocidal warfare. Or so it seems to me. And that, 
of course, is the problem. How can I tell if my beliefs here are true in the 
relevant twofold objective way. How can I tell if the values on which I base 
these judgments have an existence independent of the social reality in which 
I have grown up. Also, how can I tell if other people both should and will (if 
presented with the proper argument or witnessing actions) acknowledge the 
legitimacy of these values—especially when their own upbringing has taught 
them a different set of basic values? After all, for the Aztecs, given their 
cultural assumptions and practices, human sacrifice was a perfectly rational 
and moral activity. 
The values that are constituent elements of expressions, projects, and 
practices can be used to evaluate activities that occur in the context of their 
cultivation. But by what criteria are we to evaluate those expressions, 
projects, and practices themselves? 
We can, of course, step back from them and turn to more basic or 
widely shared expressions, projects, and practices that provide their setting. 
In trying to reach a settlement on some project for busing school children out 
from District #8 into the suburbs we can appeal to the values that structure 
the larger project of integrating the community as a whole. In negotiating 
over the proper way to practice corporate tax law we can fall back on more 
general principles of contemporary jurisprudence or appeal to the traditions 
of constitutional precedence and Anglo-Saxon common law. And in most 
cases, when our differing conceptions of fair procedure do not happen to 
yield similar substantive conclusions and we need to seek objective criteria 
for cultivating an agreement, this is what we do. 
But there are times when we step back and seem to fall into a void— 
Marxist Iraqis and Shiite Iranians, Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, blacks 
and whites in South Africa, and Indian communities and military juntas in 
Latin America may find that they simply do not seem to share any 
sufficiently broad base of common values on which to cultivate mutually 
acceptable agreements. Is this the case? Or might it be that there are 
objective values that transcend cultural perspectives? 
If there are, the argument of Part III implies that they will be emergent 
values that must be cultivated rather than predetermined absolute values that 
can be known a priori in a fully determinate way. For all the meanings of 
our words and practices—and the social realities which they define—are 
permeated with an indeterminacy which makes them emergent. 
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Immanuel Kant thought otherwise. He thought that human reason 
itself had a fixed essence that implied universal principles of morality, 
unconditional "categorical imperatives" that could be known by appeal to 
reason alone—independently of the varying perspectives provided by 
cultural differences and historical change. He was wrong. 
All of his candidates for "categorical imperatives" turned out to rest 
on concepts of human practices which were historically conditioned and 
emergent in ways that gave them a hypothetical character. He was right to 
argue that we should keep our promises to repay loans—but only if we 
believe that the institution of borrowing and lending is legitimate. A 
revolutionary who sees it as a corrupting element in a capitalist system may 
find it morally permissible—or even morally obligatory—to make false 
promises which will serve to undermine the evil banking system. 
Furthermore, the conception of rationality on which Kant’s ethics is 
based has proven to be a relatively limited one rooted in eighteenth century 
Enlightenment ideas. The concept of reasoning itself—as the arguments of 
Parts II and III make clear—is an open concept structured by strands of 
family resemblance. Even such basic principles of logic as "the law of the 
excluded middle" can be rejected by people who reason maieutically rather 
than eristically. Fundamental concepts such as consistency can admit of 
widely divergent interpretations by linear and dialectical reasoners. And 
even the practice of demonstration itself can take the radically different 
forms found in the detailed verbal proof of Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica (in which it takes pages and pages to prove that one 
plus one equals two) and the "Now look at this" demonstrations of the 
Wittgenstein’s Indian mathematicians. 
None of this implies that there cannot be trans-historical, objective 
values. It simply means that if there are they must be emergent. They will be 
something discovered rather than known a priori, and our understanding of 
them will need to be cultivated. Are there any good reasons for supposing 
that emergent trans-historical objective values exist, and, if so, what might 
some of them be? 
If the kind of values at issue do exist, they will have to be tied to 
essential features of human nature. Why? Well, they might spring, 
ultimately, from a source beyond humanity such as an eternal realm of 
Platonic forms or a divine being. But suppose that such an extra-human 
source secures the independent existence of such values and determines 
which beliefs about them are true and ought to be adopted. People 
endeavoring to cultivate peace will only be able to make effective appeals to 
such values if we humans have a nature that gives us access to these truths 
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and enables them to compel the assent of our wills by "winning conviction," 
"causing conversion," "melting our hearts" or something of that sort. We do 
not cultivate agreements by simply knowing what is right but by successfully 
persuading others to accept it. 
Given the profound cultural differences our species has developed, 
what reason is there to suppose that there is a universal essence to human 
nature that could provide a plausible ground for emergent trans-historical 
values—values that are objective in the sense that they should and could 
compel the assent of all? 
The fact that we can and do distinguish between other species and our 
own suggests that we share common features that make us identifiably 
human. Two types of features in particular seem central in this process 
individuals of our own kind, biological ones and cultural ones. 
People have bodies, bodies with common physical structures 
produced by common kinds of DNA. Our common biological nature and 
physical needs provide one promising way to ground emergent trans-
historical objective values. We might offer hypothetical arguments of the 
following sort:  
 
If you have a human body, then you need to eat (or drink, 
breathe or procreate) and must value food (or potable water, 
breathable air, or intercourse). 
You have a human body. 
Therefore, you need to eat and must value food (or potable 
water, breathable air, or intercourse). 
 
Because we too have bodies, arguments of this sort can substitute a larger 
and more inclusive "we" for the "you" in the premises and conclusion: 
"Therefore, we all need food, water, and air." And because we share a 
common earth, consequences of significance follow. 
In many contexts, this kind of argument may well serve to 
demonstrate (and compel assent to) values that seem to transcend cultural 
perspectives and which can be discovered and cultivated as emergent 
objective truths. In particular, ecological research may lead us to discover 
that—perhaps without realizing it—we have valued things like clean water 
and unpolluted air all along and that we must, because of our physical 
nature, continue to do so. In the long run, research on the environmental 
impact of nuclear weapons may well prove to be one of the most important 
and profound realms in which we discover cross-cultural values rooted in 
our biological nature. 
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But unlike animals, people do not just have bodies with biological 
needs, they interpret them. This is, in fact, one of the things that enables us 
to recognize others as genuine humans. The point is worth elaborating. 
Suppose we discovered a community of animals in the jungle with 
DNA identical to ours but we found that they had no culture—no 
institutions, no customs, and no language. We would not consider their tribe 
to be a genuine human community or society, and if we found that they 
could not be taught a language or introduced into a culture we would be 
strongly tempted to view the group’s members as something that differed 
from us in kind in a fundamental way. (Conversely, if we encountered 
animals, extra-terrestrials, or even machines that could converse and carry 
on the activities of a full-blown culture, then we would be likely to view 
them as humans, or at least as persons—who simply had bodies that differed 
from our own.) But difficulties in viewing our biological nature as the 
ground of objective values are presented by just these varying linguistic and 
cultural interpretations of our physical selves and our environment. 
It is difficult for humans to interpret starvation, suffocation, and 
radiation sickness as types of goodness rather than forms of suffering. But it 
is not so difficult for them to adopt a cultural perspective that makes these 
kinds of suffering—and even physical extinction itself—seem worthwhile. 
Suppose an expectation that heaven awaits the pious convinces me that I am 
better dead than red or that a globally catastrophic jihad will transport my 
soul to a state of eternal bliss. I would be a fool to let biological concerns get 
in the way of my salvation. 
It may be, however, that the other basic feature we all share, our 
ability to speak and interpret reality, could provide an alternative ground for 
objective values. Probably the most promising way to pursue this possibility 
is consider the basic character of humans as beings who dialogue with one 
another—as I’s that address thou’s. The chief difficulty in doing so however 
is one that was discussed near the end of Part III. This peculiar relation 
which sets us apart as conscious persons or "subjects" in dialogue with each 
other—as distinct from objects we may dialogue about—is something which 
is in principle undefinable. If we cannot define it then we can not speak of it 
in clear and plainly true premises that yield compelling conclusions. 
This is not to say that we cannot speak of it all. We have been doing 
so for some time. And we can even offer a kind of argument that might serve 
to indicate how and why it provides a source of emergent trans-historical 
objective values. The argument rests on the assumption that this activity of 
"I/Thouing" is an essential and definitive function of all human beings. And, 
in some sense, this seems true. Those that cannot or do not address others in 
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dialogue simply cannot be viewed as persons rather than things. 
Furthermore, the notion of an I without a thou or of a speech that is unheard 
seems somehow incoherent—like a cause without any effect or an inside 
without any outside. And so it seems as though people can only exercise this 
essential human function by relating to others as persons. 
These considerations suggest the following kind of argument: 
 
If you intend to function as a human person, then you must 
relate to others as human persons. 
You intend to function as a human person. 
So you must relate to others as human persons. 
 
This sort of argument is promising but problematic. It is promising because 
it suggests that there might be a way of demonstrating the objective value of 
such things as human dignity, mutual respect, and basic human rights. 
But one obvious limitation on the argument is that it does not specify 
just who these others are that we must relate to as humans. The whites in 
South Africa might view each other that way and thus enable themselves to 
function as humans in I/thou relations with others. But they might continue 
to treat blacks as second class citizens or as non-citizens and non-humans 
entirely—as mere instruments of production. It might even be that a 
totalitarian dictator could, once he had learned a language and culture by 
participating in human relations with others, decide to start treating all 
others as objects to be manipulated, as mere means to his own ends. It is not 
clear that the conversations he carried on with himself alone would enable 
him to function fully as a human, but it is clear that they would permit him 
to, at least to some degree. He and we are each in some sense a composite I 
and thou because we can listen to ourselves when we speak. 
The moral of this first point is, then, that if we want to appeal to any 
values associated with personhood when we are cultivating agreements with 
others, then we have to find ways of persuading them that we and the rest of 
the people they deal with are persons who should be related to as thous. 
One way of doing this is to act in ways that show them we cannot be 
manipulated but that we can be conversed with. And this is part of what the 
practice of satyagraha aims to accomplish. If we demonstrate the courage of 
our convictions by acting on principle rather than responding to carrots and 
sticks, then we make it impossible for oppressors to manipulate us like 
donkeys or dogs. And the witness of our courageous self-suffering gives 
them the best of reasons for viewing us as conscious subjects who must be 
dealt with as persons, namely, the fact that our actions remain unintelligible 
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on any other terms. Gandhi’s deeds repeatedly confronted the Boers and the 
British with two choices: view him as insane or negotiate with him as a man. 
If they did not relate to him as a person they could not make any sense of 
what he was doing—or predict what he would do next. 
But what, precisely, is it to relate to someone as a person? If Martin 
Buber is right, then we can not say precisely. In fact, in a sense, we can not 
say what it is to be an I or a thou at all.  We can not define this quintessential 
human activity; we can only know it through participation and acknowledge 
it through mutual responsiveness. This makes appeal to the notion of 
personhood difficult indeed for anyone attempting to discover and cultivate 
objective values.  
We can, of course, say that the mutual responsiveness involved 
requires treatment with respect and dignity and that it precludes the violation 
of certain basic human rights. So rape and acts of torture that do not respect 
other people’s personal dignity and bodily integrity are ruled out—along, 
perhaps, with violations of basic guarantees such as free speech and habeas 
corpus. 
But someone might ask for the reason why. Precisely why are these 
ruled out? Though it is less likely in a case of rape, a torturer might choose 
to establish an undeniably human relation with a strong willed victim—
addressing him as a thou in "these little conversations aimed at acquiring a 
bit of information." 
The victim could, of course, reply that the torturer was simply using 
his polite and seemingly civilized talk as a ploy, as a means of 
manipulation—and that the relation between the two was a fake, a mere 
simulacrum of a genuine I/thou relation. However, the torturer might be able 
to offer an argument in reply. And this brings us to the central point. What 
counts as treating someone as a person is arguable—and negotiable. Our 
conception of it is, itself, something which needs to be cultivated. 
It has, in fact, been cultivated extensively. Time and again someone 
has looked to her or his condition and said: "You think that’s treating us like 
human beings? That’s not treating us like human beings. You don’t treat 
someone like a human being when you..." 
The Greeks in the Illiad supposed that if you dealt with someone in 
the ways prescribed by their social roles, then that was adequate. If they 
were barbarian outsiders, you could enslave them. If they were slaves, you 
could interrogate them under torture. If they were women, you could trade 
them like chattel. If they were your own children, you could dispose of them 
at will. If they were members of your army who spoke out publicly against 
the plan you had ordered, you could stun them to silence by smacking the 
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broad edge of your sword against their heads. If they were unarmed fleeing 
opponents, you could spill their brains across the ground and trample them 
beneath your horse’s hooves. In the milieu of Achilles and Hector, all these 
things were standard, socially approved ways in which you could deal with 
other people—if you yourself held the appropriate privileged status. 
We might say that, in a sense, their society differed from ours in 
whom it counted as people. Slaves, children and women did not count. 
Greek princes did. But this would be misleading because the early Greeks 
simply did no operate with the kind of person/thing distinction we employ. 
Special privileges did not attach to warriors and princes because they were 
people but because they were warriors or princes. Insofar as the early Greeks 
had a concept of persons, it was one they applied to all humans, even those 
who spoke only the "bar bar bar" language of the barbarians. 
As slaves, serfs, landless freemen, women, and other oppressed 
people have pursued the quest for respect, dignity and human rights, they 
have enriched our concepts of what personhood involves. The notion that 
there are universal human rights attaching to people simply because they are 
persons has been advanced by their efforts to convince ruling powers that 
"you don’t treat people like human beings when you" beat them, press them 
into forced labor, deny them the vote, impose a state sanctioned theology, or 
view them as sex objects. For many people, personhood has come to imply 
not only political rights but economic, religious, social and cultural ones as 
well. 
Indeed, one way of describing world history would be to narrate it as 
the story of a massive project of cultivation—the cultivation of emergent 
trans-historical objective values associated with that most basic and 
definitive of human functions, the activity of relating to others as subjects or 
persons rather than objects or things—as thous rather than its. Key themes in 
this story would include the notions of not only respect, dignity and rights 
but also consent autonomy, independence, and self-reliance—because these 
have come to be viewed as essential features of the activity of dialogue in 
which people speak for themselves with others. And it would be important to 
recount the episodes in which people like Gandhi came to see these features 
of individual people as indissolubly bound with correlative notions at the 
communal and national level—bound with notions of economic self-
regulation, cultural independency and political sovereignty. 
This is the kind of story Hegel told in his Phenomology of the Spirit and The 
History of Philosophy. While I would not tell it in quite the way he does I 
believe that some such story is true and that we have, in this way, discovered 
a number of emergent trans-historical objective values including all the ones 
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mentioned above. I know that this view is debatable, and to critics my initial 
reply is simply this: Let’s consider the arguments. I am ready to negotiate. 
It is important, however, to see what form the argument will take. It 
will not proceed in the manner Kant adopted when he tried to demonstrate 
the validity of his various categorical imperatives; that is, it will not attempt 
to offer indubitable premises and show that the conclusions follow of 
necessity. The ultimate appeal will not be to a premise we can state but to an 
experience in which we participate. 
I cannot state precisely what the I/thou relation is, let alone deduce 
what values it implies. What I can do is engage in the activity of addressing 
you as another subject like the one I am. And I can show you experientially 
how to distinguish the times when you yourself are addressing others as 
thous and when you are viewing them as objects. 
For example, I can get you to see what it is like when a doctor 
examines a patient and talks with his interns about the body’s symptoms and 
illnesses. I can have you recall what it was like as a child to hear adults talk 
about you while ignoring your presence. Or I can ask you to parade yourself 
before members of the opposite sex who are talking with each other about 
the merits and flaws of your appearance. Attention to these kinds of 
experiences can heighten your awareness of the distinction at issue. 
Once you clearly understand the distinction experientially—as a kind 
of participatory knowledge that can be acknowledged though it cannot be 
defined—then I can employ the distinction in arguing about the way you 
treat me or others. My argument may usefully appeal to a wide variety of 
notions and principles you may accept—such as the concept of equality, the 
right to property, or the guarantee of due process. But, in the end, the heart 
of my argument will appeal to your experiential understanding of the basic 
distinction between persons and things. It will boil down to this: Pay 
attention to the way you are treating these people when you act this way. 
Can’t you see that you are treating them as things rather than relating to 
them as persons? 
Reasoning of this sort has no place for dogmatism. It is always 
possible that I may be mistaken. Perhaps I believe that we view people in 
impoverished countries as things if we are unwilling to offer them economic 
aid. But perhaps such aid would only express an illicit paternalism that 
promotes mass starvation and I am simply wrong. Furthermore, if I do not 
offer you this peculiar kind of experiential argument in a radically open-
minded way, then I fail to fully address you as a thou to whom I ought to 
respond with dialogue rather than manipulative propaganda. 
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I am convinced that open-minded reasoning of this sort can (and often 
has) won the assent of people who find that their wills are compelled to 
accept the conclusion—compelled not by any external threat or promise but 
by the irresistible force of insight. But I will not attempt to offer historical 
evidence that this is true—though a good deal of insight may come through a 
study of stories in which satyagraha and other forms of witnessing to the 
truth have converted unbelievers. Here, I will simply ask you to consult your 
own experience. If you do, I believe you will find yourself convinced that 
there are emergent trans-historical objective values—values which can be 
appealed to when we seek to cultivate agreements with other people. 
Before going on it is worth noting a two-sided merit of the view of 
cross-cultural and trans-historical objective values offered here. The view 
explains why so many people have been convinced there are such values and 
why attempts to prove them in philosophy journals have been so remarkably 
unsuccessful. 
People are convinced there are such values because they are 
acquainted with them experientially and know that they do in fact exist. 
Contemporary philosophers have been unsuccessful in persuading 
each other that such values exist because their profession normally reasons 
by appeal to premises rather than by witnessing to experiences. Furthermore, 
ethicists have, by and large, supposed that trans-historical objective values 
would have to be a-historical values that could be rigorously defined 
independently of any particular social context. 
The attempt to find such a-historical values has proved fruitless. For 
example, when one philosopher puts forth a theory of universal rights, 
another replies by noting that the concept of a right itself is something that 
most societies have lacked and that cannot be defined apart from distinctive 
types of governance and legal practices that make the notion intelligible. 
(You cannot have a right to own property if your society lacks the concept of 
private ownership. And you cannot in any significant sense have a right to 
anything at all if there is no institutional mechanism for seeking redress 
when your right is violated.) 
But if the view offered above is correct, the quest for a-historical 
values should prove fruitless because values—like all the meanings 
constitutive of social reality as a whole—are emergent. But this is not to say 
that they must be subjective or culturally relative. It only implies that if there 
are objective values they will be trans-historical and we will need to 
cultivate our understanding of them and our activities based on them to get 
them to emerge. 
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WHEN IS PEACE WISE? 
 
If there are trans-historical objective values we can fall back on in 
trying to cultivate agreements with others, then it would seem to be always 
possible—in theory at least—to practice peace. No matter how 
fundamentally different the others’ starting points are, the basis for 
agreement would be there. But even if you were persuaded by the discussion 
in the foregoing section, you ought to be ready to acknowledge that there are 
times when what is possible in theory may prove nigh impossible in 
practice—or, at the very least, unwise. 
There are times when the person we are trying to address and cultivate 
an understanding with simply will not respond in kind. He may be an upset 
child who has "completely lost it," a neighbor who is overcome with racial 
hatred, a businessman obsessed with greed, a politician totally preoccupied 
with advancing her power, a soldier who has been trained in brutalizing 
ways and given drugs (like the goon squads employed by the Polish 
government), a religious fanatic in the throes of an ecstatic vision, or 
someone who believes that all the real people have been replaced by 
humanoids and she is the only person left in existence. 
The successful practice of peace presupposes an emerging reciprocity 
in the process of negotiation. If such reciprocity continues to elude us, we 
may need to question whether it can be achieved at all or is worth the effort 
even if it can. How, in practice, can we answer that question? 
It calls for a kind of practical judgment which cannot be prescribed 
independently of a consideration of the concrete details of each case. But we 
can cultivate our ability to make such judgments and we can do so in light of 
two basic concepts. 
First, we need to be clear about what this reciprocity is that we are 
looking for. It is not a compliance with our wishes; it is a willingness to 
dialogue. We should not put forth our demands and then conclude "they 
aren’t ready to negotiate seriously and in good faith" because they refuse to 
meet our terms. The sign that others are ready to negotiate in good faith is 
that they listen to our reasons, offer replies, and then take their own replies 
seriously—that is, if we show them that on their own terms they ought to 
think differently, then they rethink their views. If we cannot get them to 
rethink their own views, then we cannot negotiate with them. But if we can 
in any way raise doubts in their own minds, then we have the makings for 
genuine dialogue. 
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This provides us with a general principle for our practical judgments. 
The cultivation of peace remains possible if, and only if, we can raise 
questions in the others’ minds. Anything that limits our ability to do this will 
limit our ability to pursue dialogue and cultivate agreements. So a second 
general principle is: Peace becomes less promising and less wise a practice 
insofar as our abilities to raise doubts in others’ minds are limited by 
language barriers, physiological distress that impedes their thought (or ours), 
entrenched perceptions that prevent them from viewing us as partners in 
dialogue, physical obstacles to communication (like helmets, jail walls, 
fences, and sheer distance), and other things—including the possibility that 
their minds are "gone." 
In judging whether peace is wise, a second concept we can employ is 
that of the BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The 
practice of peace becomes less wise precisely insofar as options to it become 
more attractive. 
It is important to assess peace and the other alternatives in terms of 
their long-run consequences. It may be that I can get to buy the new boat I 
want now by trotting down to Sears with my charge card—without bothering 
to negotiate plans for its purchase with my wife. But the effects of making 
this purchase without consultation may be devastating for a relationship I 
value deeply and do not want to destroy. Still, even once we take long-run 
consequences like this into account, there turn out to be lots of cases in 
which it would be foolish to not exercise our BATNA instead of practicing 
peace. 
It is important to note that in most cases our BATNA does not turn out 
to involve any appeal to force of arms. When the seller at the flea market 
proves to be intractable in demanding a price I deem unfair, my BATNA is 
never (or at least almost never) the option of beating him up and taking the 
article I desire. When the woman I have fallen in love with turns out to be 
unwilling to accept any offer of marriage, my BATNA will not be to shoot 
her. If a local union refuses to settle for a wage I am willing to pay, I will 
often find options such as relocating my plant much more attractive than 
bringing in a bunch of company police to terrorize the workers and break the 
strike with weapons. 
Several things often lead to mistaken practical judgments about the 
actual attractiveness of BATNA that employ violence. One is our tendency 
to contrast peace with war and negotiation with violence. Another is our 
tendency to respond self-righteously with indignance. We find ourselves 
saying: "Oh yeah? So you won’t listen to reason, huh? Well maybe you’ll 
listen to this!" Our angry indignance in the face of personal affront—an 
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indignance which may be perfectly justified—can yield a strong impulse to 
act and act immediately with the first means that come to mind. When the 
Iranian students seized the American hostages in Teheran, many U.S. 
citizens responded with an impulse to nuke ‘em. "Nuke ‘em till they glow in 
the dark. Nuke ‘em to show ‘em we won’t take this lying down." But, of 
course, a consideration of how the Iranians and other nations would 
probably respond made it clear that this kind of BATNA was one of the least 
attractive available. 
Another thing that makes us often misjudge the merits of violent 
BATNA is our unwillingness to stoically accept the things we cannot 
change. Regardless of how much the United States may have disapproved of 
the revolution occurring in Vietnam and even if that disapproval was totally 
merited, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement with Ho Chi Minh 
was clearly not the one the United States adopted. War can no more always 
work than peace can. We may not like this fact but we have to learn to live 
with it. 
One further thing that leads to misjudgment in the employment of 
personal violence, police power, or military might is our frequent failure to 
actively explore and develop other concrete possibilities. Parents who get 
caught up in a cycle of corporal punishment that becomes outright abuse of 
their unruly children might actually be better off sending the kids to a 
boarding school or giving them up for adoption. But few explore this option 
seriously enough to find out precisely what it would involve. So what 
initially seems an unattractive option remains just that, an unexplored and 
initially unattractive option. 
To take another example, the United States has expended enormous 
resources in studying effective ways to engage in counter-guerrilla warfare. 
But in many cases, perhaps even most, it might turn out that the best way to 
deal with revolutionary guerrilla movements, led, say, by Marxist Leninists, 
is to let them seize power and then coopt their government and get them to 
alter their policies—and eventually their revolutionary vision—until it 
matches the kind of thing the United States desires. But genuinely effective 
ways of doing this remain relatively unexplored. If the United States had 
spent as much money researching methods of cooption as it has spent on 
studying counter-insurgency warfare, policy-makers might find the latter 
option much less attractive (relative to the former) than they now do. 
This last point applies to the practice of peace itself in general. The 
less we know of what it is, how it has been tried in the past, the variety of 
forms it can take, and when it can be practiced successfully, then the less 
attractive it will seem. Peace will prove to become our wisest alternative in 
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increasingly more contexts as we actively explore and develop our best 
alternative to non-negotiated non-agreement. 
 
 
PACIFISM 
 
It may seem odd that in a book about peace so little has been said thus 
far about pacifism as a philosophical commitment to refuse to use violence. 
In part, the explanation is that pacifism is—at least usually—conceived of as 
a negative doctrine. It is a commitment to non-violence. The central thrust of 
this book has aimed at conceiving of peace and related notions in terms of an 
activity we can perform—one which is defined positively in terms of what 
we do rather than negatively in terms of what we refuse to do. Thus, the 
most extended account of non-violence offered here so far occurred in the 
section on Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha—a practice in which non-
violence appears simply as an aspect of an activity of undertaking self-
suffering in order to win unforced assent to moral principles. But a second 
explanation for the delay in discussing pacifism is that the doctrine becomes 
fully intelligible only once lodged in the larger context of the theory of peace 
developed in the foregoing chapters. 
Jan Narveson and others have argued that pacifism is, in fact, morally 
incoherent in the following way. It supposes that the sanctity of human life 
prohibits us from ever harming persons even when by harming them we 
could prevent them from doing much greater harm to others.1 If we believe 
that violence is an evil and that the more of it there is the greater the evil, 
then we should always be prepared to employ a little of this evil to avoid a 
lot—assuming, of course, that this little and this lot are our only two options. 
The conscientious objector who refuses combat service may have a 
number of responses to this line of criticism, including a key one that turns 
on consideration of that last assumption, the assumption that we sometimes 
face dilemma between committing some violence and permitting others to 
commit even more. 
One kind of response appeals to over-riding religious considerations. 
If I believe that my highest obligation is to obey God’s will and revelation 
tells me that God wills I never commit acts of violence, then I have a 
compelling reason to be a thoroughgoing pacifist. The motive for my choice 
may be a fear of hell or a desire for heaven, a compelling respect for the 
divine, an unyielding love of God or a conviction that acts of violence 
simply trap me further in the realm of Maya and prevent me from realizing 
my true self or achieving the enlightened understanding that there is no self. 
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Some of these motives appeal to long-run consequences (like heaven 
and hell) or to short-run consequences (like the state of blessedness which 
can be achieved now through non-violent ahimsa). Others reject a 
"consequentialist" view of action entirely. For example, if I obey God’s will 
out of love, I may neither understand nor care about what the actual 
consequences of my obedient acts will be. The results remain in the hands of 
the inscrutable divinity. 
The adoption of a non-consequentialist ethics may also be used by 
secular reasoners who make no appeal to divine powers. Someone may 
argue, for example, that the attempt to choose our actions on the basis of 
their likely effects is (at least usually) misguided because we simply lack the 
foresight to know what those results will be. Instead of aiming at good 
consequences we should aim at becoming good persons—people of virtuous 
character. In this view, it is not wrong to lie because people will be hurt; it is 
wrong to lie because acts of deception violate our personal integrity and flaw 
our characters by making us liars—regardless of what harmless good the lie 
itself does. Likewise, the consequences of acts of violence must remain in 
doubt because our knowledge is always imperfect. The one thing of which 
we can be sure is that the commission of acts of violence will, by definition, 
make us into the kinds of people who commit acts of violence and thus make 
us vicious rather than virtuous—assuming that a readiness to commit acts of 
violence is a vice. 
But this sort of response is little more than away of shifting the focus 
of the argument rather than responding to the original criticism of pacifism. 
We shift to talking about what counts as a good or virtuous character rather 
than a good action of desirable consequences. But we still need to show that 
the warrior’s character is vicious in a way that the pacifist’s is not. And it 
seems difficult to determine what makes a character trait good apart from at 
least some significant consideration of the consequences that result when 
people acquire that character—unless we are ready to appeal to over-riding 
religious considerations. And the result seems to be that the argument gets 
lengthened but does not get resolved. 
The critic can go on to argue that pacifists adopt the morally 
incoherent view that we should acquire a character trait that makes us 
sometimes choose to avoid a lesser evil by permitting a greater evil. 
In many cases this might turn out to be less incoherent than it at first 
sounds. The pacifist could point out that we usually lack the time and 
resources to carefully weigh the consequences of each of our acts and so we 
have to formulate policies—the way "rule utilitarians" do—and choose the 
policies that will, on average, in the long run, yield the best consequences. 
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In practice, it is likely to turn out that the habit of responding non-violently 
will, on average, yield the best results in most cases and so we should adopt 
it as a policy. There might be times when a police officer could save lives by 
shooting at an armed felon who is fleeing into a crowd, but usually the 
returning of the felon’s fire will fail to stop him and result in harm to 
innocent bystanders. The decision to shoot or hold fire must be made quickly 
in situations of stress and is likely to be flawed by misjudgments. So we 
should adopt the policy of never firing on fleeing felons in cases like this 
because it will, on average, in the long run, yield the best results. 
This line of argument can offer a compelling defense of non-violence 
in a wealth of cases—at the international as well as local levels. For 
example, an "Entebbe" style raid on kidnapping terrorists may sometimes 
work. But the logistical problems are usually so great as to raise serious 
doubts about the soundness of using such raids as a standard response. The 
use of one or two tactical nuclear weapons might be argued to sometimes 
prove an effective policy option. (Perhaps Eisenhower could have 
successfully used them, as he threatened to, when MacArthur’s troops were 
surrounded by the Chinese and North Koreans.) But the starkly 
unpredictable consequences of their use—including effects on international 
relations as well as the environment—argue that such an option should not 
be adopted as a policy. A pacifist revolutionary ill Latin  America could  
argue,  similarly,  that though  guerrilla  movements sometimes liberate at a 
price worth the cost, they usually do not (especially in light of the relevant 
BATNAs) and revolutionaries should adopt a policy of non-violence. 
But while this rule utilitarian style of argument can plausibly defend 
pacifism in many cases, it is not clear that it can defend it in all, and the 
critic can always argue that there are reasonably well-defined cases in which 
we have sufficient weapons to do the job, we know pretty well what the 
results of our use of violence will be, and in those types of cases the use of 
force will, (average, and in the long run, yield the greatest good or least evil. 
A good deal of popular debate about pacifism takes the form of 
extended arguments over just what those cases are and if any do in fact exist. 
William Hawk has presented a delightful dialogue that is representative of 
such debates: 
 
O.K. You’re a pacifist. What would you do if someone were, say, 
attacking your grandmother? 
Attacking my poor old grandmother? 
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Yeah. You’re in a room with your grandmother and there’s this 
guy about to attack her and you’re standing there. What would you 
do? 
I’d yell, "Three cheers for Grandma!" and leave the room. 
No, seriously. Say he had a gun and he was about to shoot her. 
Would you shoot him first? 
Do I have a gun? 
Yes. 
No. I’m a pacifist, I don’t have a gun. 
Well say you do. 
All right. Am I a good shot? 
Yes. 
I’d shoot the gun out of his hand. 
No, then you’re not a good shot. 
I’d be afraid to shoot. Might kill Grandma. 
Come on. O.K., look. We’ll take another example. Say you’re 
driving a truck. You’re on a narrow road with a sheer cliff on your 
side. There’s a little girl standing in the middle of the road. You’re 
going too fast to stop. What would you do? 
I don’t know. What would you do? 
I’m asking you. You’re the pacifist. 
Yes, I know. All right, am I in control of the truck? 
Yes. 
How about if I honk my horn so she can get out of the way? 
She’s too young to walk. And the horn doesn’t work. 
I swerve around to the left of her since she’s not going anywhere. 
No, there’s been a landslide. 
Oh. Well, then. I would try to drive the truck over the cliff and 
save the little girl. 
(Silence) 
Well, say there’s someone else in the truck with you. Then what? 
What’s my decision have to do with being a pacifist? 
There’s two of you in the truck and only one little girl. 
Someone once said, "If you have a choice between a real evil and 
a hypothetical evil, always take the hypothetical one." 
Huh? 
I said, why are you so anxious to kill off all the pacifists? 
I’m not. I just want to know what you’d do if… 
If I was with a friend in a truck driving very fast on a one-lane 
road approaching a dangerous impasse where a ten-month old girl is 
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sitting in the middle of the road with a landslide on one side of her 
and a sheer drop-off on the other? 
That’s right. 
I would probably slam on the brakes, thus sending my friend 
through the front windshield, skid into the landslide, run over the little 
girl, sail off the cliff and plunge to my own death. No doubt 
Grandma’s house would be at the bottom of the ravine and the truck 
would crash through her roof and blow up in her living room where 
she was finally being attacked for the first, and last, time.2 
 
The comic character of this dialogue springs from the incompatibility 
of two deeply held convictions. The critic thinks it is unquestionably clear 
that there are times when we face the dilemma of either harming or killing 
some people or else allowing even more harm or death to occur. And she 
believes that pragmatic realism demands in those cases that we opt for the 
lesser of the two evils. The pacifist is convinced that these cases always turn 
out to be false dilemmas; there is always some third better alternative like 
shooting the gun out of the assailant’s hand or honking the child off the road. 
And he believes that morality demands we seek out this other option and 
exercise it. 
The pacifist may admit that there will be times when we will fail to 
find it or will be unable to employ it successfully. But he is convinced that 
we must simply accept this fact in a stoic manner and he believes that we 
will always be better off seeking for that third alternative instead of turning 
to the use of violence. 
Now this version of pacifism could be interpreted as resting on an 
empirical claim that the pacifist and his critic should simply examine 
concretely and in detail—looking at case after case and considering whether 
there seems in fact to be a better third alternative. And this kind of empirical 
study can be especially valuable because it serves to cultivate our ability to 
make wise practical judgments. However, this kind of pacifism can also be 
understood in another way—one that casts considerable light on its 
motivation and the reasons why some pacifists so strongly resist accepting 
any of the counter-examples offered by their critics. 
The conviction that non-violent, better alternatives always exist can be 
interpreted as not as an empirical claim in need of proof but as a 
presupposition of a practice—a presupposition which can be vindicated or 
rendered implausible but cannot be refuted. An analogy will clarify the kind 
of presupposition involved. 
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Take the scientist who assumes that every event has a cause. This 
belief is not really a claim that has been demonstrated, it is a presupposition 
underlying the practice of scientific research. The scientist simply assumes 
that each event has a cause and then she turns to the particular events that 
interest her and begins looking for their explanations. If you asked her why 
she thought this assumption was justified, she might reply by pointing to the 
many successful discoveries made in the past. But if you replied with the 
empirical argument that there remain many events whose causes have eluded 
discovery—and which might not have causes at all—she is unlikely to take 
such an argument very seriously. Her response is likely to be: "Well, those 
are cases where we just haven’t found the cause yet. But there is always 
going to be some cause out there to be discovered." If you ask her how she 
can be so certain of this, she is likely to appeal to some dubious kind of a 
priori philosophical argument or, more probably, reason circularly ("I know 
because… because I just know") and simply insist that this belief must be 
true. 
 The function of this presupposition is further illuminated by 
considering how she would respond to the following case. Suppose she gives 
a graduate assistant the task of discovering why a protein she is interested in 
will not separate properly in an electrophoresis apparatus. He works on the 
problem for an entire semester and then comes back with the following 
report: "There’s absolutely no reason at all why the protein won’t separate, 
Dr. Russell. It just doesn’t. I guess we must have stumbled, unfortunately, 
on one of those things that simply doesn’t have a cause." 
Dr. Russell will not be delighted with this "discovery" and busily start 
writing a paper to submit to Science. Her reply will be something of this 
sort: "What do you mean it doesn’t have a cause! Of course it does! Are you 
out of your mind? We’re not playing at sorcery here, we’re practicing 
science! Get the hell out of my office and come back when you’ve figured 
out what’s wrong with that damn electrophoresis machine!" 
The most revealing part of her reply is the fourth sentence: "We’re not 
playing at sorcery here, we’re practicing science." Scientists are in the 
business of discovering causal explanations. The assumption that every 
event has a cause (or that every variable is a function of some other 
independent variable) is a presupposition which is constitutive of the 
practice of science itself. Insofar as we reject this presupposition, we stop 
doing scientific research. 
A similar cognitive function may be served by the pacifist’s 
assumption that every situation always admits of some third option which is 
morally superior to an act of violence or allowing the evil it would prevent. 
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We can view pacifism not as a mere doctrine defined by what it prohibits but 
as a full-fledged practice of non-violent peacemaking. If we view it that 
way, it shifts our understanding of the conviction that a way will always 
open for the non-violent cultivation of agreements through a practice of 
satyagraha. This no longer is viewed as a dubious empirical claim. Instead, 
it is understood as a presupposition of the practice. To reject it is to stop 
being a satyagrahi. 
There are many forms of peacemaking and pacifism. We can practice 
"principled negotiation" without becoming pacifists and we can be pacifists 
on religious grounds that permit bleakly pessimistic views of the prospects 
for cultivating agreements. We may even believe that ours is an age in which 
wars will destroy all mankind, there is nothing we can do about this, and we 
are not obliged to practice peacemaking—we are only obliged to worship 
rightly and refuse to participate in the evil ways of this world. 
But whether we opt for it or not, the practice of pacifism conceived of 
as a practice of peacemaking remains a coherent option. Mennonites and 
Quakers who actively cultivate peace under the assumption that "way will 
open" are not morally unintelligible people who simple-mindedly refuse to 
be realistic and pragmatic. Or, at any rate, not all of them are. Many are 
simply people who have chosen to adopt a practice—and a way of life—that 
is defined in terms of the assumption that non-violent solutions can, at least 
in principle, always be found—and that it is their business to discover these 
and make them a reality. 
We may want to refer to this presupposition as an article of faith. But 
it is important to see that it is an article of faith in precisely the same sense in 
which the fundamental presuppositions of science are. It is not something 
"you believe when you know it ain’t so." It cannot be proven true or false 
any more than the scientist’s basic assumptions can be, but it can be 
vindicated by the successful pursuit of the practice it is constitutive of—just 
as the scientist’s assumption that every event has a cause is vindicated by 
successful research. So it is not an empirically meaningless speculation 
about what lies beyond our experience in space and time. It is a 
presupposition that serves to make a certain kind of disciplined activity 
intelligible. In that sense, it is a faith that serves to give meaning to our 
practices in this life—rather than a creed that trades meaning here and now 
for something promised in the hereafter. 
And yet… 
And yet the arguments of this chapter do lead us to the brink of some 
very fundamental questions about humanity, being, and the divine. The 
questions are difficult to deal with and at some points impossible to resolve. 
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But they are questions worth raising, and some of them are worth raising 
again and again. For there are some basic questions that we answer best 
when we do not answer them once and for all—or even try to "get a firm 
grip on them." Such questions are ones we should choose to live with day by 
day—allowing them to get an increasingly firm grip on us. 
 
 
METAPHYSICS AND PEACE 
 
From some points of view, some of this book’s claims would seem 
strange or even downright bizarre. It is not so much the reasons appealed to 
or the conclusions drawn that will seem odd. It is some of the implications 
that those conclusions seem to suggest. 
The central arguments of this book are at many points rather 
straightforward. They do interconnect at times in some rather multi-faceted 
ways. But that is to be expected because of the kind of basic claims the book 
deals with: that peace has been fundamentally obscured in our culture; that it 
has been obscured by whole networks of assumptions and practices that give 
us a conflict-centered view of human life; that these networks are flawed (on 
their own terms) and should be replaced by other views of reason, emotion, 
meaning, truth, value, the self, social knowledge, and rational action; that the 
resulting (interconnected) networks of views lead us to conceive of peace as 
a positively distinguished activity we can perform. There is no need to recap 
all the ties between these views. Just listing them all in one sentence is 
enough to bring immediately to mind the thickness of the argument. 
The argument has this kind of "thickness" because it concerns 
alternative ways of life—alternative ways in which we could cultivate our 
own culture. This kind of argument cannot be laid out in a single, neat, linear 
proof like a demonstration in geometry. It has to circle around issues, spiral 
outward, dig back in to untangle issues, cast about for ways of reworking the 
threads of our culture, and… well, it has to proceed in the fashion of a kind 
of complex negotiation which aims to gather consensus by dealing with a 
broad range of very different points of view and trying to synthesize them. 
But the arguments are straightforward in the sense that they do not 
appeal to arcane pieces of information and they come in relatively 
manageable clumps that can each be assessed individually—though, and this 
is worth emphasizing, the interconnections between individual arguments 
and various clumps of them do claim to have a coherence that adds 
significantly to their strength. For example, the reasons offered for adopting 
a maieutic account of reasoning, a critical participatory account of social 
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knowledge and a cultivation model of rational action each claim to support 
each other. And they support, and are in turn supported by, the analysis of 
personhood developed in the account of the I/thou relation. But it is 
conclusions like the ones concerning that relation which seem to suggest 
implications that are strange or even bizarre. 
It is not so much the peculiarly indefinable character of the distinction 
between persons and things that is odd. It is the puzzles it raises about (lie 
nature of reality. This book argues that social reality has features that make 
it different from physical reality and that persons have features (which 
cannot be defined) that make them different from things like apples and 
toaster levers. But how, then, are these two realms and these two kinds of 
entities connected? The distinctions suggest that we have to adopt some kind 
of philosophical dualism that posits realms of mind and matter in something 
like the way Descartes did. And this yields a puzzle similar to Descartes’ 
problem of relating the two—which he hoped to solve (but did not) by 
connecting them with a mysterious function of the pineal gland. 
It seems certain that there is only one ultimate overall reality. Even if 
we find it useful to talk of "alternative realities"—rather than different 
perspectives on the one reality—these various realities will be of interest to 
us only if they are all related to us, and thus to one another, in some larger 
single scheme of things. If we are to believe in a social realm, persons, and 
emergent trans-historical objective values, then it seems as though we need 
some overall account of how these fit into the rest of reality and relate to the 
kind of physical reality discovered by natural science. In this way, our 
practical interest in peace leads us to a concern with metaphysical questions. 
Such questions are worth addressing here, if only briefly, and yet they 
are not the sorts of questions we should expect to make much headway 
with—at least not the sort of headway we expect in other areas of inquiry 
such as botany and economics. The best single remark ever made about 
metaphysics was probably the first sentence of Immanuel Kant’s massive 
analysis of the problems of metaphysics, his Critique of Pure Reason: 
 
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its 
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the 
very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as 
transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. 
 
Kant was wrong to suppose that there is some universal essence to 
reason and that it divides up a priori into neat compartments. But his remark 
captures the most distinctive and disturbing feature of the kinds of questions 
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we group under the heading of metaphysics: we can neither answer them nor 
ignore them. 
But how then should we deal with them? An example here will help. 
Many of the classic metaphysical puzzles arise when we try to 
understand how the views of reality implied by one group of practices are 
related to the ones implied by some other. For instance, the practice of 
treating humans as persons and holding them responsible for the choices 
they make seems to presuppose that they do in fact make choices and that if 
they choose wrongly we can blame them because they could have spoken or 
acted otherwise. This is not just an abstract article of faith, it is a 
presupposition of the practice of law as we know it. Judges suppose that 
defendants may be culpable for their crimes and suppose they acted 
voluntarily in the sense that they could have chosen to act differently. If the 
defendant turns out to be insane or not yet of age or not capable of free and 
responsible action for some other reason, then she is treated in a 
fundamentally different way. And there are practices for determining 
whether the person in the defendant’s chair should be treated as a person or 
as a patient, a juvenile, or some other sort of thing the lawyers will talk 
about and the judge will do something to. 
Scientists, in contrast, suppose that every event has a cause and this 
means that every action can be explained. If people acted one way rather 
than another, then—just as there must be a reason Dr. Russell’s damn 
electrophoresis machine won’t work—there must be a reason why they acted 
as they did. And this reason explains why they did not—and could not—
have acted otherwise. 
Now the question is: Could the defendant have acted otherwise or 
not? The scientist’s practice leads him to presuppose that she could not have; 
the judge’s practice presupposes the opposite. Whose presupposition is 
right? 
This particular question leads us pretty directly to a host of other 
metaphysical problems. The judge’s practice leads him to suppose that 
sometimes people’s actions can be explained by appeals to moral values—
namely, when the person chooses to act rightly because it is the right thing 
to do. But the scientist’s practice leads her to suppose that all actions are 
events in the physical world which can be explained solely by appeal to 
physical facts and the laws of nature. Who is right? Furthermore, who is 
right about the nature of persons? Are they subjects that can be addressed as 
thous or are they physical objects that must be studied and defined like all 
the other things around us? 
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We can not ignore these sorts of questions because we cannot help but adopt 
some kind of answer to them in practice and because the answers we adopt 
make important differences in the ways we live. You and I are daily in just 
the same situation the judge is. We have to decide whether or not to hold 
people responsible for what they do. We make different decisions based 
upon the sanity, age, and rational competence of the people with whom we 
deal. I may respond very differently to someone who has thrown a rock at 
my car window depending upon all sorts of judgments about their capacity 
for free and deliberate choice. Or I may adopt a view like the scientist’s and 
hold no one responsible in the sense that would imply guilt. I may just view 
them as things that need to be dealt with—just as a judge persuaded that 
"determinism" is true might view all the criminals that come before his court 
as deviants in need of rehabilitation or treatment rather than as free agents 
who ought to be punished. 
I may, of course, simply not give the matter a great deal of thought. 
But my actions will turn out in practice to presuppose some view or another. 
And whatever view I or the judge adopt will clearly make a difference—
rehabilitation centers are often quite different from prisons. 
But while metaphysical questions about freedom and determinism and 
other such presuppositions cannot be ignored, it also seems that they cannot 
be answered—at least not in the way we would like to have them answered, 
namely, once and for all. 
They do not concern empirical claims like the belief that a cow has 
four stomachs. To find out if people have free will or an "I" or knowledge of 
trans-historical objective values, we cannot just "cut them open and look." 
These metaphysical claims are presuppositions of practices and they can be 
neither demonstrated nor refuted. They can be vindicated by successful 
pursuit of the practice. And if they fail to be vindicated in that way (as in the 
case of the teleological presuppositions of medieval physics), then we may 
at some point choose to simply set aside the practice—and with some 
justification. But so long as our various practices like law and natural 
science are productive, then we have some reason to continue to engage in 
them and adopt the beliefs they presuppose—even if these contradict one 
another. 
But how can we deal with the apparent contradictions? From a 
theoretical point of view they are unsatisfying because they seem to make 
our beliefs inconsistent. From a practical point of view they are a source of 
difficulties because we need to decide which belief should be acted on in any 
given situation. The judge, for example, needs to decide whether to hold the 
defendant responsible as the prosecutor urges or view the defendant’s acts as 
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involuntary consequences of early upbringing and the like—as he is urged to 
do by the psychiatrist who is called as a witness for the defense. 
One way to handle the contradictions is to argue that they are only 
apparent, not real. We may adopt some version of "compatibilism" which 
holds that the doctrines of free will and determinism can both be true. 
Perhaps it will turn out that some sophisticated doctrine of metaphysical 
parallelism can show that the languages of the judge and the scientist are 
both true, though different, ways of describing the same reality. One rather 
subtle and elegant way of doing this is provided in Geoffrey Hellman and 
Frank Thompson’s "Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and 
Reduction."3 However, such sophisticated philosophical accounts offer little 
useful guidance in practical contexts like the one the judge faces. 
A more homespun version of "compatibilism" may be of more help, 
however. Perhaps an analysis of our everyday use of the concept of a free 
action will turn out to not require that responsible deeds have no cause at all. 
It may simply be that they are caused, as Aristotle held, by "internal" things 
like character traits and deliberate reasoning—rather than being caused by 
"external" threats or physical constraints. Vicious criminals may be caused 
to rape or murder by their own deviant values. Still, they are responsible for 
these actions because those values are theirs and they are acting according to 
their own (internally rooted) desires rather than as a result of external 
threats. In short, in this view, free acts are ones that people perform because 
they want to—regardless of whether their wants themselves were 
predetermined. But there are two problems with this approach. 
First, it is not clear that actions which are free in this sense are ones 
for which we are really responsible and can be held to blame. What about 
the crimes of the adult thief who is motivated by a drug addiction acquired 
in her mother’s womb? Or consider the member of Tachito Somoza’s 
National Guard who was "recruited" at the age of fourteen and taught to 
repeat things like: "What are we? TIGERS! And what do tigers eat? THE 
BODIES OF THE PEOPLE!" Or consider the case of the blueblooded 
capitalist who was raised in a secluded environment of private schools and a 
milieu in which it was assumed without argument that social Darwinism 
justified grossly unfair labor practices and a system of debt peonage that 
condemned masses of people to brutal poverty. 
Such people’s actions are caused by "internal" character traits and 
modes of reasoning they have been taught. But it is not clear that we ought 
to hold them morally responsible for their immoral deeds. And if any of 
them are to be excused, then why not excuse all of us for all our misdeeds—
for each of us might have a story to tell about how physical and social 
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factors in our environment made us the kinds of people who (in Aristotle’s 
sense) "voluntarily" choose to act in immoral ways. 
Second, many of the metaphysical problems related to the free 
will/determinism issue seem difficult to resolve with this kind of 
compatibilism. How do trans-historical objective values exist in relation to 
physical events? In particular, how do the two interact when that peculiar 
type of entity called a person thinks about what you and I ought to do in 
light of those values and then does it here in the world of space and time? 
Just this sort of theoretical question takes on a very practical cast when a 
counselor or social critic wants to understand the process by which people 
are persuaded they ought to change and then actually follow through and 
alter their behavior. 
There is an alternative to accepting one metaphysical belief rather 
than another or tidying up our seemingly conflicting presuppositions by 
working out some systematic doctrine of compatibilism. The alternative 
consists in not trying to answer metaphysical questions once and for all and 
continuing to live with them as open questions to which we give transitional 
answers. I believe that this is what most of us ordinarily do and that it is the 
wisest course to pursue. 
For example, a good judge will begin a trial with an open mind. To 
find out if the witness is a responsible agent who freely chose to commit her 
crime, he will begin by talking with her. Suppose he finds it impossible to 
practice the activity of responsible dialogue with her—and decides that the 
assumption of her competence is not vindicated. He may begin to talk about 
her with a jail guard or prison psychiatrist. But then the defense attorney 
may call in a sociologist who talks with the judge about these prison staff—
explaining their perceptions of the prisoner and their treatment of her in 
terms of physical conditions at the prison or social forces determining the 
behavior of the staff. The prosecution might, in turn, call in a political 
scientist who would try to undermine the sociologist’s testimony—not by 
arguing against her evidence but by talking with the judge about her and her 
profession and the political forces that cause them to present the kinds of 
analysis she advocates. And then… 
This kind of process could continue indefinitely. Notice that the judge 
does not attempt to determine once and for all who is a free and responsible 
person and who is not. Instead, he lives with this as an open question to 
which he gives transitional answers. 
In many cases such answers may be transitional in the sense that they 
are provisional. We are open-minded because we are not yet sure of what 
the truth is. But in many cases the answers are transitional in another sense. 
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They are not hypotheses adopted in a tentative way until we acquire further 
evidence; they are presuppositions we adopt for the moment because the 
context seems appropriate. 
For example, the judge may decide that the defendant was not a free 
and responsible agent when she committed her crime of shoplifting. He may 
talk about her case with a psychologist and then decide to sentence her to a 
juvenile rehabilitation center. But before dismissing her from the court he 
may talk with her—addressing her in a direct and personal way with words 
like these: "Young lady, this time I have taken into account your home 
environment and the peer pressures you were subjected to. Next time I will 
not. I am sending you to a counseling program that will give you the 
opportunity to change. Make the most of it. If I see you in this court again I 
will hold you entirely responsible for any crimes you may have committed." 
In this case, the judge is demanding that the defendant assume 
responsibility for her actions. He believes that in this situation it is 
appropriate to decide to start treating her as a responsible person whose acts 
are freely chosen. This kind of transition to adopting a different 
metaphysical presupposition is one made frequently. Parents, spouses, 
counselors, and social critics may point out to us what has caused our past 
behavior and then demand that we assume responsibility for it in the future. 
This kind of transition is one we can make with ourselves and it is central to 
the process of personal growth. I may think about myself as a human whose 
actions can be defined and explained and then consider how I will assume 
responsibility for myself in the future. 
Whenever we are involved in two practices that have conflicting 
presuppositions we can deal with the question about which belief is right in 
this kind of way. We can view it as an open question which we should live 
with on a daily basis by giving transitional answers. Are people motivated 
by leadings that give them insight into emergent trans-historical objective 
values or governed by bodily desires and cultural conditioning? Are they 
persons we should address as thous or organisms we should study and 
manipulate? Is the awareness we have in private meditation and communal 
sharing a presence of the Divine or a by-product of brain chemistry and 
alpha waves? 
There is no point in burdening this book with a lengthy philosophical 
examination of these issues which tries to sort them all out. As metaphysical 
problems to be given definitive solutions, our reason finds that they 
"transcend all its powers" with questions "it is not able to answer." But the 
questions are also ones which this study of peace makes arise and which in 
practical contexts we are unable to ignore. The wisest course is to simply 
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accept the limits of our philosophical powers and the inevitability of our 
philosophical problems and go on living with these issues as open questions 
which we must answer time and again—deciding which answer is 
appropriate by using a practical judgment which we can cultivate but never 
perfect. 
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CHAPTER 18 
 
 
The Hands of the Future 
What Peace Might Disclose 
 
 
 
lthough this book has discussed a wide variety of concrete problems 
associated with peace it has not argued for any particular concrete solutions. 
It has not prescribed any institutional structures for family counseling, it has 
not laid out a plan for legal reform, it has not articulated a social theory for 
dealing with racial conflicts, it has not presented an economic program for 
dealing with poverty in the third world, it has not fleshed out a political 
theory for counteracting growths in militarism, and it has not detailed a plan 
for halting the nuclear arms race. Limitations of space and competence 
provide key reasons why systematic solutions to these concrete problems 
have not been advocated here. But there is another fundamental sort of 
reason as well, one that can best be seen by focusing for a moment on the 
last problem. 
One reason this book has not offered any concrete proposal 
concerning the arms race is that it is an extremely complex process that 
needs calls for focused and detailed study. But another reason has to do with 
one of the central moving forces underlying the nuclear arms race. It is 
motivated, in part, by a fundamental inconsistency in the norms of 
international behavior which the superpowers have adopted. 
The inconsistency can best be seen by attending to an equivocation in 
the term used to define the function of nuclear arms. They are supposed to 
serve to provide for "national security." But two things are meant by this: the 
security of the population in each country, and the security of the 
government by which they are ruled. Taking the security of the first as our 
goal, we suppose that nuclear weapons serve to protect our citizens by 
preventing nuclear war. The other side is deterred from attacking because we 
commit ourselves to retaliation. And they are not encouraged to strike first in 
order to "use it before you lose it" because we assure them that we ourselves 
will never strike first. This view leads us to adopt the following rule: 
"Retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack, but never strike first and reassure the 
other side you will not." 
A 
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Fine. But suppose the enemy attacks with conventional weapons. 
Suppose the Soviets are marching through Tijuana or the United States is 
dropping napalm on Leningrad. If our side is losing a conventional war, then 
at some point our existence as a nation will be threatened. It is here that the 
second meaning of "national security" becomes operative. To preserve the 
existence of our sovereign government, we must be prepared, if necessary, 
to strike first with nuclear weapons. 
It might seem as though this second view is simply an immoral 
doctrine adopted by power-hungry civilian leaders. But notice that they may 
not have much choice about adopting it. Pretend you are president and the 
generals from the Pentagon or Kremlin tell you that they can no longer 
sustain a conventional war against enemy troops that are now killing your 
soldiers (who are these generals' currently obedient subordinates) someplace 
three hundred miles from the capital. Suppose they request permission to use 
a dozen tactical nuclear weapons to cut off the enemy's supplies and cripple 
their attack and you refuse permission. What is likely to happen? 
It is highly likely that the weapons will be employed whether you like 
it or not. If you refuse to give the order desired, you may be disobeyed or 
displaced by a coup. Knowing this, and knowing the likely consequences of 
going over the brink into a nuclear war that will probably escalate, it is in 
your interests to avoid having this situation ever arise. It would seem that the 
best way of doing so would be to use the threat of nuclear weapons to deter 
non-nuclear attacks. In fact, since acts of "economic warfare" like cutting off 
the flow of oil through the Gulf of Oman would be likely to escalate into 
confrontations with conventional weapons, it would seem wise to explicitly 
include "nuclear options" among the responses you threaten to make to such 
attacks. For the sake of protecting your government's national security (and 
preventing a coup that would precipitate nuclear confrontations), you should, 
then, adopt the following rule: "Whenever vital national interests are in 
danger, threaten to use nuclear weapons in a first strike." 
These lines of argument based on the two concepts of national 
security are each "perfectly rational"—at least in some straightforward 
everyday sense of that phrase. Yet together, they yield a pair of norms which 
are fundamentally inconsistent with each other: (1) Never threaten to strike 
first.  (2) Threaten to strike first when vital national interests are in danger. 
Both the United States and the Soviets have advocated the popular 
version of "deterrence theory," mutually assured destruction or "MAD," 
which prescribes the first norm. Both have also adopted the theory of 
national security as security of sovereignty which prescribes the second 
norm. 
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The United States has adopted the second norm explicitly in its policy 
pronouncements concerning Western Europe and the Middle East. The 
Soviets have publicly affirmed a "no first use" policy. But when actions and 
words disagree, "listen to the actions." In practice they, like the United 
States, have built and deployed tactical and intermediate range weapons that 
are irrelevant to MAD deterrence. Furthermore, given the size of their 
arsenal, there is little reason to doubt they have missiles trained on U.S. 
silos—missiles that, again, can only be understood as first strike weapons 
because once the United Stales used its silos in a first strike these would no 
longer be of any military significance.1 
The result is a negotiator's nightmare. There are a host of competing 
domestic and international forces pressuring both governments. Some urge 
them to escalate and others demand that they de-escalate their promises to 
never strike first or their threats to go ahead and do so. And to make good 
these promises and threats, each government has to act by building or not 
building whatever new weapons systems can be dreamed up. All the 
pressure groups involved find justification for their conflicting views in one 
or the other of the two fundamental imperatives to which both super-powers 
are committed. The result is an absolute mess. How can we get out of it? 
Technological breakthroughs will not provide the solution. A new 
defensive system cannot alter the basic strategic position of either side. 
Satellites with lasers that could protect the civilian population (rather than 
just guard key military installations) involve a host of fundamental technical 
problems and neither side is seriously attempting to develop such a system. 
But even if they did, there is a plethora of chemical and (especially) 
biological weapons being developed. Furthermore, a system for defending 
citizens from these is made impossible by the indefinitely various ways in 
which they could be delivered—including sending a letter containing a self-
opening packet of plague viruses to an IRS office in Los Angeles. 
Arms agreements could certainly help and are well worth trying. They 
probably hold out our best hope for preventing accidental nuclear war. But 
even if both sides reduce their arsenals by ninety percent, they will still be 
stuck with the ability to use whatever bombs they have and build more if 
they so choose—and they will still be trapped in the basic strategic doctrines 
that continue to encourage them to both de-escalate and re-escalate. 
I believe that in the long run the only way in which we will be able to 
avoid the enormous dangers the arms race poses will be to forget about 
them. I do not mean that we should stick our heads in the sand and pretend 
they do not exist. Instead, what I mean is this. 
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We have to accept the fact that modern weapons have catapulted us 
into an era in which military force simply cannot any longer serve its 
traditional function as the final arbiter—"adjudicating" disputes by letting 
might determine who is right. If the super powers are going to live "in 
peace" with each other in the old-fashioned sense that they manage to get by 
without going to war, then they will have to learn to live "in peace" in the 
other sense discussed in this book. They will have to learn to view 
differences as pieces of a shared problem rather than as conflicts in a 
situation of opposition. We will have to find ways to deal with each other by 
cultivating voluntarily shared commitments to expressions, projects and 
practices. In short, so far as the international scene goes, there is no other 
way to peace except the peace that is a way. 
It is a way filled with obstacles and difficulties of all sorts. It would be 
silly to try to outline some master plan for it here. It is a huge task that huge 
numbers of people need to work at. 
But it also involves a couple of little tasks that you and I need to get 
cracking on. I have a rough idea of one or two I might try to finish in a spare 
hour tomorrow and I am sure that you do as well. 
As we snap, crackle and pop along upon our appointed rounds, we 
may have occasions for despair. We may weigh the odds and be tempted to 
conclude that concerns for peace are pointless. In those moments, I believe it 
is dishonest not to weep and express our feelings to the full. But the fear, 
frustration, and anger express values we can name. We can name the people 
we love and the institutions we cherish. And we can name the things that 
threaten them and we can find in such expressions the makings of projects 
and practices that will serve to let us define ourselves more fully and secure 
the well-being of the people we respect and the objects we hold dear. And 
we can choose to take part in those projects and practices in a way that 
cultivates peace. We can choose to do so not out of expectation of some later 
reward but out of the overriding sense of the intrinsic value of practicing 
peace. Even if we die tomorrow, it will have been worth practicing peace 
during the time allotted us this day. 
But as we look about us, we can also take heart for the future. It is true 
that our world is in the throes of great problems which are often viewed as 
conflicts that will breed the conditions for an indefinite number of future 
wars and fights. But there are fundamental trends that are altering the nature 
of culture not only in the United States but throughout the world. Many of 
these trends are proving to foster the conditions that promote the activity of 
peace and the transformation of our culture of conflict into a culture of 
peace. And there are literally millions of people who are coming to realize 
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the nature of many of these trends and who are acting to serve as midwives 
of this new culture. 
In the long run, the changes of most profound significance are likely 
to be the ones that people in the mass media would not normally classify 
under the heading of news about developments in peace. The growth—and 
maturing—of peace movements connected with the nuclear arms freeze. 
Witness for Peace, and Sanctuary are, of course, very important. But even 
more fundamental developments of the kind Alvin Toffler discusses in The 
Third Wave dig deeper at the roots of our culture as a whole. 
For example, innovations in applied biology, computer science, and 
other technologies are pushing world culture to increasing decentralization. 
This is reflected in the diversification of "mass" media and the increasingly 
novel and varied markets—and subcultures—they serve. Social experiments 
in homes, offices, and voluntary organizations are further fostering increases 
in diversity, novelty, and decentralization—and at seemingly exponential 
rates of increase. One does not need to read Fisher and Ury in order to learn 
about the merits of "multiplying options" in negotiation. We only need to 
gaze across a magazine shelf in order to see the availability of many new 
options for housing, food, family structure, work, medical care, worship, and 
education. 
Even within large corporations and government bureaucracies there is 
a spread of "intrapreneurship" and a shift to new modes of management—
ones that emphasize the skills of group problem solving and consensus 
rather than traditional lines of hierarchical authority and obedience. People 
are learning to "get to yes" by "negotiating without giving in" in a wide 
variety of contexts. Parent Effectiveness Training teaches them to focus on 
interests rather than positions when dealing with children by speaking in "I 
statements" rather than "you statements." Management/labor relations are 
being transformed by the importation of organization structures developed in 
Japan. 
People are learning to work by consensus because they have to. The 
proliferation of centers of power and resources increasingly place them in 
the position of dealing with people they cannot compel and must deal with 
on a voluntary basis. 
Moreover, the proven effectiveness of non-conflict styles of group 
problem solving makes them increasingly attractive options—even for 
people who may resist the philosophical assumptions that underlie them. Not 
long ago a Colorado based organization that offers training programs in 
"mediation, negotiation, and group problem solving" approached a state 
prison system to offer some workshops. When prison officials were asked to 
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consider offering courses in "negotiation," they replied: "No. That would be 
of no interest to us. We are a paramilitary organization that does not operate 
on the basis of negotiation." The trainers paused for a bit, and then quietly 
asked if there would be any interest in a workshop on group problem 
solving. The reply was enthusiastic: "Oh yes! We have lots of problems!" 
There was, of course, only one significant difference between the first 
course the trainers proposed and the second which they actually taught. In 
the second, the word "negotiation" was not employed. 
Many of the key agents who are midwifing the fundamental changes 
in our midst are people who have themselves experienced profound personal 
transformations. Perhaps family problems led them to try one of the new 
counseling techniques, or work-related stress may have led them to try bio-
feedback, or vague religious impulses may have led them to experiment with 
meditation. In the process of dealing with these problems or interests they 
began to undergo a fundamental reorientation in the ways in which they 
experience life. What were conceived or as personal conflicts or 
interpersonal confrontations get reconceived. A new gestalt, a new 
"paradigm," emerges. Differences which appeared as conflicting oppositions 
are now viewed as elements of a problem to be solved. 
What works in one context is then tried in others. Increasingly, these 
individuals begin to see the world in a new way. They let go of the conflict 
centered assumptions of our culture and begin to operate with new 
assumptions. They assume that difficulties should be dealt with not by 
fighting out conflicts but by transforming the terms in which the situation is 
understood. They assume that real growth and progress occurs when 
problems are faced squarely and transcended. And they find increasingly 
that their own success in pursuing such transformation breeds the conditions 
for further success. 
They also find networks of other people who can aid them in the 
process of personal growth and social transformation which their initial 
experience has drawn them into. They come to join what Marilyn Ferguson 
has called the "Aquarian Conspiracy." It is an open conspiracy of people 
who are seeking to transform our culture. Their conspiracy 
 
…is at the same time pragmatic and transcendental. It values 
both enlightenment and mystery…power and humility… 
interdependence and individuality. It is simultaneously political 
and apolitical. Its movers and shakers include individuals who 
are impeccably Establishment allied with one-time sign-carrying 
radicals.2 
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The historical roots of this conspiracy lie in traditions of mystical practice 
and scientific studies of consciousness and brain functions. Its progress is 
tied to participatory studies of self-transformation that yield personal growth 
and lead to social transformation. At the heart of it is a host of insights into 
ways of being conscious of consciousness itself and ways of letting the mind 
grow. And a central fruit of it is an increasing awareness of presence. It is a 
presence realized when we make use of our full potential to live creatively 
and in ways that foster growth. 
It is a presence which can wed the portions of ourselves we might 
think to be masculine—as opposed to feminine. It is a presence which 
discloses undreamed-of possibilities—and thereby discloses things 
fundamental about the actualities in which we are rooted. It whispers secrets, 
hints at leadings, directs beacons to the future, and, at times, it may even 
drench us in sunlight. It is something each of us may come more and more to 
witness for ourselves—and offer witness to for others. 
This presence can bring continuity to our lives. To explore its depths 
we must make use of the categories of ethics, religion, science and 
philosophy. And we must be prepared to reconceive aspects of ourselves that 
are as fundamental as our sex. 
As we practice peace, this presence is disclosed. It is a presence that is 
experienced when we are most fully human. It brings an awareness of 
emergent trans-historical values. It is not a paternalistic God whose almighty 
power guarantees that this will be the best of all possible worlds. But it is a 
presence that offers us leadings toward the Truth and empowers us with the 
courage to cling to it in a loving way that grants us openings that melt our 
hearts. It is something that we cannot adequately name but that we can 
encounter and acknowledge. We can cultivate our ability to experience this 
presence in a host of ways. In its light, all of us are sisters and brothers of 
one flesh. If we seek it, we shall find it. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Building a Peace Academy 
 
 
 
The real university, he said, has no specific location. It owns 
no property, pays no salaries and receives no material dues. The 
real university is a state of mind. It … is nothing less that the 
continuing body of reason itself.1 
 
 
 
 
lato's Republic stands as the First major classic of Western social 
philosophy. It provided a systematic critique of Greek culture's art, 
economy, religion, social systems, methods of governance and the central 
conceptions of reason, knowledge, and action which underlay them. It 
provided a detailed defense of a vision of a reconstructed culture, one ruled 
by wisdom rather than the lust for material welfare, social status, or personal 
power. 
In the Republic, conflict is viewed as optional. It is seen as a view of 
human differences based on ignorance, intemperance, injustice, or 
cowardice. People who have achieved wisdom see that when people disagree 
it is because one or more have made a mistake. There are objective truths 
about how we ought to live. These truths exist independently in a realm of 
eternal forms, and we can come to know them by a process of open-ended 
discussion that Plato contrasted with the eristic reasoning of sophists and 
called "dialectic." To know them is to cherish them. They are objective 
values that compel the will of all who have freed themselves from 
intemperate bodily lusts, unmastered passions of anger, and cowardly fears 
for their apparent welfare which make them ignore the highest goods of 
experience—the goods achieved by the active soul. 
Like most Greeks, Plato took it for granted that the active soul could 
flourish fully only in the shared life of a community committed to raising 
P 
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virtuous citizens who cultivated wise and fair relations with each other and 
their neighboring societies. The Republic is a vision of such a community. In 
it, an economy based on agriculture provides the basic means of life. An 
educational system aimed at producing good citizens and rulers provides the 
people and culture which employs those means to create a society which 
cherishes and promotes the highest ideals Plato could envision. 
While we can learn much from Plato's blueprint, many of its 
underlying assumptions no longer apply. We no longer live in a pre-
industrial world of isolated city-states. Perhaps the most basic premise of the 
Republic which has become obsolete is, in fact, the assumption that we live 
in a world in which it is possible to envision one single ideal form of social 
life. There are many forms of communal life worth pursuing. And no single 
scheme for integrating them can do justice to the complexity of the world in 
which we live. A single model for national government can no more be 
adequate for our world than a single method of agriculture, a single style of 
worship, or a single family structure. At the level of international affairs, no 
simple plan for a world government will solve our problems. The problems 
are complex, local as well as global, and Filled with continuing novelties. 
They require solutions that are subtle, variegated in scope, and ad hoc. 
But we can build communities that cultivate expressions, projects, and 
practices to better our common lot. As we do so, two insights of Plato should 
inform our work. 
First, the economic structure of a community provides the necessary 
conditions for its maintenance and growth, and that structure is conditioned 
by external facts but can—and must—be intentionally chosen and revised by 
any community that aims to thrive. It does no good to cook up utopian 
schemes if they are not based on realistic interpretations of economic 
resources and considerations. But these still leave us with enormous room 
for interpretation. Entrepreneurial activity—whether undertaken by private 
or public agents—will be a necessary prerequisite for any fundamental 
changes in our communities and our culture. 
Second, the educational system of the community provides the heart 
of ifs maintenance and growth. It is what culture is all about. Education can 
take a host of forms, but in each it provides the way the community lives 
into the future. The transformation of our culture requires us to become 
students and teachers in every walk of life. 
We can start with our families, our friendships, our workplaces, our 
local political units—or our churches, our professions, and our voluntary 
organizations. They all provide arenas in which to cultivate a new culture. In 
each, we can bring to bear the categories discussed in this book. 
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We can try to introduce maieutic styles of reasoning in the family 
counsels or committees we serve on at work and at clubs. We can engage in 
critical participatory research for any practice in which we take part. We can 
cultivate any of the parts of our culture that we are involved in and that make 
us who we are. In doing so, we can cultivate voluntary commitments to 
cultivate shared expressions, projects, and practices. We can undertake 
special projects that are explicitly concerned with "peace issues"—cultural 
exchange programs, neighborhood conflict resolution centers, and political 
lobbying on foreign policy issues. But we can be active in the transformation 
of our culture without becoming "activists." The one sort of activity may 
lead us in a natural way to undertake the other. But both are intrinsically 
worthwhile and we should not hesitate to simply work as we find ourselves 
led to do so. 
There is an international peace academy. It is a university without 
walls. It is a school for continuing education. It charges no fees and it grants 
no degrees. It has no chancellors or professors. Its members consist of 
people like you and me who simply enroll in courses called "Introduction to 
Neighbors #101," "Talking Over Coffee #212," "Changing Habits #369," 
"Readings #411," and "Practicum #412." 
Some curricula materials and department phone numbers are listed in 
Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Some Resources 
 
 
 
 
I. READINGS 
 
What follows is a modest list of readings that provide useful places to 
pursue further critical thinking about the notions used in Parts III and IV to 
characterize peace as an activity. Almost all of these works have very useful 
bibliographies. 
 
A. Alternative Forms of Reasoning Including the Eristic, Maieutic, 
and Other Styles: 
 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1982. (Deals with sex related differences in moral 
reasoning.) 
 
R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
Apollo Edition, New York, 1971. (Contrasts eristic and "dialectic" in 
a complex but subtle analysis that philosophically minded readers will 
find of special help in reflecting on Part IV.) 
 
B. Emotion and Judgment 
 
Robert Solomon, The Passions, Anchor Books/Doubleday NY, NY, 1977. 
(Critiques the "myth of the passions" and develops a view of the 
relations between emotion and cognition analogous to the one 
developed here.) 
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C. Critical Participatory Research and Non-Instrumental Models of 
Action: 
 
Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, George Alien & Unwin, 
London, 1975. (Clear and very helpful introduction to Galilean 
models of social science and instrumental models of action as well as 
alternatives analogous to the ones developed here.) 
 
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame. 1984. (Profound and elegant philosophical and historical 
analysis of the genesis and significance of contemporary views of 
ethics and social science. Especially helpful for anyone interested in 
pursuing the notion of a practice.) 
 
Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Sheed & Ward, London, 
1972. (Develops a rich and distinctive account of critical participatory 
research in the context of the third world.) 
 
D. The Quaker Process of Consensus: 
 
Howard Brinton, Friends for Three Hundred Years, Pendle Hill 
Publications, Wallingford, Pennsylvania, 1965. (A standard—and 
excellent—introduction to the history and practice of Quakers.) 
 
Michael Sheeran, Beyond Majority Rule, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the 
Religious Society of Friends, Philadelphia, 1983. (A very perceptive 
study of the Quaker process of consensus by a Jesuit social scientist 
employing a critical participatory method of research.) 
 
E. Principled Negotiation: 
 
Roger Fisher and William Dry, Getting to Yes, Penguin Books, New York, 
1981. (A short and especially well written introduction with excellent 
examples.) 
 
F. Gandhi's Satyagraha: 
 
Joan Bondurant, The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of 
Conflict, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1965. (Includes 
detailed descriptions of satyagraha campaigns in the context of an 
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extremely helpful discussion of the systematic character of Gandhi's 
thought and practice.) 
 
Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance, Schocken Books, New York, 
1961. (A very useful anthology of Gandhi's writings on satyagraha.) 
 
Mohandas K. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, Navajivan Press, 
Ahmedabad, India, 1928. (A narrative of Gandhi's first "campaign" 
and the development of his method. Especially illuminating in 
showing his use of categories of cultivation—rather than instrumental 
concepts of action—and notions of critical participatory research—
rather than Galilean science.) 
 
G. Related Styles of Peacemaking and Social Change: 
 
Virginia Coover, et al., Resource Manual for a Living Revolution, New 
Society Press, Philadelphia, 1977. (An extremely useful cross between 
a peace and justice organizer's manual and encyclopedia.) 
 
Kathleen and James McGinnis, Parenting for Peace and Justice, Orbis 
Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1981. (A readable and down to earth 
guide written from a religious perspective and which includes a very 
useful bibliography.) 
 
Gene Sharp, The Politics of Non-Violent Action, Porter Sargent Publishers, 
Boston, 1973. (A virtual encyclopedia of techniques and case histories 
of non-violent direct action.) 
 
Marilyn Ferguson, The Aquarian Conspiracy, J. P. Tarcher Inc., Los 
Angeles, 1980. (An excellent synthetic survey of a host of current 
developments in approaches to personal and social transformation.) 
 
Duane Elgin, Voluntary Simplicity, William Morrow and Company Inc., 
New York, 1981. (A good place to start in thinking about relations 
between peacemaking and life-style issues.) 
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II. ORGANIZATIONS 
 
A large though not exhaustive list of local and national organizations 
involved in peace-related work called A Directory of Small Groups Seeking 
Peace is available from either: 
 
Jesse Aiken 
Pax Dei 
Box 44 
Damascus, MD 20872 
 
or: 
 
Andrea Coolidge 
World Peacemakers 
2025 Massachusetts Ave. N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20036 
 
Also, a number of groups that practice—and offer training programs in—
styles of peacemaking and conflict resolution similar to "principled 
negotiation" are listed in the Dispute Resolution Directory. It also includes a 
useful bibliography. It is available through: 
 
National Institute for Dispute Resolution 
1901 Street, NW, Suite 600 
Washington D. C. 20036 
 
 
III. SOME PROJECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 
 
The intent of this book has not been to defend a Galilean theory of 
peace which should be believed but lo cultivate a critical, participatory 
account of a practice of peace in which we can engage. What follows is a list 
of projects that might be pursued with the aim of further cultivating this 
understanding—projects that would lead you lo critically revise the ideas of 
this book in light of your own ongoing activity. 
 
1. Maieutic Reasoning: 
Listen carefully to several people who are talking and try to identify 
their reasoning style as eristic or maieutic. Attend to their postures, gestures, 
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emotions, word choices, metaphors, interests, and preoccupations. Think of 
ways to tie specific details of their conversation to a general analysis of their 
style of thought. Then try to alter their style indirectly by setting an example 
or directly by talking with them about it.  
Expect novelty, try to find ways in which the categories discussed in 
chapter five do not fit, and develop new ones. 
 
2. Emotion and Judgment: 
Take two emotions you experience with intensity, one you cherish and 
one you would like to avoid. Reflect on each with care and try to say in 
detail what its "intentional" component is. What beliefs does it involve? 
How? What physiological changes are associated with it? Now reflect 
critically on those beliefs. How true are they and what makes them true? 
Next time you start feeling the emotion, keep thinking. 
 
3. Models of Action: 
a. Take something you are doing that is important to you. Try to 
describe it rigorously as one of a group of instrumental actions. What 
precisely are your goals? What are your means and why do you believe these 
will accomplish your ends?  
Is this difficult to do? Why? What is left out or left vague? 
b. Now take the same activity and try to describe it as an expression, 
project or practice. Use the categories discussed in Part III to try to cultivate 
it. (For example, try using three different working "scripts" to characterize 
the setting, your role, the plot, the key themes, and the author's point of 
view.) 
 
4. Methods of Research: 
a. Take some practice you have pursued for a while and read several 
articles or a book about it written by a social scientist operating with the 
Galilean model. What do you learn from them? How does it relate to what 
you already know? (One place to start would be with an activity like flirting, 
courting, or parenting and some articles from Psychology Today, or, even 
better, the original journal articles on which the magazine essays are based.) 
b. Read a study of some practice or institution and reflect carefully on 
the extent to which it employs the Galilean model or the critical 
participatory account of social knowledge. Make notes in the margins 
identifying uses of key categories. Then consider how much of the argument 
of Part III seems correct. (One useful trio of books to start with would be the 
following, which all deal—in different ways—with negotiation: Jeffrey 
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Rubin and Bert Brown's The Social Psychology of Bargaining and 
Negotiation, Academic Press, NY, NY 1975; Howard Raiffa's The Art and 
Science of Negotiation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982, 
and Roger Fisher and William Ury's Getting to Yes. Penguin Books, NY, 
1981. The first uses a Galilean method, the third uses a critical participatory 
method, and the second something in between—because it employs decision 
theory of the sort found in economics which, as explained in chapter 12, may 
seem Galilean in method though it is not.) 
c. Take some community you are involved in and develop a critical 
participatory theory of its central practice or practices. Write it up, share it, 
and see how it goes over. 
d. Take a profession with which you are involved (either as a 
professional yourself or as a recipient of professional service) and consider 
how conflict categories are employed in it and how alternatives could be 
developed and used. (If you are ambitious, you might draw on some of the 
techniques described in Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed and 
employ them to make a systematic study of this profession—forming 
discussion groups that dialogue about pictures or audio tapes that provide 
"codifications" of experience, searching "generative themes," and so on.) 
 
5. Practices of Peace: 
a. Try employing the Quaker process of consensus in the context of 
your own family or some other small group. Use it, for instance, in deciding 
on some life style issue or a career choice. 
b. Try applying "principled negotiation" in bargaining for a new 
house, a new job, or a raise—or take some dispute in which you are not 
directly involved (such as a neighborhood dispute over zoning)—and enter 
as a third party mediator using the "single text" procedure. 
c. The application of Gandhi's method calls for patient and systematic 
work; we cannot just "give it a whirl next Saturday." However, many of the 
skills involved can be practiced in everyday contexts of a wide variety of 
sorts. A good place to begin in thinking about this is the Resource Manual 
for a Living Revolution by Virginia Coover, et al. 
 
6. Shortcomings of This Book: 
a. One of the things this book does not do is offer any concrete, 
systematic scenarios for altering institutions in the United States. To develop 
one, you might consider some particular arena of foreign policy such as 
Central America and try to think out—and implement—fundamental 
changes. For example, suppose that Central America was set aside as an 
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experimental zone in which the U.S. chose to develop a kind of "peace-
industrial complex" in its foreign policy. What institutions and practices 
might be developed to deal with issues of national security and economic 
development? (For example, how might we substitute civilian-based, non-
violent defense for military defense systems? How might a Contadora 
process of negotiation displace traditional styles of State Department 
diplomacy? How might private sector profit and non-profit organizations be 
encouraged to develop and play appropriate roles in U.S. foreign affairs in 
the region?) 
b. Theoretically minded readers might choose to try to remedy 
shortcomings in this book's treatment of the role of narrative understanding 
in the cultivation of projects. Or they might address its failure to formulate a 
theory of critical participatory research which assimilates recent work by 
writers like Michel Foucault. Or they might consider carefully whether the 
proposal for dealing with metaphysical issues (by living with them as open 
questions to which we give transitional answers) makes sense in fact and can 
be applied in the cases not discussed at any length here (such as the relations 
between the realms of trans-historical emergent objective truth presupposed 
in the practice of peace and the realm of fact and natural law presupposed in 
physical science). Or they might consider whether this book actually 
succeeds—as it claims to do—in employing the method of critical 
participatory research which it advocates. 
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